Lucas Berger
27046dbf92
- Static assertions step: verifies .dockerignore exists, covers all forbidden patterns (.env, node_modules, apps/api/scripts, .git, .planning, apps/api/tests, apps/pwa/e2e), and --target production is still pinned in publish.yml (T-16-19) - Boot-smoke step: runs freshly-built sha_tag image with NODE_ENV=production + DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true; fails if image starts (EXIT==0) or times out (EXIT==124), passes on any other non-zero exit — proves D-08 guard fires in shipped image (T-16-18) - Both steps ordered after build and before push; a hygiene failure blocks publish (T-16-20)
156 lines
7.3 KiB
YAML
156 lines
7.3 KiB
YAML
# Publishing / Releases
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#
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# Trigger: push to main — i.e. when any PR merges.
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# Image: git.bergerhouse.net/luckberg/familysync-api
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# Tags:
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# :latest — moving pointer for easy pulls
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# :<MILESTONE>-<shortsha> — immutable, rollback-traceable (e.g. v1.1-98acff8)
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#
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# Required secret: REGISTRY_PAT — a Gitea Actions secret holding a PAT with write:package scope.
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# Named REGISTRY_PAT (not GITEA_*): Gitea reserves the GITEA_ prefix for secret names, so
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# GITEA_-prefixed names cannot be created. GITEA_TOKEN / GITHUB_TOKEN cannot push packages.
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#
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# Safety gate: branch protection on main, NOT a needs: dependency in this file.
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# The PR test jobs (fast-checks, api, harness, gate in ci.yml) run on pull_request — they
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# never run in the same workflow invocation as publish.yml. Tests gate the PR; main is
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# trusted to be green because direct push and force push are blocked and the two required
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# checks (CI / fast-checks, CI / gate) must pass before merge. CI / api and CI / harness
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# are conditionally skipped on doc-only PRs and are gated via the always-running CI / gate
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# aggregate rather than being required directly.
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#
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# To bump the milestone tag at a milestone boundary: edit MILESTONE below.
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name: Publish
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on:
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push:
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branches: [main]
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env:
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MILESTONE: v1.1
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jobs:
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publish:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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# Compute both image tags per D-04:
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# :latest — moving pointer for easy pulls
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# :<milestone>-<shortsha> — immutable, rollback-traceable (e.g. v1.1-4303a1b)
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# GITHUB_SHA is confirmed available in Gitea Actions (probe P-13).
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# MILESTONE is read from the workflow-level env var (set to v1.1 above) — update at milestone boundaries.
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- name: Compute image tags
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id: tags
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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# Fail closed if GITHUB_SHA is empty/unset (Gitea runner env parity is not
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# guaranteed across versions). Without this guard SHORT_SHA degrades to ""
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# and the immutable tag silently becomes :v1.1- — a valid-but-wrong tag that
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# overwrites the milestone pointer and destroys rollback traceability (WR-03).
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: "${GITHUB_SHA:?GITHUB_SHA is empty — refusing to build a malformed image tag}"
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SHORT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA:0:7}
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MILESTONE="${{ env.MILESTONE }}"
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echo "latest=git.bergerhouse.net/luckberg/familysync-api:latest" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
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echo "sha_tag=git.bergerhouse.net/luckberg/familysync-api:${MILESTONE}-${SHORT_SHA}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
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# Pitfall 13 (load-bearing security step): PAT piped via stdin — never via -p/--password.
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# GITEA_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN cannot push packages; a PAT with write:package scope is required
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# (confirmed: Gitea forum + registry docs). Token is masked by Gitea's secret-log scrubber
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# and never echoed elsewhere or set as a plain env var.
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# Secret is named REGISTRY_PAT (not GITEA_REGISTRY_PAT): Gitea reserves the GITEA_ prefix
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# for secret names, so the GITEA_-prefixed name cannot be created.
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- name: Docker login
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# Bind the secret through env: so it is never substituted into the rendered
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# script body. Read it as $REGISTRY_PAT and pipe with printf '%s' (echo is not
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# safe for arbitrary strings — a trailing newline or shell-significant char
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# would mangle the password into a confusing `unauthorized`) (WR-05).
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env:
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REGISTRY_PAT: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PAT }}
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_PAT" | \
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docker login git.bergerhouse.net \
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--username luckberg \
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--password-stdin
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# Build from REPO ROOT (T-08-10): the Dockerfile copies the pnpm workspace manifest +
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# lockfile from the root context; building from apps/api/ would fail to find them.
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- name: Build production image
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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docker build --target production \
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-f apps/api/Dockerfile \
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-t ${{ steps.tags.outputs.latest }} \
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-t ${{ steps.tags.outputs.sha_tag }} \
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.
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# ── D-10 image hygiene assertions — run AFTER build, BEFORE push ───────────
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# A failure here stops the job before any push, so a regressed image can
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# never be published (T-16-18 / T-16-19 / T-16-20).
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- name: Image hygiene — static assertions
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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# Assert .dockerignore exists
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if [ ! -f ".dockerignore" ]; then
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echo "FAIL: .dockerignore does not exist"
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exit 1
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fi
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# Assert every forbidden pattern is covered by .dockerignore
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for pattern in ".env" "node_modules" "apps/api/scripts" ".git" ".planning" "apps/api/tests" "apps/pwa/e2e"; do
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if ! grep -q "$pattern" .dockerignore; then
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echo "FAIL: .dockerignore missing pattern: $pattern"
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exit 1
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fi
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done
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# Assert this workflow still pins --target production (D-10 / T-16-19)
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if ! grep -q "\-\-target production" .gitea/workflows/publish.yml; then
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echo "FAIL: publish.yml does not build --target production"
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "Static image hygiene assertions PASSED."
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# Boot-smoke: run the freshly-built production image with the forbidden
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# NODE_ENV=production + DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true combo and assert it refuses to
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# boot — proving the D-08 guard (assertNotDevBypassInProduction) fires in
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# the ACTUAL shipped image (T-16-18 / T-16-21).
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# EXIT==0 → image started → guard NOT working → FAIL
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# EXIT==124 → timeout (15s) → guard not firing → FAIL
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# Any other non-zero exit → image refused boot → PASS
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- name: Image hygiene — boot-smoke (must refuse dev-bypass in production)
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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IMAGE="${{ steps.tags.outputs.sha_tag }}"
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set +e
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timeout 15 docker run --rm \
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--env NODE_ENV=production \
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--env DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true \
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"$IMAGE" \
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2>&1 | head -20
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EXIT=$?
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set -e
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if [ "$EXIT" -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "FAIL: Production image started successfully with DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true — guard not working"
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exit 1
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fi
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if [ "$EXIT" -eq 124 ]; then
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echo "FAIL: Production image did not exit within 15s — guard not firing"
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "PASS: Production image refused to start with DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true (exit $EXIT)"
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# Push the IMMUTABLE :<milestone>-<sha> tag FIRST. set -euo pipefail stops on
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# the first failed push, so :latest is only moved after the immutable,
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# rollback-traceable tag has landed — a failed second push can never leave
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# :latest advanced without a corresponding rollback tag (WR-04).
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- name: Push image
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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docker push ${{ steps.tags.outputs.sha_tag }} # immutable first (WR-04)
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docker push ${{ steps.tags.outputs.latest }} # move pointer only after immutable lands
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# Always drop the stored credential from the runner after push (defence in depth).
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- name: Docker logout
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if: always()
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run: docker logout git.bergerhouse.net || true
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