Files
familysync/.gitea/workflows/publish.yml
T
Lucas BergerandClaude Opus 4.8 6e93e24df0 chore(260618-tg2): BuildKit pnpm-store cache mount in Dockerfile build
Add 'RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/pnpm-store' to all 3 pnpm install
stages (builder/pwa-builder/production) with --store-dir /pnpm-store, plus
the '# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1' directive. Set DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 on the
publish build step so the legacy builder can't break on the mount syntax.
sharing=locked because builder and pwa-builder run in parallel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 21:19:45 -04:00

183 lines
9.2 KiB
YAML

# Publishing / Releases
#
# Trigger: push to main — i.e. when any PR merges — EXCEPT pushes whose changed
# files are confined to .gitea/** (CI/workflow edits) and/or .planning/** (GSD
# planning docs, which push straight to main under the unprotected .planning/*
# branch-protection pattern). Those never alter the shipped image (.dockerignore
# already excludes .planning), so the paths-ignore filter below skips a wasted
# build + re-push. A push that also touches code/Dockerfile/manifests still publishes.
# Image: git.bergerhouse.net/luckberg/familysync-api
# Tags:
# :latest — moving pointer for easy pulls
# :<MILESTONE>-<shortsha> — immutable, rollback-traceable (e.g. v1.1-98acff8)
#
# Required secret: REGISTRY_PAT — a Gitea Actions secret holding a PAT with write:package scope.
# Named REGISTRY_PAT (not GITEA_*): Gitea reserves the GITEA_ prefix for secret names, so
# GITEA_-prefixed names cannot be created. GITEA_TOKEN / GITHUB_TOKEN cannot push packages.
#
# Safety gate: branch protection on main, NOT a needs: dependency in this file.
# The PR test jobs (fast-checks, api, harness, gate in ci.yml) run on pull_request — they
# never run in the same workflow invocation as publish.yml. Tests gate the PR; main is
# trusted to be green because direct push and force push are blocked and the two required
# checks (CI / fast-checks, CI / gate) must pass before merge. CI / api and CI / harness
# are conditionally skipped on doc-only PRs and are gated via the always-running CI / gate
# aggregate rather than being required directly.
#
# To bump the milestone tag at a milestone boundary: edit MILESTONE below.
name: Publish
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# Doc/CI-only pushes produce a byte-identical image — skip the build entirely.
# paths-ignore skips the run only when EVERY changed file matches; a mixed
# push (code + .planning) still publishes.
paths-ignore:
- '.gitea/**'
- '.planning/**'
env:
MILESTONE: v1.1
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
# Compute both image tags per D-04:
# :latest — moving pointer for easy pulls
# :<milestone>-<shortsha> — immutable, rollback-traceable (e.g. v1.1-4303a1b)
# GITHUB_SHA is confirmed available in Gitea Actions (probe P-13).
# MILESTONE is read from the workflow-level env var (set to v1.1 above) — update at milestone boundaries.
- name: Compute image tags
id: tags
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Fail closed if GITHUB_SHA is empty/unset (Gitea runner env parity is not
# guaranteed across versions). Without this guard SHORT_SHA degrades to ""
# and the immutable tag silently becomes :v1.1- — a valid-but-wrong tag that
# overwrites the milestone pointer and destroys rollback traceability (WR-03).
: "${GITHUB_SHA:?GITHUB_SHA is empty — refusing to build a malformed image tag}"
SHORT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA:0:7}
MILESTONE="${{ env.MILESTONE }}"
echo "latest=git.bergerhouse.net/luckberg/familysync-api:latest" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "sha_tag=git.bergerhouse.net/luckberg/familysync-api:${MILESTONE}-${SHORT_SHA}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Pitfall 13 (load-bearing security step): PAT piped via stdin — never via -p/--password.
# GITEA_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN cannot push packages; a PAT with write:package scope is required
# (confirmed: Gitea forum + registry docs). Token is masked by Gitea's secret-log scrubber
# and never echoed elsewhere or set as a plain env var.
# Secret is named REGISTRY_PAT (not GITEA_REGISTRY_PAT): Gitea reserves the GITEA_ prefix
# for secret names, so the GITEA_-prefixed name cannot be created.
- name: Docker login
# Bind the secret through env: so it is never substituted into the rendered
# script body. Read it as $REGISTRY_PAT and pipe with printf '%s' (echo is not
# safe for arbitrary strings — a trailing newline or shell-significant char
# would mangle the password into a confusing `unauthorized`) (WR-05).
env:
REGISTRY_PAT: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PAT }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_PAT" | \
docker login git.bergerhouse.net \
--username luckberg \
--password-stdin
# Build from REPO ROOT (T-08-10): the Dockerfile copies the pnpm workspace manifest +
# lockfile from the root context; building from apps/api/ would fail to find them.
- name: Build production image
# DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 is required: the Dockerfile uses `RUN --mount=type=cache`
# (BuildKit) to persist the pnpm store across builds. The legacy builder would
# fail on that syntax. BuildKit is default on Docker 23+, set explicitly for safety.
env:
DOCKER_BUILDKIT: '1'
run: |
set -euo pipefail
docker build --target production \
-f apps/api/Dockerfile \
-t ${{ steps.tags.outputs.latest }} \
-t ${{ steps.tags.outputs.sha_tag }} \
.
# ── D-10 image hygiene assertions — run AFTER build, BEFORE push ───────────
# A failure here stops the job before any push, so a regressed image can
# never be published (T-16-18 / T-16-19 / T-16-20).
- name: Image hygiene — static assertions
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Assert .dockerignore exists
if [ ! -f ".dockerignore" ]; then
echo "FAIL: .dockerignore does not exist"
exit 1
fi
# Assert every forbidden pattern is an ACTIVE ignore rule (WR-05).
# Strip comment lines first, then fixed-string match so a commented-out
# "# .env was here" can't satisfy the check and "$pattern" is never
# treated as a regex (e.g. ".env" matching "denv").
for pattern in ".env" "node_modules" "apps/api/scripts" ".git" \
".planning" "apps/api/tests" "apps/pwa/e2e"; do
if ! grep -v '^[[:space:]]*#' .dockerignore | grep -qF "$pattern"; then
echo "FAIL: .dockerignore missing active rule: $pattern"
exit 1
fi
done
# Assert this workflow still pins --target production (D-10 / T-16-19)
if ! grep -q "\-\-target production" .gitea/workflows/publish.yml; then
echo "FAIL: publish.yml does not build --target production"
exit 1
fi
echo "Static image hygiene assertions PASSED."
# Boot-smoke: run the freshly-built production image with the forbidden
# NODE_ENV=production + DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true combo and assert it refuses to
# boot — proving the D-08 guard (assertNotDevBypassInProduction) fires in
# the ACTUAL shipped image (T-16-18 / T-16-21).
# EXIT==0 → image started → guard NOT working → FAIL
# EXIT==124 → timeout (15s) → guard not firing → FAIL
# Any other non-zero exit → image refused boot → PASS
- name: Image hygiene — boot-smoke (must refuse dev-bypass in production)
run: |
set -euo pipefail
IMAGE="${{ steps.tags.outputs.sha_tag }}"
# WR-02: capture docker's exit code DIRECTLY, not a pipeline exit. Piping
# through `head -20` would let a chatty-but-booting regressed image emit
# 20 lines, SIGPIPE docker (exit 141), and false-PASS. Capture all output
# to a variable, then print a bounded slice for the log.
set +e
OUT=$(timeout 15 docker run --rm \
--env NODE_ENV=production \
--env DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true \
"$IMAGE" 2>&1)
EXIT=$?
set -e
echo "$OUT" | head -20
# 0 (clean start) and 124 (timeout) both mean the guard did NOT refuse boot.
if [ "$EXIT" -eq 0 ] || [ "$EXIT" -eq 124 ]; then
echo "FAIL: Production image did not refuse DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true (exit $EXIT)"
exit 1
fi
# Belt-and-suspenders: require the FATAL guard marker, so a refusal for
# some UNRELATED reason cannot masquerade as the guard working.
if ! echo "$OUT" | grep -q "DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true is set in a production environment"; then
echo "FAIL: image refused boot (exit $EXIT) but NOT via the expected D-08 guard"
exit 1
fi
echo "PASS: Production image refused to start with DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true (exit $EXIT)"
# Push the IMMUTABLE :<milestone>-<sha> tag FIRST. set -euo pipefail stops on
# the first failed push, so :latest is only moved after the immutable,
# rollback-traceable tag has landed — a failed second push can never leave
# :latest advanced without a corresponding rollback tag (WR-04).
- name: Push image
run: |
set -euo pipefail
docker push ${{ steps.tags.outputs.sha_tag }} # immutable first (WR-04)
docker push ${{ steps.tags.outputs.latest }} # move pointer only after immutable lands
# Always drop the stored credential from the runner after push (defence in depth).
- name: Docker logout
if: always()
run: docker logout git.bergerhouse.net || true