- Fill setupRouter: GET /status, POST /config, POST /validate/{db,oidc,vapid},
POST /credential, POST /complete (SETUP-01/02)
- isSetupLocked() is FIRST statement in every handler; returns 423 if locked (SETUP-04/D-10)
- /status uses isSetupLocked() directly: covers both explicit + effective-config branches
- /config: zod-validates {oidcIssuer:https, oidcClientId, vapidPublicKey, appExternalUrl};
upserts oidc_issuer|oidc_client_id|vapid_public_key|app_external_url into app_config
- /validate/db: db.execute(sql`SELECT 1`); 200 ok, 503 on failure
- /validate/oidc: fetches discovery doc with AbortSignal.timeout(5000); reads oidc_issuer
from app_config; 200 ok, 400 on unreachable/non-2xx
- /validate/vapid: webpush.setVapidDetails() structural check; reads ONLY from process.env
(VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY never from app_config, never returned; T-12-06/SC-3)
- /credential: inserts local user (oidcIss=null, claimed=false, isAdmin=true) FIRST
(Pitfall 5 FK), then calls validateEncryptAndStoreCredential(); noEchoHook + error map
- /complete: upserts setup_complete='true'; 200 first call, 423 second (Pitfall 8/D-10)
- Mount setupRouter pre-auth in index.ts BEFORE devAuthBypass() (T-12-09/Pitfall 1)
- All 394 tests pass (5 todo = D-08 RED scaffolds); typecheck clean
162 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript
162 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { serve } from '@hono/node-server';
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import { serveStatic } from '@hono/node-server/serve-static';
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import { Hono } from 'hono';
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import { healthRouter } from './routes/health.js';
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import { meRouter } from './routes/me.js';
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import { eventsRouter } from './routes/events.js';
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import { sseRouter } from './routes/sse.js';
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import { listsRouter, listItemsRouter } from './routes/lists.js';
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import { pushRouter } from './routes/push.js';
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import { adminRouter } from './routes/admin.js';
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import { setupRouter } from './routes/setup.js';
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import { oidcAuthMiddleware, processOAuthCallback } from './auth/middleware.js';
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import { devAuthBypass } from './auth/devBypass.js';
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import { persistSessionCookie } from './auth/persistSessionCookie.js';
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import { startBrokerPoller } from './broker/poller.js';
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import { startOutboxWorker, initOutboxTrigger } from './broker/outboxWorker.js';
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import { startReminderScheduler } from './broker/reminderScheduler.js';
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import { assertNotDevBypassInProduction } from './lib/bootGuards.js';
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import webpush from 'web-push';
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export const app = new Hono();
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// Compute once at startup: bypass is active only in non-production with explicit opt-in.
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// In production NODE_ENV='production' → devBypassActive=false → OIDC is always mounted.
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const devBypassActive =
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process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production' && process.env.DEV_AUTH_BYPASS === 'true';
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if (devBypassActive) {
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console.warn('⚠ DEV_AUTH_BYPASS active — OIDC guard DISABLED. Never use in production.');
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}
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// OIDC callback — must be registered BEFORE oidcAuthMiddleware so the
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// authorization-code exchange is not itself intercepted by the auth check (T-02-02)
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app.get('/callback', (c) => processOAuthCallback(c));
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// GET /health — unauthenticated, mounted BEFORE the OIDC guard (T-01-03, T-02-05)
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app.route('/health', healthRouter);
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// /api/setup/* — pre-auth wizard surface; mounted BEFORE the /api/* middleware chain
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// so the wizard is never caught by devAuthBypass or oidcAuthMiddleware (Pitfall 1 / T-12-09).
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// Mirrors the /health pre-auth pattern. isSetupLocked() in each handler provides the
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// 423 lock after setup is complete (SETUP-04 / D-10).
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app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter);
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// Dev-auth bypass — no-op passthrough unless DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true AND NODE_ENV!='production'.
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// When active, injects DEV_USER into the Hono context and the OIDC guard is NOT mounted.
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// Must be mounted BEFORE oidcAuthMiddleware (T-02-01 mitigation; see auth/devBypass.ts).
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app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass());
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// Protect all /api/* routes with OIDC session middleware (AUTH-01, T-02-05).
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// Skipped entirely when devBypassActive so that local dev works without Authelia.
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// In production devBypassActive is always false — OIDC is unconditionally mounted.
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// Unauthenticated requests receive a 302 redirect to Authelia's authorize endpoint.
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// OIDC_AUTH_EXTERNAL_URL is MANDATORY behind Pangolin to construct the correct
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// redirect_uri (Pitfall 1). Set it to https://familysync.<domain>.
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if (!devBypassActive) {
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app.use('/api/*', oidcAuthMiddleware());
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// Re-issues the session-scoped oidc-auth cookie as persistent so PWA sessions survive close (AUTH-02).
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app.use('/api/*', persistSessionCookie());
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}
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// Protected API routes (behind oidcAuthMiddleware)
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// GET /api/login — login entry point for the PWA.
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// Flow (production): unauthenticated top-level nav hits the OIDC guard above,
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// which 302-redirects to Authelia. After login, Authelia POSTs to /callback,
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// the middleware sets a `continue` cookie pointing back to /api/login, and the
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// browser follows it here — now authenticated. The handler then redirects to /
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// so the SPA boots with a valid session. Under DEV_AUTH_BYPASS the guard is not
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// mounted, so /api/login reaches this handler directly and still redirects to /.
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app.get('/api/login', (c) => c.redirect('/'));
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app.route('/api/me', meRouter);
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app.route('/api/events', eventsRouter);
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app.route('/api/sse', sseRouter);
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app.route('/api/lists', listsRouter);
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app.route('/api/list-items', listItemsRouter);
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app.route('/api/push', pushRouter);
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app.route('/api/admin', adminRouter);
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// WR-04: background worker startup (cron schedules) moved into the isMainModule()
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// guard below. Calling them at top level registered real node-cron schedules whenever
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// ./index.js was imported — the route tests import `app` from here, so the poller/outbox
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// drain fired during the test run, touched the mocked DB/CalDAV layers nondeterministically,
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// and left open handles that blocked clean process exit. They now start only when the
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// module is the process entrypoint.
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// Serve React PWA static assets from ./public (Vite build output).
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// MUST serve the whole ./public tree, not just /assets/* — root-level PWA files
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// (manifest.webmanifest, sw.js, registerSW.js, workbox-*.js, icon-*.png,
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// apple-touch-icon.png) live at the root. serveStatic calls next() when a file
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// is not found, so SPA routes fall through to the index.html catch-all below.
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// (Registered AFTER /health, /api/*, and /callback, so those win.)
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app.use('/*', serveStatic({ root: './public' }));
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app.get('*', serveStatic({ path: './public/index.html' }));
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/**
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* True only when this module is the process entrypoint (run directly), not when it
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* is imported (e.g. by route tests that import `app`).
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*
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* WR-05: the previous basename-tail comparison
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* import.meta.url.endsWith(process.argv[1].replace(/^.*\//, ''))
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* was fragile — a symlinked entrypoint or a differently-located file sharing the same
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* basename could make it mis-fire (start the server during an unrelated import, or fail
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* to start it in production). Compare fully-resolved real paths instead. realpathSync
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* resolves symlinks on argv[1]; fileURLToPath turns the module URL into a real path.
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*/
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function isMainModule(): boolean {
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if (!process.argv[1]) return false;
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try {
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// eslint-disable-next-line security/detect-non-literal-fs-filename -- process.argv[1] is the Node runtime entry path, not user input
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return fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === realpathSync(process.argv[1]);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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// Only start the HTTP server AND background workers when this module is run directly
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// (not imported in tests). WR-04: gating the cron schedules here keeps them out of the
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// test process.
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if (isMainModule()) {
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// D-08: Production safety guard — must be FIRST, before VAPID config, workers, or serve().
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assertNotDevBypassInProduction();
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// Configure VAPID credentials for web-push before starting background workers.
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// VAPID_SUBJECT must be a mailto: or https: URL identifying the operator.
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// The private key is NEVER served to clients; it signs push requests server-side only.
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const vapidSubject = process.env.VAPID_SUBJECT ?? '';
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const vapidPublicKey = process.env.VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY ?? '';
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const vapidPrivateKey = process.env.VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY ?? '';
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if (vapidSubject && vapidPublicKey && vapidPrivateKey) {
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try {
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webpush.setVapidDetails(vapidSubject, vapidPublicKey, vapidPrivateKey);
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} catch (err) {
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console.warn(
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'[startup] setVapidDetails failed — push notifications will not work:',
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err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
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);
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}
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} else {
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console.warn(
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'[startup] VAPID env vars not set — push notifications will fail. Set VAPID_SUBJECT, VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY, VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY.',
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);
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}
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// Start the CalDAV broker poller (5-min cron, D-13 ctag change-detection).
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// Runs in the background — errors are caught and logged per-credential (T-03-04).
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startBrokerPoller();
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// Drain the D-05 outbox every 15s: dispatches pending CalDAV writes to Fastmail.
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startOutboxWorker();
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initOutboxTrigger(); // subscribe drain signal listener (D-01)
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// Start the 1-min reminder scan for shared timed events starting in ~15 min (NOTIF-01).
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// VAPID must be configured (above) before this starts or push sends will fail.
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startReminderScheduler();
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serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: 3000 }, (info) => {
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console.log(`FamilySync API running on http://localhost:${info.port}`);
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});
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}
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