Lucas Berger
fa71cf1a30
LIST-03 collation gap closed, T-04-05 + T-04-08 closed by plan 04-07. Phase 04 sign-off complete.
134 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
134 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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phase: 4
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slug: shared-lists-live-sync
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status: verified
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threats_open: 0
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asvs_level: 1
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created: 2026-06-09
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closed: 2026-06-09
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---
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# Phase 4 — Security
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> Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail.
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> Register authored at plan time (`register_authored_at_plan_time: true`); this audit
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> VERIFIES each declared mitigation against implemented code — it does not scan for new
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> threat classes.
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---
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## Trust Boundaries
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| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
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|----------|-------------|---------------|
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| Browser → API (`/api/*`) | OIDC session cookie (Authelia) or dev-bypass; all list/item routes gated | List names, item text, sharing state |
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| API → MariaDB | Drizzle parameterized queries (mysql2) | List/item/share rows |
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| API → SSE clients | `GET /api/sse/lists` per-list-channel fan-out, scoped by `getAccessibleListIds` | Minimal `{type, listId, payload}` event envelopes |
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| npm registry → build | New deps (react-router, dnd-kit, fractional-indexing) installed during phase | Third-party source |
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---
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## Threat Register
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| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
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|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|------------|--------|
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| T-04-01 | Tampering | drizzle-kit push truncating populated tables | mitigate | generate+migrate only; `0001_lists_schema.sql` and `0002_yielding_mattie_franklin.sql` are additive (CREATE TABLE / ALTER TABLE MODIFY), no DROP/TRUNCATE | closed |
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| T-04-01b | Spoofing/AuthZ | unauthenticated SSE subscription | mitigate | `resolveUserId → 401`; endpoint behind OIDC middleware; client `withCredentials` | closed |
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| T-04-02 | Information Disclosure | scoped fan-out leak (D-04) — load-bearing | mitigate | per-list channel `list:${listId}` + `getAccessibleListIds`; GET /api/lists scoped | closed |
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| T-04-03 | Information Disclosure | getAccessibleListIds over-returning ids | mitigate | scoped to owner_id OR list_shares.userId; deduped via Set | closed |
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| T-04-04 | Denial of Service | EventEmitter max-listeners | accept | `setMaxListeners(200)` headroom | closed (accepted) |
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| T-04-05 | Elevation of Privilege | accessing/mutating another member's list via direct id | mitigate | `checkListAccess` on every list + item handler; DELETE list owner-only; 403 otherwise; `isShared` reconciliation now owner-gated at `lists.ts:336` (plan 04-07) | closed |
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| T-04-06 | Tampering | XSS via list name / item text | mitigate | plain-text JSX children only; no `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in ListCard/ItemRow | closed |
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| T-04-07 | Tampering | overposting on PATCH | mitigate | zod `patchListSchema` (name/isShared) + `patchItemSchema` exactly-one-of(checked/text/position) | closed |
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| T-04-08 | Elevation of Privilege | self-adding to / manipulating list_shares | mitigate | Owner-only guard at `lists.ts:336`: `if (patch.isShared !== undefined && !access.isOwner) return 403`. A non-owner sharee can no longer delete or insert `list_shares` via PATCH `{ isShared }`. Verified by two negative tests (`lists.test.ts:452`, `lists.test.ts:477`): sharee → 403 + `list_shares` unchanged. (plan 04-07) | closed |
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| T-04-09 | Tampering | resurrecting a deleted item via in-flight edit (D-09) | mitigate | DELETE final; PATCH fetches row first, 404 if missing; no upsert path | closed |
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| T-04-10 | Denial of Service | pathological zipper inserts growing rank | accept | VARCHAR(255) headroom; fractional-indexing graceful degradation | closed (accepted) |
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| T-04-11 | Denial of Service | EventSource reconnect storm | mitigate | `es.close()` before setTimeout; bounded backoff; give up after `MAX_ATTEMPTS=6` | closed |
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| T-04-12 | Information Disclosure | over-broad SSE event payload | mitigate | payload is `{type, listId, payload:{id,...}}` minimal; per-channel scoped | closed |
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| T-04-SC | Tampering | npm supply chain (react-router, dnd-kit, fractional-indexing) | mitigate | RESEARCH legitimacy audit + blocking human checkpoint (04-01 Task 1) before install | closed |
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*Status: open · closed*
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*Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)*
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---
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## Closed Threat Detail (Plan 04-07)
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### T-04-08 — Sharee can rewrite list_shares via PATCH `isShared` — CLOSED
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**Closed by:** plan 04-07 (`c0bd6d7`)
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**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/lists.ts:334-338`
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The owner-only guard was added immediately after the `checkListAccess` block and before any `updateValues` construction:
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```ts
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// T-04-08 / T-04-05: owner-only guard for isShared mutations.
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// A sharee may rename a list (patch.name) but must never mutate list_shares.
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if (patch.isShared !== undefined && !access.isOwner) {
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return c.json({ error: 'Only the list owner can change sharing settings' }, 403)
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}
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```
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**Test coverage (WR-04 now covered):**
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- `lists.test.ts:452` — sharee sends `{ isShared: false }` → 403; `list_shares` row still exists (length 1). Proves the `db.delete(listShares)` path is unreachable for non-owners.
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- `lists.test.ts:477` — sharee sends `{ isShared: true }` → 403; share count unchanged. Proves the `db.insert(listShares)` path is unreachable for non-owners.
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- Pre-existing owner-toggle tests (false→true, true→false) and sharee-rename test continue to pass.
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### T-04-05 — isShared reconciliation runs for any allowed user — CLOSED
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The shared root cause with T-04-08 (no `access.isOwner` guard on the reconciliation block) is resolved by the same guard. All other T-04-05 paths (GET/POST-item/PATCH-text/DELETE gated via `checkListAccess`) were already correct and remain so.
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---
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## Audit Observations (non-blocking, from 04-REVIEW.md)
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These are not declared threats in the register; recorded for traceability. They do not change
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any threat disposition under `block_on: high`.
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- **CR-03 — `Number(c.req.param(...))` → NaN unguarded** (`lists.ts:323,407,459,521,569,663`).
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Invalid path params (`/api/lists/abc`) coerce to `WHERE id = NaN` (MariaDB → effectively 0)
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rather than returning 400. Behavior is benign-by-accident (empty/404 responses) and does not
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defeat any declared mitigation (access checks still run against a non-matching id), so it is
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not a BLOCKER here — but it is fragile input handling that should be hardened with an
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`Number.isInteger` guard. Does not open a new threat class.
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- **CR-02 — stale SSE subscription scope** (`sse.ts:85-121`): availability/UX gap (newly shared
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lists not delivered live until poll fallback), not a confidentiality leak — does not affect
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T-04-02 (scope is computed correctly, just not refreshed). Non-security.
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- **WR-01/WR-02 — async SSE listener + cleanup-after-loop** (`sse.ts:96-119`): listener-leak /
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unhandled-rejection robustness. Relevant to T-04-04 DoS posture but within the accepted
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`setMaxListeners(200)` envelope; not a register threat.
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- **WR-03 — `position` accepts any 1..255 string** (`lists.ts:113`): no fractional-indexing
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format validation. T-04-07 (overposting / field whitelist) is still satisfied — exactly-one-field
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refine holds. Malformed-rank robustness is an integrity hardening item, not the declared threat.
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---
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## Accepted Risks Log
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| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
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|---------|------------|-----------|-------------|------|
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| AR-04-04 | T-04-04 | Single-process household app; `setMaxListeners(200)` (100 members × 2 devices) is generous headroom; Redis fan-out deferred (D-18) | Plan (04-02) | 2026-06-09 |
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| AR-04-10 | T-04-10 | VARCHAR(255) rank headroom; fractional-indexing degrades gracefully; rebalance via generateNKeysBetween available if ever needed (out of scope) | Plan (04-05) | 2026-06-09 |
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*Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.*
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---
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## Security Audit Trail
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| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
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|------------|---------------|--------|------|--------|
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| 2026-06-09 | 14 | 13 | 1 | gsd-security-auditor |
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| 2026-06-09 | 14 | 14 | 0 | gsd-verifier (re-verification after plan 04-07) |
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---
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## Sign-Off
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- [x] All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
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- [x] Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
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- [x] `threats_open: 0` confirmed
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- [x] `status: verified` set in frontmatter
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**Approval:** APPROVED — all 14 threats closed; T-04-08 and T-04-05 closed by plan 04-07 owner guard + negative tests.
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