familysync/.planning/milestones/v1.1-phases/12-initial-setup-wizard/12-SECURITY.md

phase, audited, status, asvs_level, block_on, register_authored_at_plan_time, threats_total, threats_closed, threats_open, threats_mitigate_verified, threats_accepted, supply_chain_checks

phase	audited	status	asvs_level	block_on	register_authored_at_plan_time	threats_total	threats_closed	threats_open	threats_mitigate_verified	threats_accepted	supply_chain_checks
12-initial-setup-wizard	2026-06-15	secured	2	high	true	15	15	0	12	3	1

Phase 12 — Initial Setup Wizard: Security Audit

Audited: 2026-06-15 ASVS Level: 2 block_on: high Compared against: main...HEAD Status: SECURED — 15/15 threats resolved (12 mitigate verified, 3 accept documented)

This audit verifies each declared threat mitigation EXISTS in the implemented code. It does not scan for new vulnerabilities beyond the register. Implementation files were not modified. Note: T-12-07 and T-12-10 are tracked as one accepted-risk entry per the register grouping, so the 15 register rows map to 14 IDs.

Threat Verification

Threat ID	Category	Disposition	Status	Evidence
T-12-01	Information Disclosure	mitigate	CLOSED	scripts/generate-secrets.mjs emits only via console.log (:31-40). No writeFile/appendFile/fetch/db import anywhere in file; sole imports are web-push and node:crypto.randomBytes (:23-25). Secrets never persisted.
T-12-02	Tampering	mitigate	CLOSED	0002_lethal_millenium_guard.sql uses MODIFY COLUMN (:1-2), never DROP; adds claimed (:3); backfills UPDATE users SET claimed = true WHERE oidc_iss IS NOT NULL (:6). Migration shipped via drizzle-kit generate (meta/0002_snapshot.json, _journal.json present), not push.
T-12-03	Information Disclosure	mitigate	CLOSED	schema.ts appConfig (:306-310) has no column/key for vapid_private_key or app_password_encryption_key; explicit PROHIBITION comment (:300-303). Grep confirms no app_config insert of secret material across apps/api/src.
T-12-04	Tampering	mitigate	CLOSED	isSetupLocked() is the FIRST statement returning 423 in every mutating handler: /config (setup.ts:101-102), /validate/db (:137-138), /validate/oidc (:159-160), /validate/vapid (:199-200), /credential (:244-245), /complete (:318-319). Guard re-reads DB per call, no module-level cache (setupGuard.ts:26-39).
T-12-05	Information Disclosure	mitigate	CLOSED	noEchoHook returns { error: 'Invalid request' } only, no Zod detail (setup.ts:49-53), wired on /credential (:243). CredentialValidationError → generic 400 (:294-296). No console.* of appPassword/c.req.valid (:248 explicit no-log comment; only err.message/string logged at :299-302). Helper credentialSync.ts:63-67 never logs password.
T-12-06	Information Disclosure	mitigate	CLOSED	/validate/vapid reads both keys ONLY from process.env (setup.ts:202-203); returns only { ok: true } (:218) or generic message (:220-224); private key never in any response. No app_config key for VAPID private key (T-12-03 evidence).
T-12-07 / T-12-10	Spoofing	accept	CLOSED	Accepted risk logged below. Claim query is strictly isNull(users.oidcIss) AND claimed=false LIMIT 1 (user.ts:112-116) — no email match. OIDC reach requires Authelia membership (D-08). Two-person household → one pending row. See residual-risk note RR-1.
T-12-08	Tampering (SSRF)	mitigate	CLOSED	configSchema.oidcIssuer refined startsWith('https://') (setup.ts:63). /validate/oidc discovery fetch uses AbortSignal.timeout(5000) (:175-176). See finding F-1 (error-message leakage, IN-03) — bounded, non-blocking.
T-12-09	Tampering	mitigate	CLOSED	index.ts mounts app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter) (:49) BEFORE app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass()) (:54), oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware/oidcAuthMiddleware() (:69-70). Setup surface never reaches the OIDC 302 guard.
T-12-11	Elevation of Privilege	mitigate	CLOSED	shouldBeAdmin = flagRow?.value !== 'true' && Number(count) === 0 (user.ts:156). Post-setup logins (setup_complete='true') cannot self-promote. Claim path preserves wizard-set is_admin, does not overwrite (:121-130, comment :120).
T-12-12	Tampering	mitigate	CLOSED	No claims.email/users.email in claim path; match is identity-null + claimed-false only (user.ts:112-116). Identity upsert keys on (oidcIss, oidcSub) (:78-82), never email. deriveDisplayName uses email only as a display hint, never for identity (:56-64).
T-12-13	Information Disclosure	mitigate	CLOSED	Wizard has no generate-secrets step; Step 2 collects only non-secret VAPID public key (SetupPage.tsx:614-631, field vapidPublicKey). No SESSION_SECRET / encryption key / VAPID private key referenced in SetupPage.tsx or client.ts payloads (SetupConfigPayload is public-only, client.ts:550-555).
T-12-14	Tampering (XSS)	mitigate	CLOSED	No dangerouslySetInnerHTML in SetupPage.tsx (grep across apps/pwa/src shows zero usages — only doc comments elsewhere). All copy and config values rendered as plain-text JSX children.
T-12-15	Information Disclosure	mitigate	CLOSED	App password input is type="password" (SetupPage.tsx:836), autoComplete="new-password" (:837). Server-side noEchoHook (T-12-05). Password held only in transient form state, never persisted client-side.
T-12-SC	Tampering (supply chain)	accept	CLOSED	git diff main...HEAD of package.json adds ONLY a script entry (generate-secrets), no dependencies/devDependencies change; no apps/**/package.json or lockfile change in branch diff. web-push/node:crypto/lucide-react/react-query/react-router already present. Accepted risk logged below.

Lead Assessment (from 12-REVIEW.md known overlap)

The auditing prompt flagged four prior-review items as leads bearing on the register. Verdicts:

• WR-04 (appExternalUrl no https refine) → does NOT defeat T-12-08. T-12-08's scope is the OIDC issuer SSRF surface, and oidcIssuer IS https-refined (setup.ts:63). The SSRF fetch target (/validate/oidc) uses oidc_issuer only, never app_external_url. So the declared T-12-08 mitigation is intact. Separately, appExternalUrl is .url().max(512) with no scheme refine (setup.ts:66); it is consumed only as OIDC_AUTH_EXTERNAL_URL to build the redirect base. An http:// value is an operator-self-inflicted misconfig (OIDC login fails closed at Authelia), not an attacker-controlled open-redirect — the value is operator- supplied during a one-time, lock-gated setup, not a per-request user input. Tracked as hardening F-2, not an open threat.

• IN-03 (validate/oidc echoes raw network error) → bounded info-disclosure, does NOT defeat T-12-08. The 5s timeout is present and verified (setup.ts:175-176). The error string at :182-185 can surface internal ECONNREFUSED <ip>:<port> to the pre-auth client. T-12-08's declared mitigation (https validation + server-side fetch + 5s timeout) is fully present; the leak is a residual disclosure the register did not call out as in-scope. For a self-hosted, single-operator, lock-gated setup endpoint the exposure window/audience is the operator themselves. Tracked as hardening F-1 (recommended, non-blocking at ASVS L2 for this context).

• WR-02 (TOCTOU: two concurrent /credential POSTs → two unclaimed admin rows) → weakens the robustness of the "exactly one pending user" assumption but does NOT defeat the accepted T-12-07/T-12-10 spoofing property. Both racing inserts are performed BY THE OPERATOR during their own setup window; both rows are isAdmin=true and represent the operator's own intent. The claim binds the first OIDC login (which still must be an Authelia-authorized member, D-08) to one of two operator-owned rows — it does not let an external/wrong principal claim an identity. The second row becomes an orphaned admin (a correctness/cleanup defect, also WR-01), not a privilege-escalation or spoofing vector. Recorded as residual risk RR-1. Recommend the WR-02 check-before-insert (or DB transaction) fix to restore the single-pending-row invariant.

• WR-05 (oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware permanently mutates process.env) → no security impact on this register. The injected values are the non-secret OIDC issuer / client_id / external URL (D-01), the same values that would otherwise be set as env. No secret is written to process.env by this path (middleware.ts:85-87). The "stale after wizard re-run" behavior is an operability concern, not a confidentiality/integrity threat. No register threat depends on re-reading these post-first-request.

Accepted Risks Log

• T-12-07 / T-12-10 — first-login-claims binds the wrong principal (Spoofing). Accepted per D-08. The claim query matches purely on oidc_iss IS NULL AND claimed=false and binds the first OIDC login to the single pending wizard row. Soundness rests on: (a) OIDC reach is gated by Authelia membership (only household members can authenticate at all), and (b) a two-person household has exactly one pending unclaimed row at first login. No email coupling (T-12-12) means a leaked/guessed email cannot influence the binding. Accepted as sound for the two-person, Authelia-fronted deployment. Residual robustness caveat: see RR-1.

• T-12-SC — supply-chain / dependency install. Accepted: zero runtime/dev dependencies added this phase (verified by git diff main...HEAD -- package.json: only a scripts entry added). No new attack surface from third-party packages.

• (implicit) generate-secrets operator handling. Per SC-3, secrets are printed to stdout and the operator is responsible for safe handling (paste into docker-compose env). The script itself never persists them (T-12-01). Accepted: operator-custody model is the documented trust boundary.

Residual Risks (non-blocking, recommended hardening)

• RR-1 (WR-02): Concurrent /credential POSTs can create a second orphaned unclaimed admin row, weakening the "exactly one pending user" invariant behind the accepted T-12-07/10 risk. Not exploitable for cross-principal spoofing/escalation (both rows are operator-owned), but recommend the check-before-insert / transaction fix from 12-REVIEW WR-02. Combine with WR-01 (roll back insert when post-insert re-select returns nothing) to fully close the orphan path.
• F-1 (IN-03): /validate/oidc returns raw network error detail (possible internal IP/port) to the pre-auth client. Recommend returning a generic message and logging detail server-side.
• F-2 (WR-04): Add .refine(startsWith('https://')) to appExternalUrl to fail fast on a mistyped http:// redirect base. Operability hardening; not attacker-controlled.

Unregistered Flags

None. No ## Threat Flags section exists in any 12-*-SUMMARY.md; no new attack surface appeared during implementation that lacks a register mapping.

Files Audited

• apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts
• apps/api/src/lib/setupGuard.ts
• apps/api/src/index.ts
• apps/api/src/auth/user.ts
• apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts
• apps/api/src/broker/credentialSync.ts
• apps/api/src/db/schema.ts
• apps/api/src/db/migrations/0002_lethal_millenium_guard.sql
• scripts/generate-secrets.mjs
• apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx
• apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts
• package.json (supply-chain diff)

Audited: 2026-06-15 — gsd-security-auditor. Implementation files unchanged (read-only).