import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs'; import { serve } from '@hono/node-server'; import { serveStatic } from '@hono/node-server/serve-static'; import { Hono } from 'hono'; import { healthRouter } from './routes/health.js'; import { meRouter } from './routes/me.js'; import { eventsRouter } from './routes/events.js'; import { sseRouter } from './routes/sse.js'; import { listsRouter, listItemsRouter } from './routes/lists.js'; import { pushRouter } from './routes/push.js'; import { oidcAuthMiddleware, processOAuthCallback } from './auth/middleware.js'; import { devAuthBypass } from './auth/devBypass.js'; import { persistSessionCookie } from './auth/persistSessionCookie.js'; import { startBrokerPoller } from './broker/poller.js'; import { startOutboxWorker, initOutboxTrigger } from './broker/outboxWorker.js'; import { startReminderScheduler } from './broker/reminderScheduler.js'; import webpush from 'web-push'; export const app = new Hono(); // Compute once at startup: bypass is active only in non-production with explicit opt-in. // In production NODE_ENV='production' → devBypassActive=false → OIDC is always mounted. const devBypassActive = process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production' && process.env.DEV_AUTH_BYPASS === 'true'; if (devBypassActive) { console.warn('⚠ DEV_AUTH_BYPASS active — OIDC guard DISABLED. Never use in production.'); } // OIDC callback — must be registered BEFORE oidcAuthMiddleware so the // authorization-code exchange is not itself intercepted by the auth check (T-02-02) app.get('/callback', (c) => processOAuthCallback(c)); // GET /health — unauthenticated, mounted BEFORE the OIDC guard (T-01-03, T-02-05) app.route('/health', healthRouter); // Dev-auth bypass — no-op passthrough unless DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true AND NODE_ENV!='production'. // When active, injects DEV_USER into the Hono context and the OIDC guard is NOT mounted. // Must be mounted BEFORE oidcAuthMiddleware (T-02-01 mitigation; see auth/devBypass.ts). app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass()); // Protect all /api/* routes with OIDC session middleware (AUTH-01, T-02-05). // Skipped entirely when devBypassActive so that local dev works without Authelia. // In production devBypassActive is always false — OIDC is unconditionally mounted. // Unauthenticated requests receive a 302 redirect to Authelia's authorize endpoint. // OIDC_AUTH_EXTERNAL_URL is MANDATORY behind Pangolin to construct the correct // redirect_uri (Pitfall 1). Set it to https://familysync.. if (!devBypassActive) { app.use('/api/*', oidcAuthMiddleware()); // Re-issues the session-scoped oidc-auth cookie as persistent so PWA sessions survive close (AUTH-02). app.use('/api/*', persistSessionCookie()); } // Protected API routes (behind oidcAuthMiddleware) // GET /api/login — login entry point for the PWA. // Flow (production): unauthenticated top-level nav hits the OIDC guard above, // which 302-redirects to Authelia. After login, Authelia POSTs to /callback, // the middleware sets a `continue` cookie pointing back to /api/login, and the // browser follows it here — now authenticated. The handler then redirects to / // so the SPA boots with a valid session. Under DEV_AUTH_BYPASS the guard is not // mounted, so /api/login reaches this handler directly and still redirects to /. app.get('/api/login', (c) => c.redirect('/')); app.route('/api/me', meRouter); app.route('/api/events', eventsRouter); app.route('/api/sse', sseRouter); app.route('/api/lists', listsRouter); app.route('/api/list-items', listItemsRouter); app.route('/api/push', pushRouter); // WR-04: background worker startup (cron schedules) moved into the isMainModule() // guard below. Calling them at top level registered real node-cron schedules whenever // ./index.js was imported — the route tests import `app` from here, so the poller/outbox // drain fired during the test run, touched the mocked DB/CalDAV layers nondeterministically, // and left open handles that blocked clean process exit. They now start only when the // module is the process entrypoint. // Serve React PWA static assets from ./public (Vite build output). // MUST serve the whole ./public tree, not just /assets/* — root-level PWA files // (manifest.webmanifest, sw.js, registerSW.js, workbox-*.js, icon-*.png, // apple-touch-icon.png) live at the root. serveStatic calls next() when a file // is not found, so SPA routes fall through to the index.html catch-all below. // (Registered AFTER /health, /api/*, and /callback, so those win.) app.use('/*', serveStatic({ root: './public' })); app.get('*', serveStatic({ path: './public/index.html' })); /** * True only when this module is the process entrypoint (run directly), not when it * is imported (e.g. by route tests that import `app`). * * WR-05: the previous basename-tail comparison * import.meta.url.endsWith(process.argv[1].replace(/^.*\//, '')) * was fragile — a symlinked entrypoint or a differently-located file sharing the same * basename could make it mis-fire (start the server during an unrelated import, or fail * to start it in production). Compare fully-resolved real paths instead. realpathSync * resolves symlinks on argv[1]; fileURLToPath turns the module URL into a real path. */ function isMainModule(): boolean { if (!process.argv[1]) return false; try { return fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === realpathSync(process.argv[1]); } catch { return false; } } // Only start the HTTP server AND background workers when this module is run directly // (not imported in tests). WR-04: gating the cron schedules here keeps them out of the // test process. if (isMainModule()) { // Configure VAPID credentials for web-push before starting background workers. // VAPID_SUBJECT must be a mailto: or https: URL identifying the operator. // The private key is NEVER served to clients; it signs push requests server-side only. const vapidSubject = process.env.VAPID_SUBJECT ?? ''; const vapidPublicKey = process.env.VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY ?? ''; const vapidPrivateKey = process.env.VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY ?? ''; if (vapidSubject && vapidPublicKey && vapidPrivateKey) { try { webpush.setVapidDetails(vapidSubject, vapidPublicKey, vapidPrivateKey); } catch (err) { console.warn( '[startup] setVapidDetails failed — push notifications will not work:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err), ); } } else { console.warn( '[startup] VAPID env vars not set — push notifications will fail. Set VAPID_SUBJECT, VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY, VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY.', ); } // Start the CalDAV broker poller (5-min cron, D-13 ctag change-detection). // Runs in the background — errors are caught and logged per-credential (T-03-04). startBrokerPoller(); // Drain the D-05 outbox every 15s: dispatches pending CalDAV writes to Fastmail. startOutboxWorker(); initOutboxTrigger(); // subscribe drain signal listener (D-01) // Start the 1-min reminder scan for shared timed events starting in ~15 min (NOTIF-01). // VAPID must be configured (above) before this starts or push sends will fail. startReminderScheduler(); serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: 3000 }, (info) => { console.log(`FamilySync API running on http://localhost:${info.port}`); }); }