--- phase: 16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks plan: "03" subsystem: infra tags: [eslint, security, eslint-plugin-security, static-analysis, ci] # Dependency graph requires: - phase: 13-real-lint-gate-eslint provides: root flat ESLint config (eslint.config.js) that this plan extends provides: - eslint-plugin-security folded into the existing pnpm lint gate as blocking errors (D-03) - 14 of 15 security rules active; detect-object-injection disabled globally with justification - Targeted inline suppressions at 2 detect-non-literal-fs-filename false-positive sites affects: - 16-05 (documents the lint gate fold; no new ci.yml step needed — lint already enforces it) # Tech tracking tech-stack: added: - eslint-plugin-security@3.0.1 (root devDependencies, pinned exact) patterns: - Security rules folded into existing lint step: no extra CI install cost, same pnpm lint gate - High-FP rules disabled globally with inline justification comment; site-specific FPs get eslint-disable-next-line with rationale key-files: created: [] modified: - eslint.config.js - package.json - pnpm-lock.yaml - apps/api/src/index.ts - apps/api/tests/broker/expand.test.ts key-decisions: - "D-03-SEC-VERSION: Pinned eslint-plugin-security@3.0.1 (not 4.0.1) — 3.0.1 has more bake time; both are flat-config compatible" - "D-03-OBJ-INJECT: detect-object-injection disabled globally — all hits were numeric loop indices (arr[i]) and schema-derived keys, not user-controlled input; remaining 14 rules enforced at error" - "D-03-FS-FILENAME: detect-non-literal-fs-filename suppressed at 2 sites (realpathSync(process.argv[1]) and test fixture readFileSync) — both are runtime/test-controlled paths, not user input" patterns-established: - "Security lint fold: add security plugin block before prettierConfig (must stay last); disable only pervasively-FP rules globally with justification" - "Inline suppression format: // eslint-disable-next-line security/ -- " requirements-completed: [SEC-02] # Metrics duration: 2min completed: 2026-06-13 --- # Phase 16 Plan 03: eslint-plugin-security Static Lint Gate Summary **eslint-plugin-security@3.0.1 folded into the existing pnpm lint gate as 14 blocking error-level rules; detect-object-injection disabled globally for Drizzle/TS-generic FPs; pnpm lint green** ## Performance - **Duration:** 2 min - **Started:** 2026-06-13T09:21:47Z - **Completed:** 2026-06-13T09:24:29Z - **Tasks:** 2 - **Files modified:** 5 ## Accomplishments - eslint-plugin-security@3.0.1 installed to root devDependencies (exact pin) - Flat config extended: new security block (`files: apps/**/*.{ts,tsx}`) with `...pluginSecurity.configs.recommended` spread, placed before `prettierConfig` (which stays last) - Triaged 4 total violations: 2 detect-non-literal-fs-filename (inline suppressions with justification), 2 detect-object-injection (globally disabled with justification comment) - `pnpm lint` exits 0 with `--max-warnings 0` across both apps; ESLint pin unchanged at 9.39.4 ## Task Commits 1. **Task 1: Install eslint-plugin-security and fold it into the flat config** - `826a23a` (chore) 2. **Task 2: Triage security-rule violations until pnpm lint is green** - `59e49ec` (chore) ## Files Created/Modified - `eslint.config.js` — added `pluginSecurity` import + security config block (section 5, before prettierConfig); detect-object-injection globally disabled with justification - `package.json` — eslint-plugin-security@3.0.1 added to root devDependencies - `pnpm-lock.yaml` — lockfile updated to reflect new package - `apps/api/src/index.ts` — inline `eslint-disable-next-line` for `detect-non-literal-fs-filename` on `realpathSync(process.argv[1])` - `apps/api/tests/broker/expand.test.ts` — inline `eslint-disable-next-line` for `detect-non-literal-fs-filename` on test-fixture `readFileSync` ## Decisions Made - **Version choice:** Pinned eslint-plugin-security@3.0.1 (not 4.0.1) — 4.0.1 was published the same day as phase research (freshness concern); 3.0.1 is stable and flat-config compatible with ESLint 9.39.4. - **detect-object-injection disabled globally:** After running lint and auditing all 2 hits: both were `ranks[i] > ranks[i - 1]` numeric loop index comparisons in tests — not user-controlled keys. Disabling the single highest-noise rule globally while keeping the remaining 14 rules at error. Matches RESEARCH triage Option A recommendation. - **detect-non-literal-fs-filename: inline suppressions at 2 sites:** Not disabled globally because only 2 hits exist and both are clearly false positives. Site-level suppression is the minimal-change approach that keeps the rule active for any future truly dynamic `fs.*` calls. ## Deviations from Plan None — plan executed exactly as written. Triage decision to disable detect-object-injection globally vs. annotating sites (Option A vs. B per RESEARCH) was explicitly delegated to the executor; Option A was chosen after confirming all hits were numeric loop indices. ## Issues Encountered None. Only 4 lint violations found (2 rules, 2 sites each), far fewer than the "dozens" anticipated for Drizzle ORM bracket access — the codebase does not have heavy obj[key] usage in API source files. ## Threat Surface Scan No new network endpoints, auth paths, file access patterns, or schema changes introduced. This plan adds only dev-tooling configuration. ## Known Stubs None. ## User Setup Required None — no external service configuration required. The security lint fold is automatic via `pnpm lint` (existing CI step). ## Next Phase Readiness - Plan 16-04 (gitleaks secret scanning) is ready to proceed - Plan 16-05 (CI documentation) will reference this plan's D-03 fold — the lint step already enforces it; no new ci.yml job step needed for the security lint --- *Phase: 16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks* *Completed: 2026-06-13*