`. Username field (Surface 4: id="login-username", label "Username", autoComplete="username", spellCheck=false, autoCapitalize="none", autoCorrect="off"). Password field with show/hide toggle (Surface 5: id="login-password", autoComplete="current-password", paddingRight 44, Eye/EyeOff button with aria-label + aria-pressed, 44px tap target; toggle resets to hidden on blur). Error/lockout banner (Surface 6: id="login-error", role="status", aria-live="polite", aria-atomic="true") with the four copy variants keyed off LoginError.code (invalid → "Incorrect username or password." and both inputs get destructive border, no field blamed; rate-limit → "Too many attempts. Please wait a moment and try again." + submit disabled; locked → "This account is temporarily locked. Contact your admin to reset access." + submit disabled; server → "Something went wrong. Please try again." + submit re-enabled). Submit button (Surface 7: full-width filled accent, "Sign in"/"Signing in…" with Loader2, minHeight 44, disabled until both fields non-empty). Forgot-password helper (Surface 10: "Forgot your password? Ask your admin." non-interactive). Method divider + OIDC button (Surfaces 8/9) rendered only when `authMode.oidcEnabled` — "or" divider then outlined "Login with OIDC" (ShieldCheck icon; NEVER "Authelia"); on click initiate the OIDC flow (top-level nav to /api/login). useMutation(fetchLocalLogin) → onSuccess `window.location.replace('/')`, onError set the LoginError code into local error state. Focus username on mount; move focus to the error heading on error; Enter in username → password, Enter in password → submit. role="main" on content column; `
` is the brand-slot app name.
+
+ In apps/pwa/src/App.tsx: add an `authModeQuery` (queryKey ['authMode'], fetchAuthMode, retry false, staleTime 60_000). Add a `/login` route rendering `` as a sibling of the `*` route (standalone, outside the app shell — same structure as /setup). Gate logic, applied AFTER the existing setup gate (setup wins): if the user is unauthenticated (meQuery 401/error) AND `authMode.localEnabled` → render ``; if unauthenticated AND `!localEnabled && oidcEnabled` → top-level redirect to /api/login (today's OIDC-only behavior). Keep AuthSplash during auth-state loading. Do not change the setup gate precedence.
+
+
+ pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa typecheck && pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa build && pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test
+
+
+ - `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa typecheck` and `build` exit 0
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "fetchLocalLogin" apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx` >= 1
+ - Source assertion: LoginPage renders all four error copies (grep each UI-SPEC string)
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "authModeQuery" apps/pwa/src/App.tsx` >= 1 and a `/login` route is registered
+ - Negative assertion: `grep -ci "authelia" apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx` == 0
+ - Negative assertion: login invalid-credentials copy does not name a specific field (single shared message — UI-SPEC Surface 6 variant 1)
+
+ /login renders the brand slot + accessible username/password form with show/hide, four error states, optional OIDC button; App.tsx routes unauthenticated local-mode users to /login after the setup gate.
+
+
+
+ Task 3: AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS + SettingsSheet change-password / link-OIDC
+
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx (sectionLabelStyle lines ~42-49; CredentialSheet open/trigger pattern lines ~53-100; membersQuery lines ~76-81; member-row action button pattern)
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx (bottom-sheet dialog lines ~146-178; Escape listener lines ~69-76; settings rows)
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/CredentialSheet.tsx (useMutation + invalidateQueries lines ~115-144; focus-on-open lines ~97-102; error-state pattern)
+ - apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts (fetchCreateMember / fetchAdminResetPassword / fetchChangePassword / fetchLinkOidc — from Task 1)
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UI-SPEC.md Surfaces 11A/11B/12/13 + Copywriting Contract + Destructive Actions (exact copy, field labels, autoComplete values, two-step link confirm)
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-PATTERNS.md §AdminPage.tsx + §SettingsSheet.tsx
+
+ apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx, apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx
+
+ In apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx add a "LOCAL ACCOUNTS" section (sectionLabelStyle) below the existing MEMBERS / SHARED CALENDAR sections. Surface 11A — inline "Add member" form: Display name, Username (autoComplete off, spellCheck false, autoCapitalize none), Initial password + Confirm password (autoComplete new-password), filled "Add member" submit disabled until required fields filled and passwords match; on success clear the form + invalidate ['admin','members'] and ['me']; error copy: username taken → "That username is already in use. Choose a different one.", mismatch → "Passwords do not match.", short → "Password is too short. Use at least 8 characters." Surface 11B — a per-member "Reset password" action button shown only for members with `hasLocalCredential`, opening a bottom-sheet/modal (CredentialSheet dialog pattern: role=dialog, aria-modal, Escape closes, focus returns to trigger) with New password + Confirm (autoComplete new-password, no current-password field), "Reset password" submit; success closes silently.
+
+ In apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx add a "Change password" row shown only when `meData.user.hasLocalCredential` (Surface 12) opening a nested sheet with Current/New/Confirm fields (correct autoComplete values), submit disabled until filled + new/confirm match; error variants: wrong current → "Current password is incorrect.", mismatch → "Passwords do not match.", generic → "Something went wrong. Please try again." Add a "Link OIDC identity" row shown only when `hasLocalCredential` AND `oidcEnabled` (Surface 13) opening a confirmation sheet (NOT a form) with the exact body copy "After linking, you'll sign in with your OIDC provider instead of a username and password. Your local password will be removed." + secondary note "This can't be undone from the app. Contact your admin if you need to revert." + Cancel / "Continue with OIDC" (never "Authelia"); on Continue, close the sheet and initiate the OIDC link flow (fetchLinkOidc → follow the returned redirect). Reuse the existing bottom-sheet dialog + Escape + focus patterns; never echo a password; no dangerouslySetInnerHTML.
+
+
+ pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa typecheck && pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test && pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa lint
+
+
+ - `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa typecheck`, `test`, `lint` exit 0
+ - Source assertion: AdminPage gates the Reset-password action on `hasLocalCredential` (grep)
+ - Source assertion: SettingsSheet gates Change-password on `hasLocalCredential` and Link-OIDC on `hasLocalCredential` + `oidcEnabled` (grep)
+ - Source assertion: the link-confirm body uses "your local password will be removed" and does NOT use the word "delete" (negative grep `delete` in the link copy region) — UI-SPEC copy rule
+ - Negative assertion: `grep -ci "authelia" apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx` == 0 and in AdminPage.tsx == 0
+
+ Admin can add a member + reset member passwords; a local user can change their password and (when OIDC enabled) link an OIDC identity via a two-step confirmation; all gated by hasLocalCredential/oidcEnabled; no Authelia copy.
+
+
+
+ Task 4: playwright-cli walkthrough of the login + admin/settings surfaces
+ Drive the login + admin/settings flows with the playwright-cli skill against the host dev stack, then pause for human confirmation. This is a blocking checkpoint — no code change; the executor runs the browser walkthrough and waits for approval.
+ The full local-login UI and account-management surfaces. Drive them in a desktop Chromium browser with the project's playwright-cli skill (CLAUDE.md convention: prefer automated browser checks over manual). The dev stack is reached via the Phase-7 dev-bypass; to test the real login form, clear the local-session cookie first (Plan 05 makes this possible). iOS-Safari-standalone behavior remains a separate device-only gate, not part of this check.
+
+ 1. Start the host-side dev stack (API + PWA dev servers, DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true). Use the playwright-cli skill to open the PWA.
+ 2. Clear cookies / open an incognito context so no session exists → confirm the app redirects to /login and the brand slot + "Sign in" card render with username/password fields and the show/hide toggle.
+ 3. Submit a wrong password (dev creds from Plan 05's seed: devuser / a wrong value) → confirm the single "Incorrect username or password." message and that neither field is individually blamed.
+ 4. Submit the correct dev creds (devuser / devpass) → confirm navigation into the calendar.
+ 5. With OIDC configured in app_config, reload /login → confirm the "or" divider + "Login with OIDC" button appear and the word "Authelia" appears nowhere.
+ 6. As an admin, open /admin → confirm LOCAL ACCOUNTS section with Add-member form + a per-member Reset-password action. Open Settings → confirm Change-password and (when OIDC on) Link OIDC identity rows, with the non-alarming link copy.
+
+ Type "approved" if the flows render and behave per the UI-SPEC, or describe what differs.
+
+
+
+
+
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description |
+|----------|-------------|
+| browser DOM → password fields | password values must never persist to localStorage/sessionStorage or be echoed |
+| client state → API | the PWA mirrors 401/429/423 but never derives auth; the server is authoritative |
+
+## STRIDE Threat Register (ASVS L1, block on high)
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
+| T-19-18 | Information Disclosure | password in client storage | mitigate | password fields are React-controlled state only; never written to localStorage/sessionStorage (UI-SPEC Security Display Rules) |
+| T-19-19 | Information Disclosure | field-level credential hint | mitigate | single "Incorrect username or password." copy; no field-specific error (timing-safe parity with the API) |
+| T-19-20 | Tampering | XSS via rendered values | mitigate | plain-text JSX children; no dangerouslySetInnerHTML (project convention T-05-24) |
+| T-19-21 | Information Disclosure | infra leak via provider branding | mitigate | D-06: UI never renders "Authelia"; generic "Login with OIDC" |
+| T-19-22 | Elevation of Privilege | client-only admin gating | accept | client `isAdmin`/`hasLocalCredential` are UX-only; the server requireAdmin/session is the real boundary (documented prior decision) |
+
+
+
+- `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa typecheck && build && test && lint` all green
+- playwright-cli human checkpoint confirms the login flow, error parity, OIDC chooser, and admin/settings surfaces
+- No "Authelia" string in any PWA source touched by this plan
+
+
+
+- AUTH-LOCAL-12: /login renders + logs in + shows correct error states
+- AUTH-LOCAL-13: admin add-member + reset-password surfaces work
+- AUTH-LOCAL-14: settings change-password + link-OIDC surfaces work
+- AUTH-LOCAL-15: App.tsx gate routes unauthenticated local-mode users to /login (after setup gate)
+
+
+
+## Artifacts this phase produces (Plan 04)
+- Component: `LoginPage` (apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx) + `/login` route
+- Component: `BrandSlot` (apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx) — Phase-17 seam
+- client.ts: `fetchAuthMode`, `fetchLocalLogin`, `fetchLocalLogout`, `LoginError`, `MeUser.hasLocalCredential` (+ create/reset/change/link fetchers)
+- App.tsx: `authModeQuery` gate + `/login` route
+- AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS section (add member + reset password)
+- SettingsSheet Change-password + Link-OIDC rows
+- tokens.css brand-seam custom properties (--brand-logo-*)
+
+
+
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-04-SUMMARY.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-04-SUMMARY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39e4b45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-04-SUMMARY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+plan: "04"
+subsystem: pwa-auth-ui
+status: complete
+tags: [pwa, auth, login-ui, admin, settings, local-auth]
+requirements_covered: [AUTH-LOCAL-12, AUTH-LOCAL-13, AUTH-LOCAL-14, AUTH-LOCAL-15]
+
+dependency_graph:
+ requires:
+ - 19-02 (API /api/auth/mode, /api/auth/local/login, /api/admin/members, /api/me/password)
+ - 19-03 (localAuthMiddleware, session cookie, /api/auth/local/logout)
+ provides:
+ - LoginPage (Surfaces 1-10): standalone /login route with brand slot, form, error states, OIDC button
+ - App.tsx auth-mode gate: routes unauthenticated local users to /login; OIDC-only to /api/login
+ - AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS: add-member form (Surface 11A), per-member reset-password sheet (Surface 11B)
+ - SettingsSheet: change-password row + sheet (Surface 12), link-OIDC row + confirmation sheet (Surface 13)
+ - BrandSlot component + brand-seam CSS tokens for Phase 17 override seam
+ affects:
+ - apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts (LoginError, fetchAuthMode, fetchLocalLogin, fetchLocalLogout, fetchChangePassword, fetchCreateMember, fetchAdminResetPassword, fetchLinkOidc, hasLocalCredential on MeUser/AdminMember)
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.tsx (authModeQuery + auth gate + /login route)
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx (LOCAL ACCOUNTS section, ResetPasswordSheet)
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx (change-password + link-OIDC rows + sub-sheets)
+
+tech_stack:
+ added: []
+ patterns:
+ - LoginError typed class (mirrors SessionExpiredError; code union 'invalid'|'rate-limit'|'locked'|'server')
+ - BrandSlot component with CSS custom property seam for Phase 17 brand override
+ - fetchLocalLogin maps HTTP status codes to LoginError codes before surfacing to UI
+ - authModeQuery in App.tsx gates /login redirect and OidcRedirect rendering
+ - InstructionSheet.test.tsx wrapped in QueryClientProvider (Rule 1 fix: SettingsSheet now uses useQuery)
+
+key_files:
+ created:
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx
+ modified:
+ - apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts
+ - apps/pwa/src/styles/tokens.css
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/InstructionSheet.test.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.test.tsx
+
+decisions:
+ - "OidcRedirect rendered as a React element (not a useEffect) to avoid render-inside-render conflict; window.location.replace in render body is safe for a top-level redirect-only component"
+ - "SettingsSheet reads meQuery(['me']) and authModeQuery(['authMode']) with same keys as App.tsx; TanStack deduplicates the requests — no prop drilling needed"
+ - "ResetPasswordSheet inlined in AdminPage.tsx rather than extracted to separate file; component is only used in one place and matches CredentialSheet locality pattern"
+ - "fetchCreateMember throws HTTP error message so onError can detect '409' string for username-taken copy"
+
+metrics:
+ duration: "~90 min (continued from previous session)"
+ completed: "2026-06-17"
+ tasks_completed: 3
+ files_modified: 8
+ files_created: 2
+ tests_added: 0
+ tests_modified: 2
+ test_suite_result: "263 tests passed (0 failed)"
+---
+
+# Phase 19 Plan 04: PWA Login UI + Account Management Surfaces Summary
+
+PWA-side login UI built: standalone LoginPage with brand slot + form + 4 error states + optional OIDC button (Surfaces 1-10); App.tsx auth-mode gate added; AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS section with add-member form and per-member reset-password sheet (Surfaces 11A/11B); SettingsSheet change-password and link-OIDC rows with nested bottom sheets (Surfaces 12/13).
+
+## Tasks Completed
+
+| Task | Name | Commit | Files |
+|------|------|--------|-------|
+| 1 | client.ts fetch fns + LoginError + BrandSlot + tokens | `869cdc2` | client.ts, BrandSlot.tsx, tokens.css |
+| 2 | LoginPage (Surfaces 1-10) + App.tsx gate + /login route | `32d0408` | LoginPage.tsx, App.tsx, App.test.tsx |
+| 3 | AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS + SettingsSheet surfaces 12/13 | `19c45eb` | AdminPage.tsx, SettingsSheet.tsx, InstructionSheet.test.tsx, client.ts, App.test.tsx |
+
+## What Was Built
+
+### Task 1: client.ts + BrandSlot + tokens.css
+
+**client.ts additions:**
+
+- `class LoginError extends Error` with `readonly code: 'invalid' | 'rate-limit' | 'locked' | 'server'` — mirrors `SessionExpiredError` pattern including `Object.setPrototypeOf` fix
+- `hasLocalCredential: boolean` added to `MeUser` interface
+- `hasLocalCredential: boolean` added to `AdminMember` interface
+- `fetchAuthMode()` — plain GET /api/auth/mode, no credentials; returns `{ localEnabled, oidcEnabled }`
+- `fetchLocalLogin({ username, password })` — POST /api/auth/local/login with credentials:'include', redirect:'manual'; maps 401 to LoginError('invalid'), 429 to LoginError('rate-limit'), 423 to LoginError('locked'), non-ok to LoginError('server')
+- `fetchLocalLogout()` — POST /api/auth/local/logout
+- `fetchChangePassword({ currentPassword, newPassword })` — POST /api/me/password
+- `fetchCreateMember({ displayName, username, password })` — POST /api/admin/members
+- `fetchAdminResetPassword(memberId, newPassword)` — POST /api/admin/members/:id/reset-password
+- `fetchLinkOidc()` — POST /api/me/link-oidc; returns `{ redirectUrl: string }`
+
+**BrandSlot.tsx:** Phase-17-ready placeholder component. 48px circle with CSS custom properties (`--brand-logo-bg`, `--brand-logo-text`, `--brand-logo-size`, `--brand-logo-border-radius`). "FS" initials. h1 "FamilySync" (24px/600). Tagline "Family calendar & lists" (15px/400, secondary). No img tag. No dangerouslySetInnerHTML. No "Authelia".
+
+**tokens.css:** Brand-seam block added under `:root`: `--brand-logo-bg`, `--brand-logo-text`, `--brand-logo-size`, `--brand-logo-border-radius`, `--brand-app-name`. Phase 17 overrides these.
+
+### Task 2: LoginPage + App.tsx gate
+
+**LoginPage.tsx (465 lines):**
+
+- Standalone full-page route (same pattern as SetupPage — no AppNav/BottomTabBar)
+- Accepts `authMode?: { localEnabled: boolean; oidcEnabled: boolean }` prop
+- Style: 400px max-width column, inline CSSProperties throughout (no shadcn)
+- Surface 1: BrandSlot at top
+- Surface 4: username field (type="text", autoFocus, autoComplete="username", spellCheck=false, autoCapitalize="none")
+- Surface 5: password field with show/hide toggle (Eye/EyeOff); onBlur resets to hidden
+- Surface 6 error states: invalid / rate-limit / locked / server — distinct copy per UI-SPEC
+- Surface 7: "Sign in" button (Loader2 spinner while pending); disabled on empty fields, rate-limit, locked
+- Surface 8: "or" divider (shown when oidcEnabled)
+- Surface 9: "Login with OIDC" button with ShieldCheck icon (shown when oidcEnabled)
+- Surface 10: "Forgot your password? Ask your admin." — non-interactive p tag
+- Focus management: autoFocus on username, useEffect focuses error heading on error change, Enter in username navigates to password field, Enter in password submits
+- Security: no "Authelia", no dangerouslySetInnerHTML, no field-level blame, password only in controlled state
+
+**App.tsx additions:**
+
+- `OidcRedirect` helper component: `window.location.replace('/api/login')` in render body
+- `authModeQuery` with `fetchAuthMode`, `staleTime: 60_000`
+- Auth gate in `*` route: `meQuery.isError + localEnabled` navigates to /login; `meQuery.isError + !localEnabled + oidcEnabled` renders OidcRedirect
+- `/login` route as standalone sibling of `/setup`
+
+### Task 3: AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS + SettingsSheet surfaces 12/13
+
+**AdminPage LOCAL ACCOUNTS section:**
+
+- Surface 11A — "Add member" inline form: display name, username, initial password, confirm password; `useMutation(fetchCreateMember)`; client-side mismatch/short validation + server-side 409 username-taken detection; success clears form + invalidates `['admin', 'members']` and `['me']`
+- Surface 11B — "Reset password" button in MemberRow: conditioned on `member.hasLocalCredential`; captures trigger button ref for focus-return; opens ResetPasswordSheet
+- `ResetPasswordSheet` component: bottom sheet (role=dialog, aria-modal, Escape closes, focus heading on open); new password + confirm fields; admin-reset mutation; focus returns to trigger on close
+
+**SettingsSheet additions:**
+
+- `useQuery(['me'])` and `useQuery(['authMode'])` inside SettingsSheet — TanStack deduplicates with App.tsx queries
+- "Account" section label + "Change password" row (gated on `hasLocalCredential`)
+- "Link OIDC identity" row (gated on `hasLocalCredential && oidcEnabled`)
+- `ChangePasswordSheet`: current password + new password + confirm; change-password mutation; error copies for mismatch/wrong-current/server
+- `LinkOidcSheet`: confirmation dialog; body copy uses "your local password will be removed" (passive — no "delete"); "Continue with OIDC" triggers fetchLinkOidc then redirects; no "Authelia" anywhere
+
+## Deviations from Plan
+
+### Auto-fixed Issues
+
+**1. [Rule 1 - Bug] InstructionSheet.test.tsx broke after SettingsSheet gained useQuery**
+- **Found during:** Task 3 verification
+- **Issue:** SettingsSheet now calls useQuery for `['me']` and `['authMode']`. InstructionSheet.test.tsx rendered SettingsSheet without a QueryClientProvider, causing `Error: No QueryClient set, use QueryClientProvider to set one`.
+- **Fix:** Added `renderWithQueryClient()` helper wrapping `QueryClientProvider`; added `vi.mock('../api/client.js')` with the four new fetch functions.
+- **Files modified:** `apps/pwa/src/components/InstructionSheet.test.tsx`
+- **Commit:** `19c45eb`
+
+**2. [Rule 1 - Bug] Stale eslint-disable directive in App.test.tsx**
+- **Found during:** Task 3 lint run
+- **Issue:** `_mockFetchAuthMode` uses `_` prefix naming which already suppresses unused-vars; the explicit eslint-disable comment became an "unused disable directive" error under `--max-warnings 0`.
+- **Fix:** Removed the `eslint-disable-line` comment.
+- **Files modified:** `apps/pwa/src/App.test.tsx`
+- **Commit:** `19c45eb`
+
+## Playwright-CLI Walkthrough Results
+
+The dev environment has `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true` which makes `/api/me` always return a valid user. The `/api/auth/mode` endpoint returns 404 (plan 19-02 routes not yet active in this dev stack). playwright-cli confirms:
+- Navigating to /login when authenticated redirects to calendar shell (correct behavior)
+- No React or TypeScript errors in the browser console
+
+Full login-form visual/functional verification requires the production-mode stack (no DEV_AUTH_BYPASS, plan 19-02 deployed). This is the checkpoint:human-verify scope.
+
+## Verification: checkpoint:human-verify Required
+
+The following surfaces require human verification on the deployed production stack:
+- Surface 1-10: /login page renders + form interaction + 4 error state variants + OIDC button gate
+- Surface 11A: add-member form creates a member and it appears in the list
+- Surface 11B: reset-password sheet opens per-member, submits successfully
+- Surface 12: change-password sheet validates current password and updates
+- Surface 13: link-OIDC confirmation shows "local password will be removed" copy then initiates redirect
+
+## Self-Check: PASSED
+
+Files created exist:
+- apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx — FOUND
+- apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx — FOUND
+
+Commits exist:
+- 869cdc2 (Task 1) — FOUND
+- 32d0408 (Task 2) — FOUND
+- 19c45eb (Task 3) — FOUND
+
+Tests: 263 passed, 0 failed
+Typecheck: Clean (tsc --noEmit)
+Lint: Clean (0 errors, 0 warnings, --max-warnings 0)
+
+## Known Stubs
+
+- `BrandSlot` shows "FS" initials and no logo image — intentional Phase 17 seam, not a stub. Phase 17 will override `--brand-logo-*` CSS tokens and may add an `` tag.
+
+## Threat Flags
+
+| Flag | File | Description |
+|------|------|-------------|
+| threat_flag: credential-in-controlled-state | apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx | Password in useState (controlled input); mitigated: never copied to localStorage/sessionStorage, cleared on success/error/blur |
+| threat_flag: credential-in-controlled-state | apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx | currentPassword/newPassword in useState for ChangePasswordSheet; same mitigations |
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-05-PLAN.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-05-PLAN.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8356e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-05-PLAN.md
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+plan: 05
+type: execute
+wave: 4
+depends_on: ["19-01", "19-03"]
+files_modified:
+ - apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts
+ - apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts
+ - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+autonomous: false
+requirements: [AUTH-LOCAL-11, AUTH-LOCAL-16]
+
+must_haves:
+ truths:
+ - "With DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true, every request also carries a real local-session cookie for the dev user, so the PWA login gate skips to the app"
+ - "The Phase-7/8 harness still reaches the authed PWA without manual login (existing specs unchanged)"
+ - "A login-specific spec can clear the local-session cookie and exercise the real /login form against the seeded dev credential"
+ - "global-setup seeds a local_credentials row for the dev user (id=1) and truncates it between runs"
+ - "CI provides LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET to the harness job and seeds the local_credentials table"
+ - "The break-glass CLI creates/resets a local admin by username, runs only outside production, and is excluded from the prod image"
+ artifacts:
+ - path: "apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts"
+ provides: "break-glass create/reset local admin CLI (dev-only)"
+ min_lines: 30
+ - path: "apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts"
+ provides: "real-login-form e2e covering the gate + form (AUTH-LOCAL-12/15)"
+ min_lines: 25
+ - path: "apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts"
+ provides: "local_credentials dev seed + truncate"
+ contains: "local_credentials"
+ key_links:
+ - from: "apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts"
+ to: "apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts"
+ via: "devSessionCookieMiddleware issues a real local-session cookie for DEV_USER (Option C)"
+ pattern: "local-session"
+ - from: "apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts"
+ to: "local_credentials table"
+ via: "INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE seed for dev user id=1"
+ pattern: "local_credentials"
+ - from: ".gitea/workflows/ci.yml"
+ to: "LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET"
+ via: "harness job env + table seed"
+ pattern: "LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET"
+---
+
+
+Rework the dev-bypass + Phase-7/8 Playwright harness to coexist with the new login UI (Option C: bypass issues a real `local-session` cookie), add the break-glass CLI, seed `local_credentials` for the dev user, add a real-login e2e spec, and update the CI harness job — all while preserving the D-15 dev-only/no-prod-image guarantees.
+
+Purpose: The new login gate would otherwise break the harness, which reaches the authed PWA purely via DEV_AUTH_BYPASS (D-14). Option C is the minimal-change path: the bypass keeps setting `c.get('user')` AND now also issues the same `local-session` cookie the PWA gate expects, so existing specs pass unchanged; a dedicated login spec clears the cookie to test the real form. This is glue + CI + a CLI script (type: execute). D-15 is enforced by the existing IMG-01/02/03 gates plus the `.dockerignore apps/api/scripts/` exclusion added in 19-01.
+
+Output: edited `devBypass.ts`, new `reset-admin.ts`, edited `global-setup.ts`, new `login.spec.ts`, edited `ci.yml`.
+
+Derived REQ-IDs covered: AUTH-LOCAL-11 (break-glass CLI, D-13), AUTH-LOCAL-16 (dev-bypass + harness rework, D-14/D-15).
+
+
+
+@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/workflows/execute-plan.md
+@$HOME/.claude/gsd-core/templates/summary.md
+
+
+
+@.planning/PROJECT.md
+@.planning/ROADMAP.md
+@.planning/STATE.md
+@.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md
+@.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-PATTERNS.md
+@.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-CONTEXT.md
+@.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-01-SUMMARY.md
+@.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-03-SUMMARY.md
+
+
+
+
+
+ Task 1: Option C — devSessionCookieMiddleware issues a real local-session cookie under bypass
+
+ - apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts (DEV_USER shape lines ~30-36; devAuthBypass() env-guard structure lines ~58-76; the production hard-guard is the FIRST check and must stay first)
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/devBypass.test.ts (the test that must keep passing)
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts (issueLocalSessionCookie + getCookie('local-session') — from 19-01)
+ - apps/api/src/index.ts (where devAuthBypass() is mounted — the companion middleware mounts just after it; from 19-03 wiring)
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md §Dev-Bypass Rework (Option C; D-15 compliance) + Pitfall 7
+
+ apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts, apps/api/src/index.ts
+
+ In apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts add `export function devSessionCookieMiddleware(): MiddlewareHandler`. Keep the production hard-guard as the FIRST check (return no-op when NODE_ENV==='production') and a no-op when DEV_AUTH_BYPASS!=='true' — identical guard order to devAuthBypass so the IMG-01 boot guard / `assertNotDevBypassInProduction` continues to protect it. When active: on each request that does NOT already have a `local-session` cookie (getCookie), call `issueLocalSessionCookie(c, DEV_USER.id)` so the PWA login gate sees a valid session and skips /login. Then next(). devAuthBypass() itself is unchanged (still sets c.get('user')).
+
+ In apps/api/src/index.ts mount `app.use('/api/*', devSessionCookieMiddleware())` immediately AFTER `app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass())` (it is a no-op outside bypass mode, so it is safe to mount unconditionally like devAuthBypass). Do not change the OIDC-side chain.
+
+
+ pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/auth/devBypass.test.ts && pnpm --filter @familysync/api typecheck
+
+
+ - `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/auth/devBypass.test.ts` exits 0 (existing bypass behavior intact)
+ - Source assertion: devSessionCookieMiddleware's FIRST conditional is `NODE_ENV === 'production'` returning a no-op (grep the guard order) — D-15
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "issueLocalSessionCookie" apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts` >= 1
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "devSessionCookieMiddleware" apps/api/src/index.ts` >= 1 mounted after devAuthBypass
+
+ Under DEV_AUTH_BYPASS, a real local-session cookie is issued for the dev user (production-guarded); existing bypass tests still pass.
+
+
+
+ Task 2: Break-glass reset-admin CLI (dev-only)
+
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts (mysql2/promise connection lines ~95-101; ON DUPLICATE KEY upsert lines ~125-129; NODE_ENV production guard lines ~34-44 — the "plain Node.js only" inline-hash constraint, Pitfall 11)
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md §Break-Glass (script contract; tsx run via docker exec) + §Common Pitfalls 11
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-PATTERNS.md §apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts (DB connection, idempotent upsert, dev-only guard, --arg parsing, inline hashPassword)
+ - .dockerignore (confirm apps/api/scripts/ is excluded — added in 19-01; this CLI relies on that exclusion for D-15)
+
+ apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts
+
+ Create apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts — a standalone script runnable as `docker exec -it familysync-api node --import=tsx/esm scripts/reset-admin.ts --username admin --password ''`. First statement: a dev-only guard that throws when `NODE_ENV === 'production'` (defense-in-depth; the script is also `.dockerignore`d per 19-01, IMG-02). Parse `--username` and `--password` from process.argv (no new deps). Connect via mysql2/promise using DB_HOST/DB_PORT/DB_USER/DB_PASSWORD/DB_NAME env (same defaults as global-setup.ts). Inline a `hashPassword` (copy the 5-line scrypt PHC implementation — cannot import compiled TS from a plain script, Pitfall 11). Upsert: find-or-insert a users row for the username with `is_admin=true, claimed=true`; then INSERT ... ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE the local_credentials row (user_id, username, password_hash). Print the resulting user id. Support a `--dry-run` flag that validates args + connection without writing (used by the validation command). Never log the password value.
+
+
+ cd apps/api && node --import=tsx/esm scripts/reset-admin.ts --dry-run --username smoketest --password ignored; echo "exit=$?"
+
+
+ - The `--dry-run` invocation exits 0 and prints no password value (grep the output for the literal 'ignored' → absent)
+ - Source assertion: the FIRST executable statement guards `NODE_ENV === 'production'` (throws) — D-13/D-15
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "scryptSync" apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts` >= 1 (inline hash, no TS import)
+ - Source assertion: `.dockerignore` excludes `apps/api/scripts/` (carried from 19-01) so this file never ships
+
+ reset-admin.ts creates/resets a local admin by username, refuses to run in production, is excluded from the prod image, and supports --dry-run.
+
+
+
+ Task 3: global-setup local_credentials seed + login.spec.ts + CI harness job env
+
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts (TRUNCATE block lines ~106-109; users seed lines ~125-129; member_credentials seed lines ~143-147; the inline-hash constraint Pitfall 11)
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/layout.spec.ts + apps/pwa/e2e/calendar.spec.ts (spec structure, device-profile usage, DEV_AUTH_BYPASS auth-reached precondition, serviceWorkers block)
+ - apps/pwa/playwright.config.ts (iphone/pixel/desktop projects; baseURL; webServer)
+ - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml (the harness job: DEV_AUTH_BYPASS env, dev-stack bring-up, MariaDB seed step)
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md §Dev-Bypass Rework (global-setup change + CI env) + §PWA Routing Gate
+ - .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UI-SPEC.md Surfaces 1-10 (selectors/copy the spec asserts: id="login-username", "Sign in", error copy)
+
+ apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts, apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts, .gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+
+ In apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts: add `local_credentials` to the TRUNCATE set; inline a `hashPasswordInline(password)` (scrypt PHC, Pitfall 11 — global-setup is plain Node.js); after the existing users seed, `INSERT INTO local_credentials (user_id, username, password_hash) VALUES (1, 'devuser', ?) ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE password_hash = VALUES(password_hash)` with `hashPasswordInline('devpass')`. The existing NODE_ENV/ DEV_AUTH_BYPASS guards already cover the new seed.
+
+ Create apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts: in a context that clears the `local-session` cookie (so the bypass-issued cookie does not auto-skip the gate), assert: (1) navigating to the app redirects to /login and the brand slot + username/password form render (id="login-username", "Sign in"); (2) a wrong password shows the single "Incorrect username or password." message; (3) logging in as devuser/devpass navigates into the app. Follow the existing spec structure (device profiles, serviceWorkers block, no-SW-controller precondition). Keep the other specs (layout/calendar/lists) reaching the app via the bypass-issued cookie unchanged.
+
+ In .gitea/workflows/ci.yml harness job: add `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` to the job env (a fixed dev value >=32 chars, e.g. a documented `dev-secret-change-me-0000000000000000` length-padded) so devSessionCookieMiddleware and global-setup's hash work; if the CI step seeds tables directly, add the `local_credentials` seed there too (mirroring the member_credentials seed). The harness still runs with DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true; LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET stays dev-only (never in the published image — IMG gates).
+
+
+ pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e --grep "login"
+
+
+ - `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e --grep "login"` passes (real-login-form spec green on at least the desktop/chromium profile)
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "local_credentials" apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` >= 2 (TRUNCATE + INSERT)
+ - Source assertion: `grep -c "LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET" .gitea/workflows/ci.yml` >= 1 in the harness job
+ - Behavior: the existing layout/calendar/lists specs still reach the authed app (run `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e` — full harness green)
+
+ global-setup seeds + truncates local_credentials; a real-login e2e spec passes; existing harness specs still reach the app via the bypass cookie; CI harness job has LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET + the seed.
+
+
+
+ Task 4: Verify full harness + CI green and D-15 image boundary intact
+ Run the full harness locally + push for the CI run, then pause for human confirmation that all specs and the CI harness job are green and no dev artifact ships. Blocking checkpoint — no code change; the executor presents results and waits for approval.
+ The reworked dev-bypass (Option C) and CI harness. The full Playwright harness (both the new login spec and the unchanged layout/calendar/lists specs) is the automated proof. This checkpoint confirms the CI run is green end-to-end and that no dev artifact leaks into the published image — the D-15 boundary that the IMG-01/02/03 gates and the new .dockerignore exclusion enforce.
+
+ 1. Run `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e` locally (host dev stack, DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true, LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET set) → confirm all specs pass, including login.spec.ts and the unchanged layout/calendar/lists specs.
+ 2. Push the branch and confirm the Gitea CI harness job is green (it brings up the dev stack with LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET + seeds local_credentials).
+ 3. Confirm D-15: `.dockerignore` excludes `apps/api/scripts/` (reset-admin.ts) and `apps/pwa/e2e/` (the dev seed); the published image contains no local_credentials dev seed and no reset-admin script. Spot-check the publish.yml image-hygiene assertion still passes.
+
+ Type "approved" if the full harness + CI are green and no dev artifact ships, or describe the failure.
+
+
+
+
+
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description |
+|----------|-------------|
+| dev env → published image | the D-15 boundary: dev seed, dev session secret, break-glass script must never ship |
+| CI runner → dev stack | DEV_AUTH_BYPASS + LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET are dev-only CI values, never production secrets |
+
+## STRIDE Threat Register (ASVS L1, block on high)
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
+| T-19-23 | Elevation of Privilege | dev local_credentials seed in prod image | mitigate | seed lives only in global-setup.ts (apps/pwa/e2e/ — .dockerignore'd) and the CI step; never in a migration or startup code (RESEARCH Pitfall 7) |
+| T-19-24 | Elevation of Privilege | devSessionCookieMiddleware active in prod | mitigate | production hard-guard is the FIRST check; assertNotDevBypassInProduction (IMG-01) blocks DEV_AUTH_BYPASS in prod |
+| T-19-25 | Tampering | break-glass script shipped in image | mitigate | apps/api/scripts/ excluded in .dockerignore (19-01, IMG-02); NODE_ENV=production guard in the script |
+| T-19-26 | Information Disclosure | break-glass password in logs | mitigate | reset-admin never logs the password value; --dry-run validates without writing |
+| T-19-SC | Tampering | npm installs | mitigate | zero new packages this plan |
+
+
+
+- `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e` full harness green (login + existing specs)
+- `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test` green (devBypass test intact)
+- Human checkpoint confirms CI green + D-15 boundary intact (no dev artifact in the image)
+
+
+
+- AUTH-LOCAL-16: harness reaches the authed PWA via the bypass-issued local-session cookie; a login spec tests the real form; CI updated
+- AUTH-LOCAL-11: break-glass CLI creates/resets a local admin, dev-only, image-excluded
+- D-15: no dev seed, dev secret, or break-glass script ships in the published image
+
+
+
+## Artifacts this phase produces (Plan 05)
+- Middleware: `devSessionCookieMiddleware` (apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts) — Option C
+- Script: `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts` (break-glass CLI, dev-only, .dockerignore'd)
+- e2e: `apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts` (real-login-form spec)
+- global-setup.ts: local_credentials dev seed (devuser/devpass) + TRUNCATE
+- ci.yml: LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET in the harness job + local_credentials seed
+
+
+
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-05-SUMMARY.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-05-SUMMARY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9a048c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-05-SUMMARY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+plan: "05"
+subsystem: auth
+tags: [local-auth, dev-bypass, playwright, e2e, ci, break-glass, option-c, d-15]
+status: checkpoint
+dependency_graph:
+ requires:
+ - issueLocalSessionCookie / getCookie (from 19-01)
+ - local_credentials Drizzle table + 0003 migration (from 19-01)
+ - devAuthBypass() + DEV_USER (from apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts)
+ - hashPassword / verifyPassword (from 19-01)
+ - localAuthMiddleware (from 19-03)
+ provides:
+ - devSessionCookieMiddleware(): issues real local-session cookie under bypass (Option C)
+ - apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts: break-glass CLI (dev-only, D-13)
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts: real-login-form e2e spec (AUTH-LOCAL-12/15)
+ - global-setup.ts: local_credentials dev seed (devuser/devpass) + TRUNCATE
+ - ci.yml: LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET + local_credentials seed in harness job
+ affects:
+ - apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts (devSessionCookieMiddleware added)
+ - apps/api/src/index.ts (devSessionCookieMiddleware mounted after devAuthBypass)
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts (TRUNCATE + INSERT local_credentials)
+ - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml (LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET + local_credentials seed step)
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/* (mock devBypass now exports devSessionCookieMiddleware)
+tech_stack:
+ added: []
+ patterns:
+ - Option C: devSessionCookieMiddleware issues real JWT cookie under bypass (D-14/D-15)
+ - Production hard-guard FIRST check pattern (mirrors devAuthBypass, T-19-24)
+ - Inline scrypt PHC hashPassword (Pitfall 11 — plain Node.js scripts)
+ - CLI --dry-run flag: validates without writing (T-19-26)
+ - vitest mock update pattern: add new exports to all vi.mock(devBypass.js) blocks
+key_files:
+ created:
+ - apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts
+ modified:
+ - apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts
+ - apps/api/src/index.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts
+ - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+ - apps/api/tests/lib/requireAdmin.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/authMode.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/lists.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/push.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/setup.test.ts
+decisions:
+ - "Option C (devSessionCookieMiddleware): minimal-change path — bypass keeps setting c.get('user') AND issues local-session cookie, so existing specs pass unchanged"
+ - "devSessionCookieMiddleware degrades gracefully when LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET is absent (skip cookie issuance) rather than throwing"
+ - "reset-admin uses mysql2/promise createConnection (same as global-setup.ts) — no new deps"
+ - "CI local_credentials seed step uses inline CJS hashPassword (--input-type=commonjs) matching the existing CI seed pattern"
+ - "LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET CI value: 'dev-secret-change-me-0000000000000000' — 36 chars, documented as dev-only"
+ - "login.spec.ts scoped to desktop/Chromium only — other profiles reach the app via bypass cookie unchanged"
+metrics:
+ duration: "~13 minutes"
+ completed: "2026-06-17"
+ tasks_completed: 3
+ tasks_total: 4
+ files_created: 2
+ files_modified: 11
+---
+
+# Phase 19 Plan 05: Dev-Bypass Rework + Harness + CI Summary
+
+**One-liner:** Option C devSessionCookieMiddleware issues real local-session cookie under DEV_AUTH_BYPASS, break-glass reset-admin CLI, login.spec.ts real-form e2e, global-setup seeds local_credentials, and CI harness job gets LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET.
+
+## Status: CHECKPOINT REACHED
+
+Task 4 is a `type="checkpoint:human-verify"` (gate="blocking"). Tasks 1-3 are complete and committed. The plan pauses for human confirmation that the full Playwright harness + CI run are green and that no dev artifact ships in the published image (D-15 boundary).
+
+## Tasks Completed
+
+| Task | Name | Commit | Key Files |
+|------|------|--------|-----------|
+| 1 | Option C — devSessionCookieMiddleware | 3094df8 | devBypass.ts, index.ts |
+| 2 | Break-glass reset-admin CLI | 8239187 | apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts |
+| 3 | global-setup seed + login.spec.ts + CI env | 1f94dc5 | global-setup.ts, login.spec.ts, ci.yml + 7 test mocks |
+
+## Task 4: Checkpoint (Pending Human Verification)
+
+**Checkpoint type:** `human-verify` (blocking)
+
+### What was verified locally
+
+**API tests:** 446/446 tests pass (all 34 test files, including devBypass.test.ts: 3/3).
+
+**Typecheck:** `pnpm --filter @familysync/api typecheck` and `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa typecheck` both exit 0.
+
+**reset-admin --dry-run:** Exit 0; no password value ("ignored") in output.
+
+**D-15 boundary verified:**
+- `.dockerignore` excludes `apps/api/scripts/` (reset-admin.ts never ships) — confirmed in file.
+- `.dockerignore` excludes `apps/pwa/e2e/` (global-setup seed never ships) — confirmed in file.
+- `devSessionCookieMiddleware()` production hard-guard is FIRST check (line 105 of devBypass.ts).
+- `reset-admin.ts` NODE_ENV=production throw is FIRST executable statement (line 26).
+- `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` in ci.yml is a documented dev-only value, never in the published image.
+
+**E2E login.spec.ts:** Cannot run locally yet — `LoginPage.tsx` is being produced by the concurrent plan 04 executor in the same wave. The spec is structurally correct (matches UI-SPEC selectors `id="login-username"`, `role="heading" name="Sign in"`, etc.) and will run as part of the full harness after wave 4 merges.
+
+### What the human needs to verify
+
+1. **Push and run CI:** Push the branch → confirm the Gitea CI `harness` job is green. The harness job now includes `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` and the `local_credentials` seed step. The full Playwright suite (iphone + pixel + desktop) should pass including `login.spec.ts` on the desktop profile.
+2. **D-15 image boundary:** Confirm the `publish.yml` image-hygiene assertion still passes (no `apps/api/scripts/` or `apps/pwa/e2e/` artifacts in the published image). Spot-check `.dockerignore` covers both dirs.
+3. **Confirm login.spec.ts passes:** After wave 4 merges (plan 04 completes LoginPage.tsx), confirm `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e --grep "login"` exits 0 on the desktop profile.
+
+**Resume signal:** Type "approved" if the full harness + CI are green and no dev artifact ships.
+
+## What Was Built
+
+### Task 1: devSessionCookieMiddleware (Option C)
+
+**`apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts`** — new export `devSessionCookieMiddleware(): MiddlewareHandler`:
+- Production hard-guard FIRST check: `NODE_ENV === 'production'` → no-op (T-19-24, D-15)
+- No-op when `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS !== 'true'`
+- No-op when `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` not set (degrades gracefully)
+- When active: if no `local-session` cookie present, calls `issueLocalSessionCookie(c, DEV_USER.id)`
+- Imports: `getCookie` from hono/cookie, `issueLocalSessionCookie` from localSession.ts
+
+**`apps/api/src/index.ts`** — mounts `devSessionCookieMiddleware()` immediately after `devAuthBypass()` on `/api/*`.
+
+### Task 2: reset-admin.ts (Break-Glass CLI)
+
+**`apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts`** — standalone break-glass CLI (149 lines):
+- NODE_ENV=production throw as FIRST executable statement (D-13/D-15)
+- `.dockerignore apps/api/scripts/` excludes it from the prod image (IMG-02)
+- Inline scrypt PHC `hashPassword()` (Pitfall 11 — cannot import compiled TS from plain script)
+- Parses `--username` / `--password` / `--dry-run` from process.argv
+- Upserts `users` row (is_admin=true, claimed=true) then upserts `local_credentials` row
+- Never logs the password value (T-19-26)
+- `--dry-run`: validates args + DB connection without writing; exit 0
+
+### Task 3: global-setup seed + login.spec.ts + CI harness env
+
+**`apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts`**:
+- Added `hashPasswordInline()` inline scrypt PHC (Pitfall 11 — plain Node.js)
+- Added `TRUNCATE TABLE local_credentials` to the TRUNCATE block
+- Added `INSERT INTO local_credentials (user_id, username, password_hash) VALUES (1, 'devuser', ?) ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE ...` after member_credentials seed
+
+**`apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts`** (new, 98 lines):
+- Scoped to desktop/Chromium only (other profiles use bypass cookie)
+- Uses `context.clearCookies()` before each test to strip the bypass-issued cookie
+- Test 1: unauthenticated navigation → /login; brand + "Sign in" heading + form visible
+- Test 2: wrong password → `role="status"` shows "Incorrect username or password."
+- Test 3: devuser/devpass → navigates away from /login
+
+**`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`** harness job:
+- Added new "Seed local_credentials for dev user (id=1)" step (CJS inline script with hashPassword)
+- Added `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET: 'dev-secret-change-me-0000000000000000'` to harness env
+- LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET is a dev-only value, never in the published image (IMG gates)
+
+**Test mock fixes (Rule 1 — Bug):** Added `devSessionCookieMiddleware: () => async (_c, next) => next()` to all 7 `vi.mock('../../src/auth/devBypass.js', ...)` blocks that used an explicit factory return object (admin, setup, push, lists, localAuth, authMode, requireAdmin tests). `events.test.ts` uses `importOriginal` + spread and already picks up the new export automatically.
+
+## Deviations from Plan
+
+### Auto-fixed Issues
+
+**1. [Rule 1 - Bug] vitest mock missing devSessionCookieMiddleware export**
+- **Found during:** Task 3 — running the full API test suite after Task 1's devBypass.ts change
+- **Issue:** 7 test files mock `devBypass.js` with an explicit factory object. After adding `devSessionCookieMiddleware` to devBypass.ts, vitest reported "No `devSessionCookieMiddleware` export is defined on the mock" for every mock that did not include it.
+- **Fix:** Added `devSessionCookieMiddleware: () => async (_c, next) => next()` to all 7 explicit mock factories: admin.test.ts, setup.test.ts, push.test.ts (both `vi.mock` and `vi.doMock`), lists.test.ts, localAuth.test.ts, authMode.test.ts, requireAdmin.test.ts.
+- **Files modified:** 7 test files
+- **Commit:** 1f94dc5
+
+## D-15 Guarantee
+
+| Artifact | Dev boundary | Enforcement |
+|----------|--------------|-------------|
+| `devSessionCookieMiddleware` | NODE_ENV=production hard-guard (FIRST check) + IMG-01 boot guard | T-19-24 |
+| `reset-admin.ts` | NODE_ENV=production throw (FIRST statement) + .dockerignore apps/api/scripts/ | T-19-25, IMG-02 |
+| `local_credentials` dev seed | Lives in apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts (.dockerignore apps/pwa/e2e/) + CI step only | T-19-23 |
+| `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` in CI | Dev-only value in harness job env; never in Dockerfile or published image | IMG-01/02/03 |
+
+## Known Stubs
+
+None. All new code performs real operations.
+
+## Threat Surface Scan
+
+No new network endpoints introduced. New surface:
+- `devSessionCookieMiddleware`: internal middleware, no external exposure; guarded by NODE_ENV=production FIRST check (T-19-24).
+- `reset-admin.ts`: CLI only (docker exec), guarded by NODE_ENV=production throw + .dockerignore exclusion (T-19-25).
+
+All surfaces are within the plan's threat model (T-19-23 through T-19-26).
+
+## Self-Check: PASSED
+
+All created files confirmed present on disk:
+- FOUND: apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts
+- FOUND: apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts
+
+All commits confirmed in git log:
+- 3094df8: feat(19-05): Option C — devSessionCookieMiddleware issues real local-session cookie under bypass
+- 8239187: feat(19-05): add break-glass reset-admin CLI (dev-only, .dockerignore'd)
+- 1f94dc5: feat(19-05): global-setup local_credentials seed + login.spec.ts + CI harness env
+
+API tests: 446/446 pass (all 34 test files); typecheck: exit 0.
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-CONTEXT.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-CONTEXT.md
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-CONTEXT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# Phase 19: Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode) - Context
+
+**Gathered:** 2026-06-16
+**Status:** Ready for planning
+
+
+## Phase Boundary
+
+Let an operator run FamilySync entirely on **local DB username/password accounts with no OIDC/Authelia required**, while keeping OIDC available as an opt-in, generic (RFC-compliant, not Authelia-specific) provider that can be wired in later from the admin UI. Builds directly on the Phase-12 pre-OIDC local-user foundation (nullable `users.oidc_iss`/`oidc_sub`, the `claimed` marker, and the first-login-claims merge in `upsertUser`).
+
+**In scope:** local credential storage (scrypt) + local login flow; a new local login UI in the PWA; a stateless local-session cookie + middleware; coexistence with the existing OIDC middleware; admin-managed local account creation + password set/change/reset; per-user OIDC-link (replacing local for that user); de-Authelia-izing OIDC config/copy to a generic OIDC provider; a lockout/break-glass recovery mechanism; reworking dev-bypass + the Phase 7/8 Playwright harness to cover the new login UI.
+
+**Out of scope:** a full pluggable multi-auth-provider framework (LDAP, magic-link, multiple OIDC) — that is the auth-layer counterpart of backlog 999.1, a future phase. Email-based password reset (email is out of project scope). BYO-CalDAV provider abstraction (999.1, separate).
+
+
+
+
+## Implementation Decisions
+
+### Mode & Coexistence
+- **D-01:** Local auth is the **default and always available**. OIDC is **opt-in/additive**, never a replacement for the local path at the system level.
+- **D-02:** OIDC is configured from the **admin UI** (extends the Phase-12 config that already lands in `app_config`: `oidc_issuer`, `oidc_client_id`, `app_external_url`). When OIDC is configured, **both methods are offered and the user chooses at login** (local username/password OR "Login with OIDC").
+- **D-03:** This must **not break the existing live OIDC deployment**. The two current household members already authenticate via Authelia (`oidc_iss`/`oidc_sub` set, `claimed=true`); they continue as OIDC users. Local auth is layered on additively.
+- **D-04:** A **new local login UI (username + password) must be built in the PWA** — none exists today. The PWA currently boots straight into the authed app (OIDC redirect) or via dev-bypass; there is no login form.
+
+### Session Issuance
+- **D-05:** Local logins are backed by a **stateless signed httpOnly JWT cookie** carrying `userId`, validated by a **new local-auth middleware that sets `c.get('user')`** the same way `auth/devBypass.ts` does — so every downstream route resolves the user unchanged. **No DB sessions table** (consistent with the app's existing storage-less-JWT approach; right for household scale). Tradeoff accepted: a password change cannot retroactively invalidate other live sessions; logout = clear cookie.
+- **D-06 (BYO-Auth principle):** Local auth is first-class; OIDC is treated as a **generic RFC-compliant provider, not Authelia-hardcoded**. `@hono/oidc-auth` is already provider-agnostic — work is to de-Authelia-ize config keys and user-facing copy and treat issuer/client as generic OIDC config. Mirrors the planned BYO-CalDAV provider abstraction (999.1).
+- **D-07 (BYO-Auth scope):** Ship **local + one generic OIDC** with a **clean internal seam** for future methods. **No plugin/registry framework** in this phase.
+
+### Password Hashing & Storage
+- **D-08:** Hash local passwords with **`node:crypto` scrypt** — zero new dependency, no native node-gyp build in the Docker image (honors the stack's deliberate no-native-dep stance, the same reason Drizzle was chosen over Prisma). Encode **algorithm + params + salt alongside the hash** so parameters can evolve. (argon2id/bcrypt native addons explicitly rejected.)
+- **D-09:** Store local credentials in a **new `local_credentials` table** — `user_id` (FK to `users`, UNIQUE), `username` (UNIQUE), `password_hash` (encoded), `createdAt`/`updatedAt` — mirroring the `member_credentials` pattern. Keeps the `users` row identity-method-agnostic. **Auth methods are a per-user property**: a user has local login iff a `local_credentials` row exists, and OIDC login iff an `oidc_iss+oidc_sub` binding exists. Drizzle **generate+migrate, never push** (additive migration on populated MariaDB — same rule as Phases 10/12).
+
+### Accounts & OIDC-Link
+- **D-10:** **Admin creates members** + sets an initial password; the member changes it later. **No open self-signup** (wrong trust model for a private household app exposed via Pangolin).
+- **D-11:** Password lifecycle = **self-change (current + new) + admin-reset** from the admin UI. **No email reset** (email out of project scope). Reuses the admin surface that already rotates Fastmail app passwords.
+- **D-12:** **OIDC link replaces local at the per-user level**: when a local user links an OIDC identity (explicit action while authenticated as that user — never an email match, per Phase-12 D-10), **delete that user's `local_credentials` row** → they become OIDC-only. OIDC-only users never receive a local credential. The returned `iss+sub` must not already belong to another user.
+- **D-13 (break-glass):** Lockout recovery does **not** need to be a permanent local user account (avoids a member-vs-operator capability split — explicitly rejected). Instead, recovery is a **CLI/console command and/or env override** (e.g. create/reset a local admin, or disable/force-off OIDC), run on the host/container. **No new role/capability model**; reuse today's single `users.is_admin`. Exact form → researcher (see Open Questions).
+
+### Testing & Dev-Bypass
+- **D-14:** The new login UI requires touching existing API/unit tests and the **Phase 7/8 Playwright harness** (which today reaches the authed PWA purely via `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS`, skipping any login). Both the already-authed fast path and the **real login form** must remain testable.
+- **D-15 (hard constraint):** Any seeded test login / reworked dev-bypass mechanism **stays dev-only and never ships in the Docker/prod image**. It is bound by the existing Phase-16 image-hygiene gates: the IMG-01 boot guard (`assertNotDevBypassInProduction`), `.dockerignore` (IMG-02), and the publish-time hygiene assertion (IMG-03). New dev-seed-login artifacts must be covered by those same gates.
+
+### Claude's Discretion (decided in-discussion)
+- Session backing mechanism (chose stateless signed JWT cookie — D-05).
+- Credential storage location (chose separate `local_credentials` table — D-09).
+These were "you decide" responses; rationale captured above. Researcher/planner may refine implementation detail but should not reverse the locked choice without cause.
+
+
+
+
+## Canonical References
+
+**Downstream agents MUST read these before planning or implementing.**
+
+### Auth foundation this phase extends
+- `apps/api/src/auth/user.ts` — `upsertUser` (identity = `oidc_iss+oidc_sub`, never email; first-login-claims of the single unclaimed row; first-login-wins `is_admin` bootstrap; `claimed` semantics). The local-account + OIDC-link model generalizes this.
+- `apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts` — OIDC middleware wiring + `oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware` (env-OR-`app_config` fallback for `OIDC_ISSUER`/`OIDC_CLIENT_ID`/`app_external_url`). The generic-OIDC config path lives here.
+- `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts` — `devAuthBypass()` + `DEV_USER`; the `c.set('user', …)` pattern the new local-auth middleware mirrors. Subject of the dev-bypass rework (D-14/D-15).
+- `apps/api/src/auth/persistSessionCookie.ts` — session-cookie persistence helper (referenced by the session model).
+- `apps/api/src/index.ts` — middleware mount order (`/api/setup` pre-auth → `devAuthBypass` → `oidcConfigFallback` → `oidcAuthMiddleware` → `persistSessionCookie`); `devBypassActive` computed once at boot; `assertNotDevBypassInProduction()` boot guard. Local-login routes + middleware slot in here.
+- `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts` — `resolveUserId` (dev-bypass `c.get('user')` first, else `getAuth`) + `needsProviderSetup`/`isAdmin` exposure. The user-resolution seam for all routes.
+- `apps/api/src/db/schema.ts` — `users` (nullable `oidc_iss`/`oidc_sub`, `claimed`, `is_admin`, `uniq_oidc_identity`), `member_credentials` (pattern to mirror for `local_credentials`), `app_config` (k/v config; PROHIBITION list for secrets-in-DB).
+- `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` + `apps/api/src/lib/requireAdmin.ts` — admin route surface + role guard the account-management UI and OIDC config UI extend.
+- `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` + `apps/api/src/lib/setupGuard.ts` — Phase-12 pre-auth wizard + 423 lock; the first-local-admin bootstrap replaces the current unclaimed-user provisioning.
+
+### Image hygiene / dev-prod boundary (constrains D-15)
+- `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts` — `assertNotDevBypassInProduction` (IMG-01).
+- `.dockerignore` (repo root) — IMG-02 dev-artifact exclusion.
+- `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml` — IMG-03 publish-time image-hygiene + boot-smoke assertions.
+
+### Test harness this phase must update
+- `apps/pwa/playwright.config.ts` + `apps/pwa/e2e/` (global-setup deterministic mysql2 seed, `layout.spec.ts`, `calendar.spec.ts`, `lists.spec.ts`) — Phase 7 harness; auth reached via `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS`.
+- `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — CI `harness` job (brings up dev stack with `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true`).
+
+### Provenance / prior decisions
+- `.planning/phases/12-initial-setup-wizard/12-CONTEXT.md` §Deferred Ideas — origin of this phase (full local-auth/no-OIDC mode deferred from Phase 12; D-07 local-user groundwork is the deliberate foundation).
+- `.planning/ROADMAP.md` §"Phase 19" — goal, dependency on Phase 12, and the four seed open questions.
+- `.planning/PROJECT.md` §Constraints / §Auth — Authelia-OIDC constraint context; MariaDB-only; no-native-dep stance.
+
+
+
+
+## Existing Code Insights
+
+### Reusable Assets
+- `member_credentials` table shape + `validateEncryptAndStoreCredential` flow (`broker/credentialSync.ts`) — direct template for the `local_credentials` table and an admin-managed create/reset write path.
+- `devAuthBypass()`'s `c.set('user', …)` pattern — the new local-auth middleware reuses it so downstream routes (`resolveUserId` in every router) need no change.
+- `oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware` (env-OR-`app_config`) — the established pattern for admin-UI-written OIDC config taking effect.
+- Phase-12 `upsertUser` claim/link machinery — the OIDC-link flow (D-12) is a generalization (bind `iss+sub` to an already-authenticated local user, then drop their local credential).
+- `assertNotDevBypassInProduction` + `.dockerignore` + `publish.yml` hygiene assertions — the enforcement surface for D-15.
+
+### Established Patterns
+- **Identity = `oidc_iss+oidc_sub`, never email** (Phase-12 D-10) — local accounts are a separate per-user credential, and OIDC-link must be explicit (no email matching).
+- **Drizzle generate+migrate, never push** — additive migration on populated MariaDB (Phases 10/12 precedent); applies to the new `local_credentials` table.
+- **`is_admin` is the server boundary; client `isAdmin` is UX-only** — local-auth admin gating reuses `requireAdmin`.
+- **Secrets stay in env, never in `app_config`/DB** (Phase-12 PROHIBITION) — the local-session signing secret and scrypt config live in env, not the DB.
+- **Storage-less JWT session cookie** (CLAUDE.md, `@hono/oidc-auth`) — the local-session cookie follows the same stateless philosophy (D-05).
+
+### Integration Points
+- New local-login routes + local-auth middleware mount in `index.ts` alongside (and ordered against) `devAuthBypass`/`oidcAuthMiddleware`; the OIDC guard must not 302-redirect local-mode requests.
+- The PWA gate (App.tsx setup/login routing) gains a login screen and a login-vs-OIDC chooser; `/api/me` / a new auth-mode endpoint tells the PWA which methods to offer.
+- Setup wizard bootstrap shifts from "provision one unclaimed user" to "create the first local admin (username+password)".
+
+
+
+
+## Specific Ideas
+
+- "Bring Your Own Auth" framing (user's words) — explicitly do not pigeon-hole into Authelia; OIDC is one generic provider, parallel to the intended "Bring Your Own CalDAV provider" direction (999.1).
+- User leans toward **"replace dev-bypass with seeded auto-login"** for the harness, but defers the final call to the researcher.
+- User prefers the **break-glass to be a CLI/env override rather than a user account**, to avoid added user/capability complexity.
+
+
+
+
+## Deferred Ideas
+
+- **Full pluggable auth-provider framework** (registry/plugin for LDAP, magic-link, multiple simultaneous OIDC providers) — auth-layer counterpart of backlog 999.1; its own future phase/milestone. Phase 19 builds only a clean internal seam.
+- **Member-vs-operator capability/role split** — considered for the break-glass account, explicitly rejected in favor of a CLI/env recovery mechanism + the existing single `is_admin` flag.
+- **Email-based password reset** — out of project scope (no email features).
+
+## Open Questions for Research
+
+- **Dev-bypass rework (decide among 3):** (a) keep bypass + seed a real test login for login-specific specs; (b) replace bypass with seeded auto-login through the real local flow (user's lean); (c) bypass auto-issues a real local-session cookie. Must satisfy D-14 + the D-15 dev-only/no-prod-image constraint.
+- **Break-glass recovery form:** CLI/console command vs env override (or both) for create/reset-local-admin and/or disable-OIDC; how it interacts with the boot-time mode/middleware selection.
+- **OIDC-only user provisioning:** how an OIDC-only user is first created given D-10 forbids email-matching unclaimed rows — just-in-time on first OIDC login vs admin pre-creation + claim (the Phase-12 single-unclaimed-row claim can't disambiguate multiple pre-created placeholders).
+- **Login-vs-OIDC mode signalling to the PWA:** reuse/extend `/api/me` or `/api/setup/status`, or a new pre-auth `/api/auth/mode` endpoint, so the login page knows which methods to render.
+- **Local-login hardening:** rate-limiting / lockout / timing-safe compare on the local login endpoint (household scale, but Pangolin-exposed).
+
+
+
+---
+
+*Phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode*
+*Context gathered: 2026-06-16*
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-DISCUSSION-LOG.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-DISCUSSION-LOG.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-DISCUSSION-LOG.md
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+# Phase 19: Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode) - Discussion Log
+
+> **Audit trail only.** Do not use as input to planning, research, or execution agents.
+> Decisions are captured in CONTEXT.md — this log preserves the alternatives considered.
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-16
+**Phase:** 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+**Areas discussed:** Mode & coexistence, Session issuance, Password hashing & storage, Accounts & OIDC-link, Testing & dev-bypass
+
+---
+
+## Mode & Coexistence
+
+### Q1 — How should the app decide between local-auth and OIDC?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| app_config flag (runtime) | `auth_mode` row in app_config, set by wizard; no restart | |
+| Deploy-time env switch | `AUTH_MODE` env read at boot | |
+| Both always live | Local form + OIDC button always shown | |
+
+**User's choice:** Free-text — "Default to local and add the ability to wire OIDC in later if wanted."
+**Notes:** Local is the always-available default; OIDC is additive/opt-in.
+
+### Q2 — How does the app know OIDC is wired in, and what happens to local login?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Auto-detect, local stays live | OIDC on when config present; local always available | (partial) |
+| Auto-detect, OIDC takes over | Local disabled once OIDC present | |
+| Explicit app_config toggle | Separate `auth_mode` controlled from admin UI | (partial) |
+
+**User's choice:** Free-text — OIDC config is set/stored in a later step, so wire it into the **admin UI**; give users the choice of which to use at login; **no local login UI exists today** so it must be built.
+**Notes:** Blend — admin-UI-configured OIDC, both methods offered at login, user chooses.
+
+---
+
+## Session Issuance
+
+### Q1 — What backs a local login session?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Stateless signed JWT cookie | userId in signed httpOnly cookie; no DB table | ✓ (Claude) |
+| Server-side session table | sessions table for true revocation | |
+| You decide | — | ✓ |
+
+**User's choice:** "You decide" + "do not pigeon-hole the user into Authelia — Bring Your Own Auth and Bring Your Own CalDAV provider."
+**Notes:** Claude chose stateless signed JWT cookie. User added the BYO-Auth architectural principle (generic OIDC, not Authelia-locked).
+
+### Q2 — How far should the BYO-Auth abstraction go in Phase 19?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Local + generic OIDC | Two concrete methods, clean seam, no framework | ✓ |
+| Full pluggable framework | Provider registry/plugin (LDAP, magic-link, multi-OIDC) | |
+| Local only for now | Leave Authelia OIDC as-is, defer generic OIDC | |
+
+**User's choice:** Local + generic OIDC (recommended).
+**Notes:** Clean internal seam now; full framework deferred.
+
+---
+
+## Password Hashing & Storage
+
+### Q1 — Which password hashing approach?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| scrypt via node:crypto | Stdlib, zero-dep, no native build | ✓ |
+| argon2id (native dep) | OWASP top pick, needs native addon | |
+| bcrypt (bcryptjs) | Pure JS, older KDF | |
+
+**User's choice:** scrypt via node:crypto (recommended).
+**Notes:** Honors the stack's no-native-dep stance.
+
+### Q2 — Where to store username + hash?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Separate local_credentials table | Mirrors member_credentials; user-agnostic users row | ✓ (Claude) |
+| Columns on users | Add username + password_hash to users | |
+| You decide | — | ✓ |
+
+**User's choice:** "You decide."
+**Notes:** Claude chose a separate `local_credentials` table — best fits the BYO-Auth per-user-method seam (one row can hold both a local credential and an OIDC binding).
+
+---
+
+## Accounts & OIDC-Link
+
+### Q1 — How are local accounts created?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Admin creates members | Wizard creates first admin; admin creates rest | ✓ |
+| Admin creates + invite link | One-time set-password link | |
+| Open self-signup | Anyone can register | |
+
+**User's choice:** Admin creates members.
+
+### Q2 — Password change/reset?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Self-change + admin reset | Member self-change; admin resets lockouts | ✓ |
+| Self-change only | No admin reset | |
+| Admin reset only | No self-change | |
+
+**User's choice:** Self-change + admin reset.
+**Notes:** No email reset (email out of scope).
+
+### Q3 — After OIDC-link, what methods stay valid? (reformulated after clarification)
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Both stay valid | Row holds local + OIDC; either logs in | |
+| OIDC primary, local fallback | Same data model, UI emphasis on OIDC | |
+| OIDC replaces local | Linking removes local credential | ✓ (per user) |
+
+**User's choice:** Initially requested clarification; then chose **OIDC replaces local per user** — there can/should be OIDC-only users with no local creds. Raised the need for a break-glass path.
+**Notes:** Auth methods are per-user (presence of local_credentials row and/or OIDC binding). Break-glass need surfaced here.
+
+### Q4 — Break-glass capability model?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Protected local admin (no new role model) | Initial admin, un-removable local cred | |
+| Operator-only account (member/operator split) | Strip member capability from break-glass | |
+| Let researcher scope it | Lock the requirement, defer the how | ✓ (twist) |
+
+**User's choice:** Let researcher scope it — **with a twist: break-glass can be a CLI/console command or env override instead of a user**, removing the added-user/capability complexity.
+**Notes:** No new role/capability model; reuse `is_admin`. Recovery mechanism (not account) to be scoped by researcher.
+
+---
+
+## Testing & Dev-Bypass (added mid-discussion at user's request)
+
+### Q1 — How should DEV_AUTH_BYPASS evolve?
+
+| Option | Description | Selected |
+|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Bypass stays + seed a real test login | Fast bypass for most specs; real form for login specs | |
+| Replace bypass with seeded auto-login | Harness logs in via real local flow | (user's lean) |
+| Bypass auto-issues a real local session | Bypass logs in seeded user, skips form | |
+
+**User's choice:** Defer final determination to the **research agent**; user **leans toward "replace bypass with seeded auto-login."**
+**Notes:** Hard constraint — the seeded test login / dev-bypass **stays dev-only and never ships in the Docker/prod image** (Phase 16 IMG-01/02/03 gates apply).
+
+---
+
+## Claude's Discretion
+
+- Local session backing → stateless signed JWT cookie (D-05).
+- Credential storage location → separate `local_credentials` table (D-09).
+
+## Deferred Ideas
+
+- Full pluggable auth-provider framework (registry/plugin; LDAP, magic-link, multi-OIDC) — future phase, counterpart of 999.1.
+- Member-vs-operator capability/role split — rejected in favor of CLI/env break-glass recovery.
+- Email-based password reset — out of project scope.
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-PATTERNS.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-PATTERNS.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abfeb58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-PATTERNS.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1091 @@
+# Phase 19: Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode) - Pattern Map
+
+**Mapped:** 2026-06-17
+**Files analyzed:** 20 (new/modified)
+**Analogs found:** 20 / 20
+
+---
+
+## File Classification
+
+| New/Modified File | Role | Data Flow | Closest Analog | Match Quality |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts` | utility | transform | `apps/api/src/auth/user.ts` | role-match |
+| `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts` | utility | request-response | `apps/api/src/auth/persistSessionCookie.ts` | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts` | middleware | request-response | `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts` | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/routes/authMode.ts` | route | request-response | `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` (GET /status) | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts` | route | request-response | `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` (POST /credential) | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/db/schema.ts` (modified) | model | CRUD | itself — `memberCredentials` block (lines 74–94) | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/db/migrations/0003_local_credentials.sql` | migration | batch | existing `0002` migration | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` (modified) | route | CRUD | itself — `POST /credentials` + `GET /members` (lines 83–132) | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts` (modified) | route | request-response | itself — `POST /credential` + `GET /` (lines 88–202) | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/index.ts` (modified) | config | request-response | itself — middleware ordering block (lines 31–73) | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts` (modified) | middleware | request-response | itself | exact |
+| `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts` (modified) | utility | request-response | itself (lines 1–34) | exact |
+| `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts` | utility | CRUD | `apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` seed pattern | role-match |
+| `apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx` | component | request-response | `apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx` | exact |
+| `apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx` | component | — | `apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx` (header block) | role-match |
+| `apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx` (modified) | component | CRUD | itself — `CredentialSheet` + section pattern (lines 42–100) | exact |
+| `apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx` (modified) | component | request-response | itself + `CredentialSheet.tsx` | exact |
+| `apps/pwa/src/App.tsx` (modified) | component | request-response | itself — `setupQuery` gate + `/setup` route (lines 72–167) | exact |
+| `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts` (modified) | utility | request-response | itself — `fetchMe`, `handleAuthResponse` pattern (lines 51–84) | exact |
+| `apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` (modified) | test | batch | itself (lines 119–148) | exact |
+
+---
+
+## Pattern Assignments
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts` (utility, transform)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/api/src/auth/user.ts`
+
+**Imports pattern** (user.ts lines 11–13):
+```typescript
+import { and, eq, isNull, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db/client.js';
+import { users, appConfig } from '../db/schema.js';
+```
+New file will substitute:
+```typescript
+import { scryptSync, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+// No npm deps — pure stdlib
+```
+
+**Core pattern** — PHC-encoded hash (from RESEARCH.md §Password Hashing, runtime-verified):
+```typescript
+const SCRYPT_N = 16384;
+const SCRYPT_R = 8;
+const SCRYPT_P = 1;
+const KEY_LEN = 32;
+
+export function hashPassword(password: string): string {
+ const salt = randomBytes(16);
+ const hash = scryptSync(password, salt, KEY_LEN, { N: SCRYPT_N, r: SCRYPT_R, p: SCRYPT_P });
+ return ['scrypt', SCRYPT_N, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P, salt.toString('base64url'), hash.toString('base64url')].join('$');
+}
+
+export function verifyPassword(storedEncoded: string, candidate: string): boolean {
+ try {
+ const [, n, r, p, saltB64, hashB64] = storedEncoded.split('$');
+ const salt = Buffer.from(saltB64, 'base64url');
+ const storedHash = Buffer.from(hashB64, 'base64url');
+ const candidateHash = scryptSync(candidate, salt, storedHash.length, { N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p) });
+ return timingSafeEqual(storedHash, candidateHash);
+ } catch {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+```
+
+**No error types defined here** — all errors returned as boolean false (timing-safe contract).
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts` (utility, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/api/src/auth/persistSessionCookie.ts`
+
+**Imports pattern** (persistSessionCookie.ts lines 24–26):
+```typescript
+import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
+import { setCookie } from 'hono/cookie';
+```
+New file extends to:
+```typescript
+import { Jwt } from 'hono/utils/jwt';
+import { setCookie, getCookie, deleteCookie } from 'hono/cookie';
+import type { Context } from 'hono';
+```
+
+**Core cookie-issue pattern** — mirrors persistSessionCookie.ts (lines 55–77) but issues a new JWT rather than re-issuing an existing one:
+```typescript
+const COOKIE_NAME = 'local-session';
+const SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = Number(process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES ?? 86400);
+
+export async function issueLocalSessionCookie(c: Context, userId: number): Promise {
+ const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET;
+ if (!secret) throw new Error('LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET env var not set');
+ const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+ const token = await Jwt.sign({ userId, iat: now, exp: now + SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS }, secret, 'HS256');
+ setCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME, token, {
+ httpOnly: true,
+ secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+ sameSite: 'Lax',
+ path: '/',
+ maxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+ });
+}
+```
+
+**Verify pattern** — wraps Jwt.verify in try/catch (Pitfall 9 — throws on expiry):
+```typescript
+export async function verifyLocalSessionCookie(c: Context): Promise {
+ const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET;
+ if (!secret) return null;
+ const token = getCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME);
+ if (!token) return null;
+ try {
+ const payload = await Jwt.verify(token, secret, 'HS256');
+ return typeof payload.userId === 'number' ? payload.userId : null;
+ } catch {
+ return null; // includes JwtTokenExpired
+ }
+}
+```
+
+**Clear pattern** — mirrors cookie attribute set on issue:
+```typescript
+export function clearLocalSessionCookie(c: Context): void {
+ deleteCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/', httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'Lax' });
+}
+```
+
+**Cookie name:** `local-session` — distinct from OIDC cookie `oidc-auth` (persistSessionCookie.ts line 55: `process.env.OIDC_COOKIE_NAME ?? 'oidc-auth'`).
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts` (middleware, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts`
+
+**Imports pattern** (devBypass.ts lines 27–28):
+```typescript
+import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
+import { COLOR_PALETTE } from './user.js';
+```
+New file:
+```typescript
+import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db/client.js';
+import { users } from '../db/schema.js';
+import { verifyLocalSessionCookie } from './localSession.js';
+```
+
+**`c.set('user', ...)` pattern** — must produce same shape as `DEV_USER` (devBypass.ts lines 30–36):
+```typescript
+export const DEV_USER = {
+ id: 1,
+ oidcIss: 'dev',
+ oidcSub: 'dev-user',
+ displayName: 'Dev User',
+ color: COLOR_PALETTE[0],
+} as const;
+// ContextVariableMap declares user: typeof DEV_USER
+```
+The new middleware must call `c.set('user', { id, oidcIss, oidcSub, displayName, color })` with the same shape — fetched from the `users` table by the `userId` from the JWT.
+
+**Core middleware pattern** (mirrors devBypass.ts lines 58–76):
+```typescript
+export function localAuthMiddleware(): MiddlewareHandler {
+ return async (c, next) => {
+ const userId = await verifyLocalSessionCookie(c);
+ if (!userId) {
+ await next();
+ return;
+ }
+ // Load user row to populate the same shape as DEV_USER
+ const [row] = await db.select({ ... }).from(users).where(eq(users.id, userId)).limit(1);
+ if (!row) { await next(); return; }
+ c.set('user', { id: row.id, oidcIss: row.oidcIss ?? '', oidcSub: row.oidcSub ?? '', displayName: row.displayName ?? null, color: row.color });
+ await next();
+ };
+}
+```
+
+**Key rule:** Must be a no-op (call `next()`) when no `local-session` cookie is present — never set `c.get('user')` to undefined (Pitfall 1: OIDC guard redirects only when `c.get('user')` is falsy, so leaving it unset is correct fall-through behavior).
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/routes/authMode.ts` (route, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` — `GET /status` (lines 86–95)
+
+**Imports pattern** (setup.ts lines 29–41):
+```typescript
+import { Hono } from 'hono';
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db/client.js';
+import { appConfig } from '../db/schema.js';
+```
+
+**Pre-auth pattern** — same pattern as `setupRouter.get('/status', ...)`: no `isSetupLocked()` gate, no auth middleware, always reachable:
+```typescript
+export const authModeRouter = new Hono();
+
+authModeRouter.get('/', async (c) => {
+ const issuerFromEnv = process.env.OIDC_ISSUER;
+ let oidcEnabled = Boolean(issuerFromEnv);
+ if (!oidcEnabled) {
+ const [row] = await db.select({ value: appConfig.value }).from(appConfig)
+ .where(eq(appConfig.key, 'oidc_issuer')).limit(1);
+ oidcEnabled = Boolean(row?.value);
+ }
+ return c.json({ localEnabled: true, oidcEnabled });
+});
+```
+
+**Mount position in index.ts:** Before `app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass())` — same position as `app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter)` (index.ts line 49).
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts` (route, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` — `POST /credential` + `noEchoHook` pattern (lines 44–53, 73–77)
+
+**Imports pattern** (setup.ts lines 29–39):
+```typescript
+import { Hono } from 'hono';
+import type { Context } from 'hono';
+import { zValidator } from '@hono/zod-validator';
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db/client.js';
+```
+
+**noEchoHook pattern** (setup.ts lines 49–53) — copy verbatim:
+```typescript
+const noEchoHook = (result: { success: boolean }, c: Context) => {
+ if (!result.success) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Invalid request' }, 400);
+ }
+};
+```
+
+**zValidator usage** (admin.ts line 112):
+```typescript
+localAuthRouter.post('/login', zValidator('json', loginSchema, noEchoHook), async (c) => {
+ const { username, password } = c.req.valid('json');
+ // ...
+});
+```
+
+**Success response pattern** (me.ts line 201, admin.ts line 131):
+```typescript
+return c.json({ ok: true }, 200);
+```
+
+**Error response pattern** (admin.ts lines 119–130):
+```typescript
+if (err instanceof SomeError) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Invalid request' }, 400);
+}
+console.error('[localAuth/POST /login] Unexpected error:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
+return c.json({ error: 'Service unavailable' }, 503);
+```
+
+**Rate-limiting:** In-memory Map — no analog in codebase; pattern is from RESEARCH.md §Rate Limiting. See RESEARCH.md for the full `loginAttempts` Map implementation.
+
+**Logout route** — uses `clearLocalSessionCookie(c)` then:
+```typescript
+return c.json({ ok: true }, 200);
+```
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/db/schema.ts` (modified — additive) (model, CRUD)
+
+**Analog:** `memberCredentials` block in schema.ts (lines 74–94) — direct template.
+
+**Pattern to copy** (schema.ts lines 74–94):
+```typescript
+export const memberCredentials = mysqlTable(
+ 'member_credentials',
+ {
+ id: int().primaryKey().autoincrement(),
+ userId: int('user_id')
+ .notNull()
+ .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+ encryptedPassword: text('encrypted_password').notNull(),
+ fastmailEmail: varchar('fastmail_email', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
+ createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
+ updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').defaultNow().onUpdateNow(),
+ providerType: varchar('provider_type', { length: 64 }).notNull().default('caldav'),
+ },
+ (t) => [
+ index('idx_member_credentials_user_id').on(t.userId),
+ unique('uniq_member_credential_user').on(t.userId),
+ ],
+);
+```
+
+**New `localCredentials` table** — replace `encryptedPassword`/`fastmailEmail`/`providerType` with `username` + `passwordHash`, add a second `unique` on `username`:
+```typescript
+export const localCredentials = mysqlTable(
+ 'local_credentials',
+ {
+ id: int().primaryKey().autoincrement(),
+ userId: int('user_id').notNull().references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+ username: varchar('username', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
+ passwordHash: varchar('password_hash', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
+ createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
+ updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').defaultNow().onUpdateNow(),
+ },
+ (t) => [
+ unique('uniq_local_cred_user').on(t.userId),
+ unique('uniq_local_cred_username').on(t.username),
+ index('idx_local_credentials_user_id').on(t.userId),
+ ],
+);
+```
+
+**Import additions needed** (schema.ts line 1–14): `varchar` and `timestamp` already imported; `int`, `unique`, `index` already imported — no new imports required.
+
+**Export rule:** Add `localCredentials` to the existing named exports so `test/setup.ts` can truncate it.
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` (modified — additive) (route, CRUD)
+
+**Analog:** itself — `POST /credentials` (lines 112–132) and `GET /members` (lines 83–102).
+
+**Admin guard pattern** (admin.ts line 42) — already applies to all new routes via `adminRouter.use('*', requireAdmin)`:
+```typescript
+adminRouter.use('*', requireAdmin); // FIRST statement; never move this
+```
+
+**noEchoHook pattern** (admin.ts lines 70–74) — reuse existing:
+```typescript
+const noEchoHook = (result: { success: boolean }, c: Context) => {
+ if (!result.success) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Invalid request' }, 400);
+ }
+};
+```
+
+**Transaction pattern for create-member** (admin.ts lines 170–183 — `PUT /calendars/:id/shared` uses `db.transaction`):
+```typescript
+await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+ // 1. INSERT into users
+ // 2. INSERT into local_credentials
+});
+```
+
+**`GET /members` LEFT JOIN extension** (admin.ts lines 83–101) — extend the existing query to add `hasLocalCredential`:
+```typescript
+const rows = await db
+ .select({
+ id: users.id,
+ displayName: users.displayName,
+ color: users.color,
+ credentialId: memberCredentials.id,
+ localCredId: localCredentials.id, // NEW — LEFT JOIN
+ })
+ .from(users)
+ .leftJoin(memberCredentials, eq(memberCredentials.userId, users.id))
+ .leftJoin(localCredentials, eq(localCredentials.userId, users.id)); // NEW
+
+const members = rows.map((row) => ({
+ id: row.id,
+ displayName: row.displayName,
+ color: row.color,
+ hasCredential: row.credentialId !== null,
+ hasLocalCredential: row.localCredId !== null, // NEW
+}));
+```
+
+**Conflict (409) pattern** — not currently in codebase; use:
+```typescript
+return c.json({ error: 'Username already in use' }, 409);
+```
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts` (modified — additive) (route, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** itself — `POST /credential` (lines 154–202) and `resolveUserId` (lines 74–86).
+
+**`resolveUserId` pattern** (me.ts lines 74–86) — unchanged; new `POST /password` route calls it the same way:
+```typescript
+async function resolveUserId(c: Context): Promise {
+ const devUser = c.get('user') as { id: number } | undefined;
+ if (devUser) return devUser.id;
+ const auth = await getAuth(c);
+ if (!auth) return null;
+ // ... upsertUser
+}
+```
+
+**`meNoEchoHook` pattern** (me.ts lines 164–168) — copy for password route:
+```typescript
+const meNoEchoHook = (result: { success: boolean }, c: Context) => {
+ if (!result.success) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Invalid request' }, 400);
+ }
+};
+```
+
+**`resolveAdminAndSetupStatus` extension** — add `hasLocalCredential` (after existing `cred` query pattern at lines 50–66):
+```typescript
+const [localCred] = await db
+ .select({ id: localCredentials.id })
+ .from(localCredentials)
+ .where(eq(localCredentials.userId, userId))
+ .limit(1);
+// Add hasLocalCredential: Boolean(localCred) to the return object
+```
+
+**Response shape extension** (me.ts lines 93–104 / 129–139) — add `hasLocalCredential` alongside `isAdmin`, `needsProviderSetup`.
+
+**Self-change password route** — zValidator + noEchoHook + resolveUserId + error pattern identical to `POST /credential` (lines 170–202).
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/index.ts` (modified) (config, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** itself — middleware ordering block (lines 31–73).
+
+**Current middleware chain** (index.ts lines 49–73):
+```typescript
+app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter); // pre-auth
+
+app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass());
+
+if (!devBypassActive) {
+ app.use('/api/*', oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware);
+ app.use('/api/*', oidcAuthMiddleware());
+ app.use('/api/*', persistSessionCookie());
+}
+```
+
+**New chain** — insert `authModeRouter`, `localAuthRouter`, `localAuthMiddleware`, and OIDC guard wrapper:
+```typescript
+app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter); // pre-auth (unchanged)
+app.route('/api/auth', authModeRouter); // GET /api/auth/mode — pre-auth
+app.route('/api/auth', localAuthRouter); // POST /api/auth/local/login, /logout — pre-auth
+
+app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass()); // unchanged
+app.use('/api/*', localAuthMiddleware()); // NEW — sets c.get('user') from local-session cookie
+
+if (!devBypassActive) {
+ app.use('/api/*', oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware);
+ // OIDC guard: skip if user already set by localAuthMiddleware or devAuthBypass
+ app.use('/api/*', async (c, next) => {
+ if (c.get('user')) { await next(); return; }
+ await oidcAuthMiddleware()(c, next);
+ });
+ app.use('/api/*', persistSessionCookie());
+}
+```
+
+**`devBypassActive` computation** (index.ts lines 31–32) — unchanged; `localAuthMiddleware` is always mounted (it's a no-op when no cookie is present).
+
+**Boot guard extension** (index.ts lines 134–136) — add `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` assertion alongside `assertNotDevBypassInProduction()`.
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts` (modified) (middleware, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** itself.
+
+**Change scope:** Comment-only de-Authelia-ization (D-06). Line 5 header comment "Authelia as the identity provider" → "generic OIDC identity provider". Inline comments referencing "Authelia base URL" → "OIDC issuer URL". No runtime behavior changes.
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts` (modified) (utility, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** itself (lines 26–34).
+
+**Existing pattern** — copy structure for new `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` guard:
+```typescript
+export function assertNotDevBypassInProduction(): void {
+ if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' && process.env.DEV_AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
+ console.error('[FATAL] DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true is set in a production environment. ...');
+ process.exit(1);
+ }
+}
+```
+
+**New guard to add** — same pattern, different env var:
+```typescript
+export function assertLocalSessionSecretSet(): void {
+ // Only required when not in dev-bypass mode (bypass doesn't issue local-session cookies)
+ if (process.env.DEV_AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') return;
+ const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET;
+ if (!secret || secret.length < 32) {
+ console.error('[FATAL] LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET is not set or is shorter than 32 characters. Refusing to start.');
+ process.exit(1);
+ }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts` (utility, CRUD)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` — direct DB seed pattern (lines 95–148).
+
+**DB connection pattern** (global-setup.ts lines 95–101):
+```typescript
+import mysql from 'mysql2/promise';
+
+const conn = await mysql.createConnection({
+ host: process.env.DB_HOST ?? '127.0.0.1',
+ port: Number(process.env.DB_PORT ?? 3306),
+ user: process.env.DB_USER ?? 'familysync',
+ password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD ?? '',
+ database: process.env.DB_NAME ?? 'familysync',
+});
+```
+
+**Idempotent upsert pattern** (global-setup.ts lines 125–129):
+```typescript
+await conn.execute(
+ `INSERT INTO users (id, ...) VALUES (1, ...) ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE is_admin=true`,
+);
+```
+
+**Dev-only guard** — same pattern as global-setup.ts lines 34–44:
+```typescript
+if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
+ throw new Error('reset-admin refused: NODE_ENV=production.');
+}
+```
+
+**CLI arg parsing** — use `process.argv` directly (no new deps):
+```typescript
+const args = Object.fromEntries(
+ process.argv.slice(2).reduce((acc, arg, i, arr) => {
+ if (arg.startsWith('--')) acc.push([arg.slice(2), arr[i + 1] ?? '']);
+ return acc;
+ }, [])
+);
+const { username, password } = args;
+```
+
+**hashPassword inline** — copy the 5-line scrypt implementation inline (cannot import compiled TS — same constraint as global-setup.ts "Plain Node.js only" pattern). Use `import { scryptSync, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'` directly.
+
+---
+
+### `apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx` (component, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx`
+
+**Page shell styles** (SetupPage.tsx lines 60–84) — copy verbatim, adjust `maxWidth`:
+```typescript
+const pageStyle: React.CSSProperties = {
+ minHeight: '100dvh',
+ display: 'flex',
+ flexDirection: 'column',
+ alignItems: 'center',
+ justifyContent: 'flex-start',
+ background: 'var(--color-surface, #ffffff)',
+ fontFamily: 'var(--font-family-base)',
+ color: 'var(--color-text-primary, #111318)',
+};
+
+const contentColStyle: React.CSSProperties = {
+ maxWidth: '400px', // LoginPage: 400px, not 540px (UI-SPEC Surface 1)
+ width: '100%',
+ margin: '0 auto',
+ padding: 'var(--space-12, 48px) var(--space-6, 24px)',
+};
+
+const cardStyle: React.CSSProperties = {
+ background: 'var(--color-surface, #ffffff)',
+ border: '1px solid var(--color-border, #e2e4e9)',
+ borderRadius: '8px',
+ padding: 'var(--space-6, 24px)',
+ boxShadow: '0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,0.06)',
+};
+```
+
+**Button styles** (SetupPage.tsx lines 86–113) — copy verbatim:
+```typescript
+const primaryBtnStyle = (disabled: boolean): React.CSSProperties => ({
+ background: disabled ? 'var(--color-border, #e2e4e9)' : 'var(--color-member-0, #4a90d9)',
+ color: '#ffffff',
+ border: 'none',
+ cursor: disabled ? 'default' : 'pointer',
+ fontSize: 'var(--text-label-size, 13px)',
+ fontWeight: 600,
+ minHeight: '44px',
+ minWidth: '44px',
+ padding: '0 var(--space-6, 24px)',
+ borderRadius: 'var(--space-1, 4px)',
+ fontFamily: 'var(--font-family-base)',
+ transition: 'background 0.15s ease',
+});
+
+const ghostBtnStyle: React.CSSProperties = {
+ background: 'none',
+ border: 'none',
+ cursor: 'pointer',
+ fontSize: 'var(--text-label-size, 13px)',
+ fontWeight: 600,
+ color: 'var(--color-text-secondary, #6b7280)',
+ minHeight: '44px',
+ minWidth: '44px',
+ padding: '0 var(--space-4, 16px)',
+ fontFamily: 'var(--font-family-base)',
+ borderRadius: 'var(--space-1, 4px)',
+};
+```
+
+**Input style** (SetupPage.tsx lines 115–126) — copy verbatim (has `hasError` variant):
+```typescript
+const inputStyle = (hasError: boolean): React.CSSProperties => ({
+ width: '100%',
+ boxSizing: 'border-box',
+ padding: 'var(--space-3, 12px) var(--space-4, 16px)',
+ border: `1px solid ${hasError ? 'var(--color-destructive, #dc2626)' : 'var(--color-border, #e2e4e9)'}`,
+ borderRadius: 'var(--space-1, 4px)',
+ fontSize: 'var(--text-body-size, 15px)',
+ color: 'var(--color-text-primary, #111318)',
+ background: 'var(--color-surface, #ffffff)',
+ fontFamily: 'var(--font-family-base)',
+ outline: 'none',
+});
+
+const labelStyle: React.CSSProperties = {
+ display: 'block',
+ fontSize: 'var(--text-label-size, 13px)',
+ fontWeight: 600,
+ color: 'var(--color-text-primary, #111318)',
+ marginBottom: 'var(--space-1, 4px)',
+};
+```
+
+**Mutation + error state pattern** (SetupPage.tsx `useMutation` + `useState` for error):
+```typescript
+import { useState } from 'react';
+import { useMutation } from '@tanstack/react-query';
+import { Loader2, AlertCircle, Eye, EyeOff, ShieldCheck } from 'lucide-react';
+
+const [username, setUsername] = useState('');
+const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
+const [showPassword, setShowPassword] = useState(false);
+const [loginError, setLoginError] = useState<'invalid' | 'rate-limit' | 'locked' | 'server' | null>(null);
+
+const loginMutation = useMutation({
+ mutationFn: () => fetchLocalLogin({ username, password }),
+ onSuccess: () => { window.location.replace('/'); },
+ onError: (err) => {
+ if (err instanceof LoginError) {
+ setLoginError(err.code);
+ } else {
+ setLoginError('server');
+ }
+ },
+});
+```
+
+**Loader2 spinner pattern** (SetupPage.tsx — inline during pending):
+```tsx
+{loginMutation.isPending && }
+```
+
+**No AppNav / BottomTabBar** — same constraint as SetupPage: this component renders standalone; `App.tsx` routes `/login` outside the normal app shell.
+
+**Password show/hide toggle** — new pattern (no analog in codebase); position: relative wrapper + absolute button at right:
+```tsx
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+---
+
+### `apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx` (component, n/a)
+
+**Analog:** `apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx` — ShieldCheck icon header pattern
+
+**Pattern:** A standalone component with no props (initially); renders a placeholder circle with "FS" initials above the login card. Phase 17 replaces internals only.
+
+```tsx
+export function BrandSlot() {
+ return (
+
+```
+
+**Escape key pattern** (SettingsSheet.tsx lines 69–76):
+```typescript
+useEffect(() => {
+ if (!isOpen) return;
+ const onKeyDown = (e: KeyboardEvent) => { if (e.key === 'Escape') onClose(); };
+ document.addEventListener('keydown', onKeyDown);
+ return () => document.removeEventListener('keydown', onKeyDown);
+}, [isOpen, onClose]);
+```
+
+**Focus-on-open pattern** (CredentialSheet.tsx lines 97–102):
+```typescript
+useEffect(() => {
+ if (isOpen && headingRef.current) {
+ headingRef.current.focus();
+ }
+}, [isOpen]);
+```
+
+**Mutation error state pattern** (CredentialSheet.tsx lines 141–144):
+```typescript
+onError: () => {
+ setValidationError(FAILURE_TEXT);
+},
+```
+
+**Conditional row render** — "Change password" row shown only when `hasLocalCredential`:
+```tsx
+{meData?.user.hasLocalCredential && (
+
+)}
+```
+
+**New `hasLocalCredential` from `/api/me`** — already flows through `meQuery` in App.tsx; pass as prop or read from `useQuery(['me'])` inside the sheet.
+
+---
+
+### `apps/pwa/src/App.tsx` (modified) (component, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** itself — `setupQuery` gate (lines 72–79, 140–167).
+
+**Auth mode query pattern** — mirrors `setupQuery` (App.tsx lines 72–79):
+```typescript
+const authModeQuery = useQuery({
+ queryKey: ['authMode'],
+ queryFn: () => fetch('/api/auth/mode').then(r => r.json()) as Promise<{ localEnabled: boolean; oidcEnabled: boolean }>,
+ retry: false,
+ staleTime: 60_000, // auth mode changes rarely
+});
+```
+
+**Gate logic** — mirrors the `setupComplete` gate (App.tsx lines 140–167); add login gate after setup gate:
+```tsx
+// After setup gate, before normal app shell:
+// If user is not authenticated (meQuery.isError with 401) AND localEnabled:
+// render
+// If user is not authenticated AND !localEnabled AND oidcEnabled:
+// top-level redirect to /api/login (OIDC flow)
+```
+
+**`/login` route** — same structure as `/setup` route (App.tsx lines 156–167):
+```tsx
+}
+/>
+```
+
+**No AppNav/BottomTabBar on `/login`** — same constraint as `/setup`: login route is a sibling of the `*` route, rendered standalone.
+
+---
+
+### `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts` (modified) (utility, request-response)
+
+**Analog:** itself — `fetchMe` (lines 74–84) and `handleAuthResponse` (lines 51–58).
+
+**New fetch functions follow exact same pattern** as existing ones:
+```typescript
+export async function fetchAuthMode(): Promise<{ localEnabled: boolean; oidcEnabled: boolean }> {
+ // No credentials:'include' needed — pre-auth endpoint
+ const res = await fetch('/api/auth/mode');
+ if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`fetchAuthMode failed: ${res.status}`);
+ return res.json() as Promise<{ localEnabled: boolean; oidcEnabled: boolean }>;
+}
+
+export async function fetchLocalLogin(body: { username: string; password: string }): Promise {
+ const res = await fetch('/api/auth/local/login', {
+ method: 'POST',
+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+ credentials: 'include',
+ redirect: 'manual',
+ body: JSON.stringify(body),
+ });
+ // 401, 429, 423 are typed errors — throw with code; caller checks instanceof
+ if (res.status === 401) throw new LoginError('invalid');
+ if (res.status === 429) throw new LoginError('rate-limit');
+ if (res.status === 423) throw new LoginError('locked');
+ if (!res.ok) throw new LoginError('server');
+}
+```
+
+**Typed error class pattern** (client.ts lines 33–39 — `SessionExpiredError`):
+```typescript
+export class LoginError extends Error {
+ readonly name = 'LoginError';
+ constructor(public readonly code: 'invalid' | 'rate-limit' | 'locked' | 'server') {
+ super(`Login failed: ${code}`);
+ Object.setPrototypeOf(this, LoginError.prototype);
+ }
+}
+```
+
+**`MeUser` interface extension** (client.ts lines 62–68) — add `hasLocalCredential`:
+```typescript
+export interface MeUser {
+ id: number;
+ displayName: string | null;
+ color: string;
+ isAdmin: boolean;
+ needsProviderSetup: boolean;
+ hasLocalCredential: boolean; // NEW
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### `apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` (modified) (test, batch)
+
+**Analog:** itself — seed block (lines 119–148).
+
+**Pattern to extend** — add after the existing `users` seed (lines 125–129) and `member_credentials` seed (lines 143–147):
+```typescript
+// Seed local_credentials for dev user (id=1) — Option C dev-bypass rework
+// hashPassword is inlined (see Pitfall 11 — global-setup is plain Node.js, cannot import TS source)
+// Pre-hash the dev password at known params and hard-code the encoded string, OR inline hashPassword:
+import { scryptSync, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+function hashPasswordInline(password: string): string {
+ const salt = randomBytes(16);
+ const hash = scryptSync(password, salt, 32, { N: 16384, r: 8, p: 1 });
+ return ['scrypt', 16384, 8, 1, salt.toString('base64url'), hash.toString('base64url')].join('$');
+}
+await conn.execute(
+ `INSERT INTO local_credentials (user_id, username, password_hash) VALUES (1, 'devuser', ?)
+ ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE password_hash = VALUES(password_hash)`,
+ [hashPasswordInline('devpass')]
+);
+```
+
+**TRUNCATE extension** — add `local_credentials` to the existing TRUNCATE block (lines 106–109):
+```typescript
+await conn.execute('TRUNCATE TABLE local_credentials');
+```
+
+**Guard pattern** (global-setup.ts lines 34–44) — unchanged; existing `NODE_ENV === 'production'` and `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS !== 'true'` guards already cover the new seed.
+
+---
+
+## Shared Patterns
+
+### Authentication middleware — `c.set('user', ...)` contract
+**Source:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts` (lines 30–48, 72–75)
+**Apply to:** `localAuthMiddleware.ts`, all route files that read `c.get('user')`
+
+The user object shape declared in `ContextVariableMap`:
+```typescript
+declare module 'hono' {
+ interface ContextVariableMap {
+ user: typeof DEV_USER; // { id, oidcIss, oidcSub, displayName, color }
+ }
+}
+```
+`localAuthMiddleware` must produce a value assignable to this type. Import the type augmentation via `import '../auth/devBypass.js'` (side-effect import) in any file that reads `c.get('user')` — exactly as admin.ts (line 36) and me.ts (line 42) already do.
+
+### noEchoHook — password routes
+**Source:** `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` (lines 49–53), `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` (lines 70–74)
+**Apply to:** `localAuth.ts` (login), `admin.ts` (create-member, reset-password), `me.ts` (change-password)
+
+```typescript
+const noEchoHook = (result: { success: boolean }, c: Context) => {
+ if (!result.success) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Invalid request' }, 400);
+ }
+};
+```
+Never return `result.error` — Zod's error object echoes `issues[].received` which may contain the submitted password.
+
+### Error response pattern
+**Source:** `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` (lines 119–130), `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts` (lines 191–198)
+**Apply to:** all new API routes
+
+```typescript
+try {
+ // ... business logic
+} catch (err) {
+ if (err instanceof KnownError) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'descriptive message' }, 4xx);
+ }
+ console.error('[routeFile/POST /endpoint] Unexpected error:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
+ return c.json({ error: 'Service unavailable' }, 503);
+}
+```
+
+### DB transaction pattern
+**Source:** `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` (lines 170–183)
+**Apply to:** `admin.ts` — `POST /members` (must insert `users` + `local_credentials` atomically)
+
+```typescript
+const found = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+ // 1. INSERT users
+ // 2. INSERT local_credentials
+ return true;
+});
+```
+
+### requireAdmin guard
+**Source:** `apps/api/src/lib/requireAdmin.ts` (lines 25–47)
+**Apply to:** all new `adminRouter.*` routes (already covered by `adminRouter.use('*', requireAdmin)` — no new work needed)
+
+### Bottom sheet (dialog) pattern
+**Source:** `apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx` (lines 146–178), `apps/pwa/src/components/CredentialSheet.tsx` (lines 86–113)
+**Apply to:** `SettingsSheet.tsx` additions (Surfaces 12, 13), `AdminPage.tsx` addition (Surface 11B)
+
+Key attributes: `role="dialog"`, `aria-modal="true"`, `aria-label`, Escape-close listener, focus-heading-on-open, focus-return-to-trigger-on-close.
+
+### TanStack Query `useMutation` + cache invalidation
+**Source:** `apps/pwa/src/components/CredentialSheet.tsx` (lines 115–144)
+**Apply to:** all new PWA mutation surfaces (login, create-member, reset-password, change-password, link-OIDC)
+
+```typescript
+const mutation = useMutation({
+ mutationFn: async () => { /* fetch call */ },
+ onSuccess: () => {
+ void queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ['admin', 'members'] });
+ void queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ['me'] });
+ handleClose();
+ },
+ onError: () => {
+ setError(FAILURE_TEXT);
+ },
+});
+```
+
+### Drizzle generate+migrate (never push)
+**Source:** CONTEXT.md §Established Patterns + RESEARCH.md §Migration Workflow
+**Apply to:** `local_credentials` migration only
+
+```bash
+pnpm --filter @familysync/api db:generate # → 0003_local_credentials.sql
+pnpm --filter @familysync/api db:migrate
+```
+Review generated SQL before applying — must be purely additive (CREATE TABLE only).
+
+---
+
+## No Analog Found
+
+All files have close analogs. No entries.
+
+---
+
+## Metadata
+
+**Analog search scope:** `apps/api/src/` (auth/, routes/, db/, lib/), `apps/pwa/src/` (routes/, components/, api/), `apps/pwa/e2e/`
+**Files read:** 18 source files
+**Pattern extraction date:** 2026-06-17
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a99cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-RESEARCH.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1161 @@
+# Phase 19: Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode) - Research
+
+**Researched:** 2026-06-17
+**Domain:** Authentication — local username/password credentials, stateless JWT session cookies, Hono middleware ordering, Drizzle schema migration
+**Confidence:** HIGH
+
+---
+
+
+## User Constraints (from CONTEXT.md)
+
+### Locked Decisions
+
+- **D-01:** Local auth is the **default and always available**. OIDC is **opt-in/additive**, never a replacement for the local path at the system level.
+- **D-02:** OIDC is configured from the **admin UI** (extends the Phase-12 config that already lands in `app_config`: `oidc_issuer`, `oidc_client_id`, `app_external_url`). When OIDC is configured, **both methods are offered and the user chooses at login** (local username/password OR "Login with OIDC").
+- **D-03:** This must **not break the existing live OIDC deployment**. The two current household members already authenticate via Authelia (`oidc_iss`/`oidc_sub` set, `claimed=true`); they continue as OIDC users. Local auth is layered on additively.
+- **D-04:** A **new local login UI (username + password) must be built in the PWA** — none exists today. The PWA currently boots straight into the authed app (OIDC redirect) or via dev-bypass; there is no login form.
+- **D-05:** Local logins are backed by a **stateless signed httpOnly JWT cookie** carrying `userId`, validated by a **new local-auth middleware that sets `c.get('user')`** the same way `auth/devBypass.ts` does — so every downstream route resolves the user unchanged. **No DB sessions table**. Tradeoff accepted: a password change cannot retroactively invalidate other live sessions; logout = clear cookie.
+- **D-06 (BYO-Auth principle):** Local auth is first-class; OIDC is treated as a **generic RFC-compliant provider, not Authelia-hardcoded**. `@hono/oidc-auth` is already provider-agnostic — work is to de-Authelia-ize config keys and user-facing copy.
+- **D-07 (BYO-Auth scope):** Ship **local + one generic OIDC** with a **clean internal seam** for future methods. **No plugin/registry framework** in this phase.
+- **D-08:** Hash local passwords with **`node:crypto` scrypt** — zero new dependency, no native node-gyp build. Encode **algorithm + params + salt alongside the hash** so parameters can evolve.
+- **D-09:** Store local credentials in a **new `local_credentials` table** — `user_id` (FK to `users`, UNIQUE), `username` (UNIQUE), `password_hash` (encoded), `createdAt`/`updatedAt`. Drizzle **generate+migrate, never push**.
+- **D-10:** **Admin creates members** + sets an initial password; the member changes it later. **No open self-signup**.
+- **D-11:** Password lifecycle = **self-change (current + new) + admin-reset** from the admin UI. **No email reset**.
+- **D-12:** **OIDC link replaces local at the per-user level**: when a local user links an OIDC identity (explicit action while authenticated as that user — never an email match), **delete that user's `local_credentials` row** → they become OIDC-only.
+- **D-13 (break-glass):** Lockout recovery is a **CLI/console command and/or env override** (e.g. create/reset a local admin, or disable/force-off OIDC), run on the host/container. **No new role/capability model**; reuse today's single `users.is_admin`.
+- **D-14:** The new login UI requires touching existing API/unit tests and the **Phase 7/8 Playwright harness** (which today reaches the authed PWA purely via `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS`, skipping any login). Both the already-authed fast path and the **real login form** must remain testable.
+- **D-15 (hard constraint):** Any seeded test login / reworked dev-bypass mechanism **stays dev-only and never ships in the Docker/prod image**. Bound by the existing Phase-16 image-hygiene gates: IMG-01 boot guard (`assertNotDevBypassInProduction`), `.dockerignore` (IMG-02), and the publish-time hygiene assertion (IMG-03).
+
+### Claude's Discretion (decided in-discussion)
+- Session backing mechanism (chose stateless signed JWT cookie — D-05).
+- Credential storage location (chose separate `local_credentials` table — D-09).
+
+### Deferred Ideas (OUT OF SCOPE)
+- **Full pluggable auth-provider framework** (registry/plugin for LDAP, magic-link, multiple simultaneous OIDC providers) — auth-layer counterpart of backlog 999.1.
+- **Member-vs-operator capability/role split** — explicitly rejected in favor of a CLI/env recovery mechanism.
+- **Email-based password reset** — out of project scope.
+
+
+---
+
+
+## Phase Requirements
+
+The following REQ-IDs are newly defined by this phase. The planner should include them verbatim in PLAN.md task descriptions and VALIDATION.md.
+
+| ID | Description | Research Support |
+|----|-------------|------------------|
+| AUTH-LOCAL-01 | `local_credentials` Drizzle schema + migration (0003): `user_id` FK UNIQUE, `username` UNIQUE, `password_hash` varchar | §Schema Change, §Standard Stack §Migration |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-02 | `hashPassword(password)` and `verifyPassword(hash, candidate)` helpers using `node:crypto` scrypt in PHC-style encoded format | §Password Hashing |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-03 | `POST /api/auth/local/login` route — timing-safe verify, issue `local-session` JWT cookie, return 401/429/423/200 | §Local Login Endpoint |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-04 | `localAuthMiddleware` — reads `local-session` cookie, validates JWT, sets `c.get('user')` identical to devBypass; mounts in `index.ts` before OIDC guard | §Middleware Slot |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-05 | `GET /api/auth/mode` pre-auth endpoint — returns `{ localEnabled: true, oidcEnabled: boolean }` based on `app_config` OIDC keys | §Auth Mode Endpoint |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-06 | `POST /api/auth/local/logout` — clears `local-session` cookie; `GET /api/auth/local/logout` alias | §Logout |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-07 | `POST /api/admin/members` — admin creates local member: insert `users` row + `local_credentials` row with hashed initial password | §Admin Account Management |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-08 | `POST /api/admin/members/:id/password` — admin resets a local member's password (no current-password required); admin-gated | §Admin Account Management |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-09 | `POST /api/me/password` — self-change password: verify current password, hash new, update `local_credentials` | §Self-Service Password |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-10 | OIDC-link flow: `POST /api/me/link-oidc` (or reuse OIDC callback, see §OIDC-Link Flow) — bind `oidc_iss+oidc_sub` to the authenticated user, delete their `local_credentials` row | §OIDC-Link Flow |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-11 | Break-glass CLI — Node.js script `scripts/reset-admin.ts` runnable as `tsx scripts/reset-admin.ts` inside the container, creates/resets a local admin by username without requiring an existing session | §Break-Glass |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-12 | PWA `LoginPage` component (`/login` route) per UI-SPEC Surface 1–10: username+password form, `BrandSlot`, OIDC button when `oidcEnabled`, error state machine | §UI — LoginPage |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-13 | PWA admin additions: "Add member" form (UI-SPEC Surface 11A) + "Reset password" modal (Surface 11B) in `AdminPage.tsx` | §UI — Admin |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-14 | PWA self-service: "Change password" sheet (UI-SPEC Surface 12) in `SettingsSheet.tsx`; "Link OIDC identity" confirmation sheet (Surface 13) | §UI — Settings |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-15 | `App.tsx` login gate: fetch `/api/auth/mode` pre-auth, add `/login` route (standalone), redirect unauthenticated users there when `localEnabled`, skip if valid local or OIDC session | §PWA Routing Gate |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-16 | Playwright harness dev-bypass rework: "option C" (bypass issues a real local-session cookie), update `global-setup.ts` to seed `local_credentials` for dev user (id=1), update CI workflow | §Dev-Bypass Rework |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-17 | `/api/me` response extended with `hasLocalCredential: boolean` so `SettingsSheet` and `AdminPage` know which users have local creds | §API Extensions |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-18 | `app_config` OIDC key de-Authelia-ization: rename any Authelia-specific copy in config keys and comments to generic OIDC labels (no key name change — keys are already generic `oidc_issuer` etc.) | §BYO-Auth De-Authelia-ization |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-19 | Rate-limiting on `POST /api/auth/local/login`: in-memory per-IP counter (Map), 5 failures → 60s cooldown → 429; account lockout at 10 failures → 423; cleared on success | §Rate Limiting |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-20 | Vitest unit tests: password hashing round-trip, timing-safe compare, login success/failure/lockout, middleware session validation, OIDC-link 409 conflict | §Validation Architecture |
+
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+Phase 19 builds a complete local username/password authentication system on top of the Phase 12 pre-OIDC user foundation. The core architectural move is to add a parallel authentication path alongside the existing `@hono/oidc-auth` middleware: a new `localAuthMiddleware` that reads a signed `local-session` cookie (JWT, HS256 via Hono's built-in `Jwt.sign`/`Jwt.verify`) and populates `c.get('user')` with the same shape that `devAuthBypass()` uses, so all downstream routes work unchanged.
+
+No new npm dependencies are required. Password hashing uses `node:crypto` scrypt (Node.js stdlib), JWT signing uses Hono's built-in `Jwt` from `hono/utils/jwt`, and session cookies use the existing `hono/cookie` helpers (`getCookie`/`setCookie`). The `local_credentials` table mirrors the `member_credentials` shape already in the schema. The migration is a straightforward additive `drizzle-kit generate` + `migrate`.
+
+The PWA adds a `/login` route (standalone, no AppNav/BottomTabBar — same pattern as `/setup`). The login gate is driven by a new pre-auth `GET /api/auth/mode` endpoint. Existing OIDC users are completely unaffected by all of this: their `oidcAuthMiddleware` path is unchanged; the local auth path only fires for requests that arrive with a `local-session` cookie.
+
+**Primary recommendation:** Implement in three waves: (1) schema + credential helpers + API routes, (2) middleware wiring + mode endpoint + PWA login page, (3) admin UI extensions + OIDC-link + break-glass + harness update.
+
+---
+
+## Architectural Responsibility Map
+
+| Capability | Primary Tier | Secondary Tier | Rationale |
+|------------|-------------|----------------|-----------|
+| Password hashing/verification | API / Backend | — | Secrets never leave server; `node:crypto` scrypt runs server-side only |
+| Session JWT sign/verify | API / Backend | — | `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` is an env-floor secret; client only holds opaque cookie |
+| Auth middleware selection | API / Backend | — | `index.ts` is the single mount-order source of truth |
+| Auth mode signalling | API / Backend (pre-auth endpoint) | Frontend fetch | `/api/auth/mode` is the authoritative source; PWA reads it |
+| Login form UI | Browser / Client | — | React component, form state, client-side validation |
+| Admin member management | API / Backend | Admin UI (client) | Server enforces `requireAdmin`; client is UX-only |
+| OIDC-link binding | API / Backend | Browser / Client (confirmation UI) | Actual `iss+sub` binding + `local_credentials` delete is a backend transaction |
+| Break-glass recovery | API / Backend (CLI script) | — | Host/container-side only; no UI surface |
+| Cookie issuance | API / Backend | — | `httpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Lax`; client cannot write it |
+| Rate-limiting / lockout | API / Backend | Browser / Client (error display) | In-memory Map on the server; UI mirrors the 429/423 response |
+
+---
+
+## Standard Stack
+
+### Core (no new packages — everything already installed)
+
+| Library | Version | Purpose | Status |
+|---------|---------|---------|--------|
+| `node:crypto` | stdlib (Node 22) | `scrypt`, `scryptSync`, `randomBytes`, `timingSafeEqual` | [VERIFIED: codebase — confirmed available in Node 22.22.3 on this machine] |
+| `hono` | 4.12.23 (installed) | `Jwt.sign`, `Jwt.verify` from `hono/utils/jwt`; `getCookie`, `setCookie` from `hono/cookie` | [VERIFIED: codebase — `Jwt.sign` and `Jwt.verify` confirmed callable at runtime from `hono/utils/jwt`; `getCookie`/`setCookie` confirmed from `hono/cookie`] |
+| `drizzle-orm` | 0.45.2 (installed) | New `local_credentials` table; `drizzle-kit generate` + `migrate` | [VERIFIED: codebase — already in use; `mysqlTable`, `unique`, `index` patterns from `schema.ts`] |
+| `zod` | 3.25.x (installed) | Validate login request body (`username`, `password`) | [VERIFIED: codebase — already used in every route] |
+
+### Zero new npm dependencies
+
+This phase installs **no new packages**. All required capabilities are in the existing stack:
+
+- Password hashing: `node:crypto` scrypt (stdlib, confirmed available)
+- JWT signing: `hono/utils/jwt` `Jwt.sign`/`Jwt.verify` (confirmed callable from `hono@4.12.23`)
+- Cookie read/write: `hono/cookie` `getCookie`/`setCookie` (already used in `persistSessionCookie.ts`)
+- Schema: `drizzle-orm` `mysqlTable` (same pattern as `member_credentials`)
+- Input validation: `zod` + `@hono/zod-validator` (already used in every route)
+
+**Installation:** None required.
+
+---
+
+## Package Legitimacy Audit
+
+No new packages are introduced in this phase. All libraries listed above are already installed and legitimacy-verified from prior phases.
+
+**Packages removed due to SLOP verdict:** None
+**Packages flagged as suspicious:** None (hono is flagged SUS by the seam's "too-new" heuristic because its last publish date happens to be recent, but it is the same `hono@4.12.23` already installed and running in production — not a new install)
+
+---
+
+## Architecture Patterns
+
+### System Architecture Diagram
+
+```
+PWA /login page
+ ↓ GET /api/auth/mode (pre-auth, no middleware)
+ ← { localEnabled: true, oidcEnabled: boolean }
+
+ ↓ POST /api/auth/local/login { username, password }
+ API auth/localLogin.ts
+ → local_credentials lookup by username
+ → verifyPassword(stored_hash, candidate) [node:crypto timingSafeEqual]
+ → Jwt.sign({ userId, iat, exp }, LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET)
+ ← Set-Cookie: local-session=; httpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax
+ ← 200 { ok: true }
+
+ ↓ Any subsequent /api/* request (carries local-session cookie)
+ index.ts middleware chain:
+ devAuthBypass() — no-op passthrough (bypass not set in prod)
+ localAuthMiddleware() — getCookie('local-session'), Jwt.verify(), c.set('user', {id, ...})
+ → next() if valid cookie; else fall through
+ oidcConfigFallback — injects OIDC config from app_config if absent
+ oidcAuthMiddleware() — skipped if c.get('user') already set? [see §Middleware Slot]
+ persistSessionCookie()— OIDC sessions only
+ ↓ downstream routes read c.get('user') — unchanged
+
+PWA /admin → AdminPage
+ ↓ GET /api/admin/members (returns hasLocalCredential per member)
+ ↓ POST /api/admin/members { displayName, username, initialPassword }
+ → users INSERT + local_credentials INSERT (hashed)
+ ↓ POST /api/admin/members/:id/password { newPassword, confirmPassword }
+ → local_credentials UPDATE (hashed)
+
+PWA SettingsSheet
+ ↓ POST /api/me/password { currentPassword, newPassword }
+ → verifyPassword(stored, current) → UPDATE hash
+ ↓ POST /api/me/link-oidc (authenticated as local user)
+ → initiates OIDC authorization-code redirect
+ → on /callback with valid OIDC session:
+ bind iss+sub to users row (must not conflict with existing user)
+ DELETE local_credentials WHERE user_id = current
+ → user is now OIDC-only
+
+Break-glass:
+ docker exec familysync-api node scripts/reset-admin.ts --username admin --password
+ → direct DB write: upsert local_credentials for username, ensure is_admin=true
+```
+
+### Recommended Project Structure
+
+New files (additions only):
+
+```
+apps/api/src/
+├── auth/
+│ ├── localCredentials.ts # hashPassword(), verifyPassword() using node:crypto scrypt
+│ ├── localSession.ts # issueLocalSessionCookie(), verifyLocalSessionCookie(), clearLocalSessionCookie()
+│ └── localAuthMiddleware.ts # Hono middleware: getCookie → Jwt.verify → c.set('user')
+├── routes/
+│ ├── authMode.ts # GET /api/auth/mode (pre-auth)
+│ └── localAuth.ts # POST /api/auth/local/login, /logout
+└── db/
+ └── migrations/
+ └── 0003_local_credentials.sql # generated by drizzle-kit
+
+apps/api/scripts/
+└── reset-admin.ts # break-glass CLI (dev-only gate: .dockerignore excludes scripts/)
+
+apps/pwa/src/
+├── routes/
+│ └── LoginPage.tsx # /login standalone page (UI-SPEC Surfaces 1–10)
+└── components/
+ └── BrandSlot.tsx # phase-17 seam component (UI-SPEC §Brand Slot)
+```
+
+Modified files:
+
+```
+apps/api/src/
+├── db/schema.ts # + local_credentials table definition
+├── routes/admin.ts # + POST /members, POST /members/:id/password
+├── routes/me.ts # + POST /password, + hasLocalCredential in GET response
+├── routes/setup.ts # + link-oidc callback handler (or reuse /callback)
+└── index.ts # + mount localAuthMiddleware, authModeRouter before OIDC guard
+
+apps/pwa/src/
+├── App.tsx # + /login route, auth-mode fetch gate
+├── api/client.ts # + fetchAuthMode(), fetchLocalLogin(), fetchLocalLogout(), etc.
+├── routes/AdminPage.tsx # + LOCAL ACCOUNTS section (Surfaces 11A, 11B)
+└── components/SettingsSheet.tsx # + Change password row (Surface 12), Link OIDC row (Surface 13)
+```
+
+---
+
+## Password Hashing Pattern
+
+### PHC-Style Encoding with `node:crypto` scrypt
+
+D-08 mandates `node:crypto` scrypt with the algorithm + params + salt encoded alongside the hash so parameters can evolve. The established pattern for self-describing encoded hashes is a `$`-delimited PHC-style string. [VERIFIED: codebase — scryptSync, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual all available in Node 22.22.3; runtime confirmed]
+
+```typescript
+// Source: node:crypto docs + runtime-verified on Node 22.22.3
+import { scryptSync, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+
+// Parameters (OWASP-compatible for scrypt at this resource level)
+const SCRYPT_N = 16384; // CPU/memory cost — 2^14; increase to 2^15 if hardware permits
+const SCRYPT_R = 8;
+const SCRYPT_P = 1;
+const KEY_LEN = 32; // 256-bit output
+
+/**
+ * Hash a password. Returns a self-describing encoded string:
+ * scrypt$N$r$p$$
+ *
+ * The $-delimited format is inspired by PHC and allows future parameter upgrades
+ * without a separate migration — verifyPassword parses all fields from the string.
+ */
+export function hashPassword(password: string): string {
+ const salt = randomBytes(16);
+ const hash = scryptSync(password, salt, KEY_LEN, { N: SCRYPT_N, r: SCRYPT_R, p: SCRYPT_P });
+ return [
+ 'scrypt',
+ SCRYPT_N,
+ SCRYPT_R,
+ SCRYPT_P,
+ salt.toString('base64url'),
+ hash.toString('base64url'),
+ ].join('$');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a password against a stored encoded hash.
+ * Uses timingSafeEqual to prevent timing-oracle attacks.
+ * Returns false (never throws) on any parse/format mismatch.
+ */
+export function verifyPassword(storedEncoded: string, candidate: string): boolean {
+ try {
+ const [, n, r, p, saltB64, hashB64] = storedEncoded.split('$');
+ const salt = Buffer.from(saltB64, 'base64url');
+ const storedHash = Buffer.from(hashB64, 'base64url');
+ const candidateHash = scryptSync(candidate, salt, storedHash.length, {
+ N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p),
+ });
+ return timingSafeEqual(storedHash, candidateHash);
+ } catch {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+```
+
+**Key points:**
+- `scryptSync` blocks the event loop. For login (infrequent in a 2-person household) this is acceptable. If async is preferred, use `promisify(scrypt)` from `node:util`.
+- `timingSafeEqual` requires equal-length buffers — `storedHash.length` as keylen ensures this.
+- The encoded string is ~83 characters at N=16384 — fits comfortably in `varchar(256)`.
+
+**Note on pepper:** D-08 specifies no pepper (env-only secret kernel). The scrypt salt + encoding is sufficient for this use case. Adding a pepper would require another env var and would not materially improve security for this threat model (household scale, Pangolin-exposed but not public).
+
+---
+
+## Drizzle Schema Change
+
+### `local_credentials` Table
+
+Mirrors the `member_credentials` shape but stores username + password hash. [VERIFIED: codebase — `member_credentials` pattern in `schema.ts` lines 74–94; `mysqlTable`, `int`, `varchar`, `timestamp`, `unique`, `index` all imported]
+
+```typescript
+// In apps/api/src/db/schema.ts — additive only
+export const localCredentials = mysqlTable(
+ 'local_credentials',
+ {
+ id: int().primaryKey().autoincrement(),
+ userId: int('user_id')
+ .notNull()
+ .references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+ username: varchar('username', { length: 128 }).notNull(),
+ // PHC-encoded: scrypt$N$r$p$$ — self-describing
+ passwordHash: varchar('password_hash', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
+ createdAt: timestamp('created_at').defaultNow().notNull(),
+ updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at').defaultNow().onUpdateNow(),
+ },
+ (t) => [
+ // One local credential per user (UNIQUE on user_id)
+ unique('uniq_local_cred_user').on(t.userId),
+ // Username is globally unique (login identifier)
+ unique('uniq_local_cred_username').on(t.username),
+ index('idx_local_credentials_user_id').on(t.userId),
+ ],
+);
+```
+
+### Migration Workflow
+
+Drizzle generate+migrate only — never push (established rule; `push` emits false destructive diffs on MariaDB). [VERIFIED: codebase — 0002 migration and `scripts` in `package.json`]
+
+```bash
+# 1. Add localCredentials to schema.ts
+# 2. Generate migration
+pnpm --filter @familysync/api db:generate
+# → apps/api/src/db/migrations/0003_local_credentials.sql
+
+# 3. Review generated SQL (must be purely additive — CREATE TABLE only)
+# 4. Apply
+pnpm --filter @familysync/api db:migrate
+```
+
+The generated SQL will be something like:
+```sql
+CREATE TABLE `local_credentials` (
+ `id` int AUTO_INCREMENT PRIMARY KEY,
+ `user_id` int NOT NULL REFERENCES `users`(`id`) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+ `username` varchar(128) NOT NULL,
+ `password_hash` varchar(256) NOT NULL,
+ `created_at` timestamp NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+ `updated_at` timestamp DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ON UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
+ CONSTRAINT `uniq_local_cred_user` UNIQUE(`user_id`),
+ CONSTRAINT `uniq_local_cred_username` UNIQUE(`username`),
+ INDEX `idx_local_credentials_user_id`(`user_id`)
+);
+```
+
+**Remember:** Export `localCredentials` from `schema.ts` so `test/setup.ts` can truncate it in `afterEach`.
+
+---
+
+## Middleware Slot and Ordering
+
+### Current `index.ts` middleware chain
+
+[VERIFIED: codebase — read `apps/api/src/index.ts`]
+
+```
+app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter) // pre-auth
+app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass()) // DEV only — no-op in prod
+if (!devBypassActive) {
+ app.use('/api/*', oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware)
+ app.use('/api/*', oidcAuthMiddleware())
+ app.use('/api/*', persistSessionCookie())
+}
+```
+
+### New middleware slot for Phase 19
+
+The `localAuthMiddleware` must sit **between `devAuthBypass` and `oidcAuthMiddleware`**. It reads the `local-session` cookie. If the cookie is present and valid, it sets `c.get('user')` and calls `next()`. If no cookie, it falls through to `oidcAuthMiddleware`.
+
+The key architectural requirement: `oidcAuthMiddleware` must **not** redirect to Authelia when the request already has a valid local session. The solution is to check whether `c.get('user')` is set before mounting `oidcAuthMiddleware`, or to make `localAuthMiddleware` short-circuit the OIDC path.
+
+**Recommended approach:** Wrap `oidcAuthMiddleware` in a guard that skips it when `c.get('user')` is already populated:
+
+```typescript
+// index.ts updated middleware chain
+app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter) // pre-auth (no change)
+app.route('/api/auth', authModeRouter) // GET /api/auth/mode — pre-auth, no middleware
+app.route('/api/auth', localAuthRouter) // POST /api/auth/local/login + /logout — pre-auth
+
+app.use('/api/*', devAuthBypass()) // DEV only (existing)
+
+// NEW: local session check — populates c.get('user') if local-session cookie valid
+app.use('/api/*', localAuthMiddleware())
+
+if (!devBypassActive) {
+ app.use('/api/*', oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware)
+ // OIDC guard: skip if user already set by localAuthMiddleware or devAuthBypass
+ app.use('/api/*', async (c, next) => {
+ if (c.get('user')) { await next(); return; }
+ await oidcAuthMiddleware()(c, next);
+ });
+ app.use('/api/*', persistSessionCookie())
+}
+```
+
+**Why pre-auth for login/logout routes:** `POST /api/auth/local/login` must be reachable without a session (it's how a session is created). Mount it before the OIDC guard, just like `/api/setup/*`. The `GET /api/auth/mode` endpoint similarly needs no auth.
+
+**Security note:** `localAuthMiddleware` must be a no-op when no `local-session` cookie is present — it should not attempt to verify a missing cookie and must not set `c.get('user')` to `undefined`. The downstream `oidcAuthMiddleware` redirects only when `c.get('user')` is falsy.
+
+---
+
+## JWT Session Cookie Pattern
+
+### `issueLocalSessionCookie` / `verifyLocalSessionCookie`
+
+Uses Hono's built-in `Jwt` from `hono/utils/jwt`. The algorithm is HS256 (symmetric, fast, appropriate for a single-server household app). [VERIFIED: codebase — `Jwt.sign` and `Jwt.verify` confirmed callable at runtime]
+
+```typescript
+// Source: hono/utils/jwt (runtime-verified in this project)
+import { Jwt } from 'hono/utils/jwt';
+import { setCookie, getCookie, deleteCookie } from 'hono/cookie';
+import type { Context } from 'hono';
+
+const COOKIE_NAME = 'local-session';
+const SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = Number(process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES ?? 86400); // 1 day default
+
+export async function issueLocalSessionCookie(c: Context, userId: number): Promise {
+ const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET;
+ if (!secret) throw new Error('LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET env var not set');
+
+ const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+ const payload = { userId, iat: now, exp: now + SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS };
+
+ const token = await Jwt.sign(payload, secret, 'HS256');
+
+ setCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME, token, {
+ httpOnly: true,
+ secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+ sameSite: 'Lax',
+ path: '/',
+ maxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+ });
+}
+
+export async function verifyLocalSessionCookie(c: Context): Promise {
+ const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET;
+ if (!secret) return null;
+
+ const token = getCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME);
+ if (!token) return null;
+
+ try {
+ const payload = await Jwt.verify(token, secret, 'HS256');
+ return typeof payload.userId === 'number' ? payload.userId : null;
+ } catch {
+ return null;
+ }
+}
+
+export function clearLocalSessionCookie(c: Context): void {
+ deleteCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/', httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'Lax' });
+}
+```
+
+**Cookie name:** `local-session` (distinct from the OIDC cookie `oidc-auth` — avoids collision).
+
+**`LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` env var:** This is a new env-floor secret that must be added to the D-01 minimal env kernel documentation (it encrypts the local session JWT). It never goes to `app_config`. Operators generate it with `openssl rand -base64 32`. The `generate-secrets` script from Phase 12 should be extended to emit it.
+
+---
+
+## Local Login Endpoint
+
+### `POST /api/auth/local/login`
+
+[ASSUMED — specific implementation, but directly derived from the patterns in `setup.ts` and `admin.ts`]
+
+```typescript
+// apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts
+const loginSchema = z.object({
+ username: z.string().min(1).max(128).trim(),
+ password: z.string().min(1).max(1000),
+});
+
+// Rate-limiting: simple in-memory Map (household scale; no Redis needed)
+// { ip → { failCount, lockedUntil } }
+const loginAttempts = new Map();
+const RATE_WINDOW_FAILURES = 5; // 5 failures → 60s cooldown
+const RATE_WINDOW_SECS = 60;
+const LOCKOUT_FAILURES = 10; // 10 failures → account locked (admin must reset)
+
+localAuthRouter.post('/login', zValidator('json', loginSchema, noEchoHook), async (c) => {
+ const ip = c.req.header('x-forwarded-for') ?? c.req.raw.headers.get('host') ?? 'unknown';
+
+ // Check rate limit / lockout
+ const attempt = loginAttempts.get(ip);
+ if (attempt?.lockedOut) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Account locked' }, 423);
+ }
+ if (attempt && attempt.count >= RATE_WINDOW_FAILURES && Date.now() < attempt.lockedUntil) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Too many attempts' }, 429);
+ }
+
+ const { username, password } = c.req.valid('json');
+
+ // Lookup by username — constant-time operation for timing safety
+ const [cred] = await db
+ .select({ userId: localCredentials.userId, passwordHash: localCredentials.passwordHash })
+ .from(localCredentials)
+ .where(eq(localCredentials.username, username))
+ .limit(1);
+
+ // Always run verifyPassword even on unknown username (dummy hash) to prevent timing oracle
+ const dummy = hashPassword('dummy-constant-time-filler');
+ const valid = cred ? verifyPassword(cred.passwordHash, password) : verifyPassword(dummy, password);
+
+ if (!valid || !cred) {
+ // Increment failure counter
+ const cur = loginAttempts.get(ip) ?? { count: 0, lockedUntil: 0, lockedOut: false };
+ cur.count += 1;
+ cur.lockedUntil = Date.now() + RATE_WINDOW_SECS * 1000;
+ cur.lockedOut = cur.count >= LOCKOUT_FAILURES;
+ loginAttempts.set(ip, cur);
+ return c.json({ error: 'Invalid credentials' }, 401);
+ }
+
+ // Success: clear failure counter, issue session cookie
+ loginAttempts.delete(ip);
+ await issueLocalSessionCookie(c, cred.userId);
+ return c.json({ ok: true }, 200);
+});
+```
+
+**Security notes:**
+- The `noEchoHook` must be used on `zValidator` for the login route — same as credential routes — to prevent Zod errors from echoing the submitted password.
+- "Username not found" and "wrong password" return the same 401 + same copy — no field discrimination.
+- The dummy hash prevents timing oracle on username enumeration.
+- Rate-limiting is per-IP (from `X-Forwarded-For` header, which Pangolin sets). For a 2-person household this is more than sufficient.
+- Lockout (423) is resolved only by admin password reset — mirrors the UI copy "Contact your admin to reset access".
+
+---
+
+## Auth Mode Endpoint
+
+### `GET /api/auth/mode` (pre-auth)
+
+Must be mounted **before** all auth middleware in `index.ts` (same pre-auth pattern as `/api/setup/*` and `/health`). [VERIFIED: codebase — `app.route('/api/setup', setupRouter)` mounts pre-auth; same pattern applies]
+
+```typescript
+// apps/api/src/routes/authMode.ts
+authModeRouter.get('/', async (c) => {
+ // localEnabled: always true — local auth is the default and always available (D-01)
+ // oidcEnabled: true when oidc_issuer is configured in app_config OR process.env
+ const issuerFromEnv = process.env.OIDC_ISSUER;
+ let oidcEnabled = Boolean(issuerFromEnv);
+
+ if (!oidcEnabled) {
+ const [row] = await db
+ .select({ value: appConfig.value })
+ .from(appConfig)
+ .where(eq(appConfig.key, 'oidc_issuer'))
+ .limit(1);
+ oidcEnabled = Boolean(row?.value);
+ }
+
+ return c.json({ localEnabled: true, oidcEnabled });
+});
+```
+
+This endpoint is not protected by OIDC middleware. The PWA fetches it on app load before knowing if the user is authenticated.
+
+---
+
+## OIDC-Link Flow
+
+D-12: when a local user explicitly links an OIDC identity, their `local_credentials` row is deleted and `users.oidc_iss`/`oidc_sub` are populated. The returned `iss+sub` must not already belong to another user.
+
+### Recommended Implementation
+
+The simplest approach reuses the existing `/callback` handler: add a `link_mode` query param that signals the OIDC callback to run in "link" mode rather than "new session" mode.
+
+**Flow:**
+1. User (authenticated as local user with valid `local-session` cookie) clicks "Continue with OIDC"
+2. PWA calls `POST /api/me/link-oidc` → server initiates OIDC authorization-code redirect with `state` parameter encoding `{ linkUserId: currentUserId, nonce }`
+3. OIDC callback fires → `processOAuthCallback` handles the code exchange, gets `iss+sub`
+4. Backend detects `linkUserId` in state → look up if `iss+sub` already belongs to a different user → if yes, 409 error page; if no, UPDATE `users SET oidc_iss, oidc_sub WHERE id = linkUserId`, DELETE from `local_credentials WHERE user_id = linkUserId`
+5. Issue OIDC session (the user is now OIDC-only) → redirect to `/calendar`
+
+**Alternative (simpler, recommended):** A dedicated `POST /api/me/link-oidc` endpoint that initiates the OIDC redirect. The current user's `userId` is encoded in the OIDC `state` parameter (signed to prevent CSRF). On callback, the backend reads `state.userId`, verifies the OIDC identity is unique, binds it.
+
+**D-10 constraint:** Identity binding must use `iss+sub` from the OIDC token, never email. The `upsertUser` function already enforces this — the link flow must replicate this strictness.
+
+**409 conflict:** If the `iss+sub` returned by OIDC already exists in `users`, return a redirect to an error page. The PWA displays: "This OIDC identity is already linked to another account. Please contact your admin."
+
+---
+
+## Admin Account Management API
+
+### New Routes on `adminRouter`
+
+Extends `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`. The `requireAdmin` guard at the router level already covers these. [VERIFIED: codebase — `adminRouter.use('*', requireAdmin)` is the first statement]
+
+**Create member:**
+```typescript
+adminRouter.post('/members', zValidator('json', createMemberSchema, noEchoHook), async (c) => {
+ // 1. Insert into users (displayName, color from palette)
+ // 2. Hash initialPassword via hashPassword()
+ // 3. Insert into local_credentials (userId, username, passwordHash)
+ // If username conflict: 409
+});
+```
+
+**Reset password:**
+```typescript
+adminRouter.post('/members/:id/password', zValidator('json', resetPasswordSchema, noEchoHook), async (c) => {
+ // Admin does not need to know the current password (D-11)
+ // 1. Verify target user exists + has local_credentials row
+ // 2. Hash newPassword
+ // 3. UPDATE local_credentials SET password_hash WHERE user_id
+ // Also clear any in-memory lockout entry for this user
+});
+```
+
+**Extend `GET /api/admin/members`** to include `hasLocalCredential: boolean` (LEFT JOIN on `local_credentials`).
+
+---
+
+## Self-Service Password Change
+
+### `POST /api/me/password`
+
+Added to `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`. [ASSUMED — derived from existing `POST /api/me/credential` pattern]
+
+```typescript
+meRouter.post('/password', zValidator('json', changePasswordSchema, meNoEchoHook), async (c) => {
+ const currentUserId = await resolveUserId(c);
+ if (!currentUserId) return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 401);
+
+ const [cred] = await db.select().from(localCredentials).where(eq(localCredentials.userId, currentUserId)).limit(1);
+ if (!cred) return c.json({ error: 'No local credential' }, 404);
+
+ const { currentPassword, newPassword } = c.req.valid('json');
+ if (!verifyPassword(cred.passwordHash, currentPassword)) {
+ return c.json({ error: 'Current password incorrect' }, 401);
+ }
+
+ const newHash = hashPassword(newPassword);
+ await db.update(localCredentials).set({ passwordHash: newHash }).where(eq(localCredentials.userId, currentUserId));
+
+ return c.json({ ok: true }, 200);
+});
+```
+
+**Note:** After a password change, existing sessions remain valid (D-05 tradeoff — stateless JWT, no revocation). This is documented and accepted.
+
+---
+
+## `/api/me` Extensions
+
+`GET /api/me` must return `hasLocalCredential: boolean` so the PWA knows whether to show "Change password" and "Link OIDC identity" in `SettingsSheet`. [ASSUMED — straightforward LEFT JOIN on `local_credentials`]
+
+Add `hasLocalCredential` alongside `isAdmin` and `needsProviderSetup` in the `resolveAdminAndSetupStatus` function.
+
+---
+
+## Break-Glass CLI
+
+D-13: break-glass is a CLI/console command or env override. Recommended form: a standalone Node.js/tsx script `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts` that:
+1. Accepts `--username` and `--password` CLI args
+2. Connects to the DB using the same env vars as the app (`DB_HOST`, `DB_USER`, etc.)
+3. Upserts a `users` row with `is_admin=true, claimed=true` for the given username (or finds existing by username)
+4. Upserts `local_credentials` for that user with the hashed password
+5. Prints the resulting user ID
+
+This script is:
+- Not imported by any production code
+- Listed in `.dockerignore` `scripts/` exclusion (verify `.dockerignore` covers this; if `scripts/` is not yet excluded, add it)
+- Gated with a `NODE_ENV !== 'production'` guard as defense-in-depth
+
+Usage: `docker exec -it familysync-api node --import=tsx/esm scripts/reset-admin.ts --username admin --password 'newpass'`
+
+Alternatively: an `APP_RECOVERY_USER` + `APP_RECOVERY_PASSWORD` env pair that, if set at boot, creates/updates that local user before the server starts (similar to some Docker apps' `INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD`). This is simpler to deploy but exposes the password in env. The CLI script is cleaner.
+
+---
+
+## Dev-Bypass Rework
+
+### Recommendation: Option C — bypass issues a real local-session cookie
+
+The three options from the CONTEXT.md open questions:
+
+| Option | Description | Assessment |
+|--------|-------------|------------|
+| A | Keep bypass + seed a real test login for login-specific specs | Most complex — two auth paths in harness |
+| B | Replace bypass with seeded auto-login through the real local flow | Requires changing ALL 40+ harness startup assertions; riskiest |
+| C | Bypass auto-issues a real local-session cookie | Minimal change to existing harness; satisfies D-15 |
+
+**Recommendation: Option C.** When `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true`:
+- `devAuthBypass()` still sets `c.get('user')` (existing behavior — unchanged)
+- A new companion `devSessionCookieMiddleware()` mounted just after `devAuthBypass()` issues a signed `local-session` cookie for `DEV_USER.id` (using `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET`) on every request that doesn't already have one
+- The PWA login page sees `local-session` cookie already set → skips to `/calendar`
+- Login-specific Playwright specs can explicitly clear the cookie and test the real login form
+
+This means:
+1. The harness `global-setup.ts` seeds `local_credentials` for `DEV_USER` (id=1) with a known dev-only username/password
+2. The `devAuthBypass()` function already handles the API-side auth
+3. The PWA routing gate (which checks for a valid session cookie) works because a `local-session` cookie is present
+
+**D-15 compliance:** `devSessionCookieMiddleware()` is inside `auth/devBypass.ts` (the same file the IMG-01 boot guard protects) and is only mounted when `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true`. The `assertNotDevBypassInProduction()` guard already blocks this in production.
+
+**Minimal `global-setup.ts` change:**
+```typescript
+// Seed local_credentials for dev user (id=1) — Option C
+await conn.execute(
+ `INSERT INTO local_credentials (user_id, username, password_hash) VALUES (1, 'devuser', ?)
+ ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE password_hash = VALUES(password_hash)`,
+ [hashPassword('devpass')]
+);
+// (hashPassword is called inline or imported from a compiled path)
+```
+
+**CI `ci.yml` change:** Add `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET=dev-secret-change-me` to the harness job env (used by `devSessionCookieMiddleware` and `global-setup.ts` hash). Add `local_credentials` table seed to the CI seeding step.
+
+---
+
+## PWA Routing Gate
+
+### App.tsx changes
+
+The current `App.tsx` setup gate checks `setupQuery.data?.setupComplete`. Phase 19 adds a parallel auth-mode gate. [VERIFIED: codebase — `App.tsx` lines 140–230 read]
+
+**New fetch on app load:**
+```typescript
+const authModeQuery = useQuery({
+ queryKey: ['authMode'],
+ queryFn: () => fetch('/api/auth/mode').then(r => r.json()),
+ staleTime: 60_000, // auth mode changes rarely; 1 min stale is fine
+});
+```
+
+**Gate logic (simplified):**
+1. If setup not complete → `/setup`
+2. If `meQuery` succeeds (user authenticated) → normal app
+3. If `meQuery` fails 401 and `authMode.localEnabled` → `/login`
+4. If `meQuery` fails 401 and `!authMode.localEnabled && authMode.oidcEnabled` → trigger OIDC redirect (top-level nav to `/api/login`)
+
+The `/login` route renders `` standalone (no AppNav, no BottomTabBar) — same pattern as `/setup`.
+
+---
+
+## BYO-Auth De-Authelia-ization
+
+D-06 requires removing Authelia-specific copy from user-facing strings and config. [VERIFIED: codebase — checked `middleware.ts`, `index.ts`, `setup.ts` for "Authelia" references]
+
+**What to change:**
+- `apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts` header comment: "Authelia as the identity provider" → "generic OIDC identity provider"
+- Remove references to `OIDC_ISSUER` being "Authelia base URL" in inline comments → "OIDC issuer URL"
+- The `app_config` keys are already generic (`oidc_issuer`, `oidc_client_id`) — no key changes needed
+- The setup wizard Step 3 label (if any) mentioning Authelia → generic "OIDC provider"
+- User-facing copy: already handled by UI-SPEC (never say "Authelia")
+
+**What NOT to change:** The actual `@hono/oidc-auth` library, PKCE flow, or any runtime behavior — these are already provider-agnostic.
+
+---
+
+## Don't Hand-Roll
+
+| Problem | Don't Build | Use Instead | Why |
+|---------|-------------|-------------|-----|
+| Password hashing | Custom hash function | `node:crypto` scrypt | Side-channel timing, parameter management, salt uniqueness |
+| JWT signing | HMAC-SHA256 manually | `Jwt.sign`/`Jwt.verify` from `hono/utils/jwt` | Already installed; handles base64url encoding, exp checking |
+| Cookie serialization | Manual `Set-Cookie` string | `hono/cookie` `setCookie`/`getCookie` | Already used in `persistSessionCookie.ts`; handles attributes correctly |
+| Constant-time comparison | `===` on hash strings | `timingSafeEqual` from `node:crypto` | Prevents timing oracle attacks on credential comparison |
+| OIDC code exchange | Custom OAuth flow | `@hono/oidc-auth` `processOAuthCallback` + `oidcAuthMiddleware` | Already installed and working |
+| Rate-limiting storage | Redis or DB sessions | In-memory Map | Household scale; single process; Redis is overkill |
+
+**Key insight:** This phase's auth primitives are entirely in stdlib (`node:crypto`) and packages already installed (`hono/utils/jwt`, `hono/cookie`). The zero-new-dependency constraint is achievable without compromise.
+
+---
+
+## Common Pitfalls
+
+### Pitfall 1: OIDC guard 302-redirecting local-session requests
+
+**What goes wrong:** `oidcAuthMiddleware()` intercepts requests that already have a valid `local-session` cookie and redirects to Authelia.
+
+**Why it happens:** `oidcAuthMiddleware` redirects any request where `getAuth(c)` returns null, regardless of whether another auth mechanism already authenticated the user.
+
+**How to avoid:** Wrap `oidcAuthMiddleware` in a guard that skips it when `c.get('user')` is already set (by `localAuthMiddleware` or `devAuthBypass`). See §Middleware Slot.
+
+**Warning signs:** Local login succeeds (200 + cookie set) but next `/api/me` request returns 302.
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 2: Timing oracle on username enumeration
+
+**What goes wrong:** Login returns faster for non-existent usernames (no hash computation) than for wrong passwords (hash computed).
+
+**Why it happens:** `if (!cred) return 401` skips `verifyPassword`.
+
+**How to avoid:** Always call `verifyPassword` — use a pre-computed dummy hash when the username is not found (see §Local Login Endpoint).
+
+**Warning signs:** Measurable latency difference in login responses for known vs unknown usernames.
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 3: Zod error echoing the password
+
+**What goes wrong:** `zValidator` default error handler returns `result.error` which includes `issues[].received` — the submitted password.
+
+**Why it happens:** No `noEchoHook` provided.
+
+**How to avoid:** All `zValidator` calls on the login, password-change, and create-member routes MUST use `noEchoHook`. [VERIFIED: codebase — pattern established in `setup.ts`, `admin.ts`, `me.ts`]
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 4: `local-session` cookie colliding with `oidc-auth` cookie
+
+**What goes wrong:** If the cookie name `local-session` matches the OIDC cookie name, `persistSessionCookie.ts` reads the wrong cookie.
+
+**Why it happens:** `persistSessionCookie.ts` reads `process.env.OIDC_COOKIE_NAME ?? 'oidc-auth'` — these are different names by default.
+
+**How to avoid:** Keep the local-session cookie name `local-session` (distinct from `oidc-auth`). Never set `OIDC_COOKIE_NAME=local-session` in env.
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 5: `local_credentials` FK constraint before `users` row
+
+**What goes wrong:** Inserting `local_credentials` before the `users` row exists fails with FK error.
+
+**Why it happens:** `local_credentials.user_id` references `users.id`.
+
+**How to avoid:** Always insert `users` row first, then `local_credentials`. Wrap in a transaction for admin create-member. [VERIFIED: codebase — same pattern documented in `setup.ts` at `POST /api/setup/credential`]
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 6: OIDC-link without checking `iss+sub` uniqueness
+
+**What goes wrong:** Two local users attempt to link the same OIDC account → one succeeds, one silently overwrites.
+
+**Why it happens:** No uniqueness check before binding `iss+sub`.
+
+**How to avoid:** Before UPDATE-ing `users.oidc_iss`/`oidc_sub`, SELECT to verify no existing row has that `iss+sub` pair. Return 409 if conflict. The `uniq_oidc_identity` index on `users` is also a safety net (will throw a DB unique violation). [VERIFIED: codebase — `schema.ts` line 63, `unique('uniq_oidc_identity').on(t.oidcIss, t.oidcSub)`]
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 7: Dev bypass seeds in prod image
+
+**What goes wrong:** `local_credentials` seed for dev user (id=1) ships in the production Docker image, granting access with a known password.
+
+**Why it happens:** `scripts/` or seed data not excluded from Docker image.
+
+**How to avoid:** Verify `.dockerignore` excludes `scripts/`. The `local_credentials` dev seed goes in `global-setup.ts` (Playwright) and the CI step — NOT in any migration or startup code. The `assertNotDevBypassInProduction()` guard blocks the dev-session-cookie middleware in production. [VERIFIED: codebase — IMG-01/02/03 gates from Phase 16]
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 8: `Jwt.verify` import path
+
+**What goes wrong:** `import { sign, verify } from 'hono/utils/jwt'` fails — `hono/utils/jwt` exports only `{ Jwt }` (default object), not named exports.
+
+**Why it happens:** The Hono `utils/jwt/index.js` wraps the functions in a `Jwt` namespace object.
+
+**How to avoid:** Use `import { Jwt } from 'hono/utils/jwt'` then call `Jwt.sign()` / `Jwt.verify()`. [VERIFIED: codebase — confirmed at runtime: `Jwt.sign type: function`]
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 9: `Jwt.verify` throws on expired token (must catch)
+
+**What goes wrong:** If the `local-session` JWT is expired, `Jwt.verify` throws `JwtTokenExpired` rather than returning null.
+
+**Why it happens:** This is expected Hono behavior — errors are thrown, not returned.
+
+**How to avoid:** Wrap `Jwt.verify` in try/catch in `verifyLocalSessionCookie`. Return `null` on any error (including expiry). [ASSUMED — derived from Hono JWT error types visible in `jwt.js` source]
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 10: `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` missing at boot
+
+**What goes wrong:** `issueLocalSessionCookie` throws because `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` is not set.
+
+**Why it happens:** New env var; operator didn't add it to Docker compose.
+
+**How to avoid:** Add a boot-time assertion alongside `assertNotDevBypassInProduction()`: check `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` is set and >= 32 chars when not in dev-bypass mode. Log a clear error and refuse to start.
+
+---
+
+### Pitfall 11: Harness `global-setup.ts` seeding `local_credentials` hash without importing app code
+
+**What goes wrong:** `global-setup.ts` is plain Node.js (no tsx/TypeScript — per its own comment "Plain Node.js only"). If it tries to import `hashPassword` from the API source, it needs to compile first.
+
+**Why it happens:** `global-setup.ts` uses `mysql2/promise` directly, no app imports.
+
+**How to avoid:** Inline the `hashPassword` implementation in `global-setup.ts` (copy the 5-line scrypt hash function), or pre-hash the dev password at a known constant and hard-code the encoded string in the seed. Since `global-setup.ts` already knows the dev-bypass semantics, a hard-coded dev hash (never used in production) is acceptable.
+
+---
+
+## Code Examples
+
+### scrypt hash + verify (production pattern)
+
+```typescript
+// Source: runtime-verified on Node 22.22.3 in this project
+import { scryptSync, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+
+export function hashPassword(password: string): string {
+ const salt = randomBytes(16);
+ const hash = scryptSync(password, salt, 32, { N: 16384, r: 8, p: 1 });
+ return ['scrypt', 16384, 8, 1, salt.toString('base64url'), hash.toString('base64url')].join('$');
+}
+
+export function verifyPassword(stored: string, candidate: string): boolean {
+ try {
+ const [, n, r, p, saltB64, hashB64] = stored.split('$');
+ const salt = Buffer.from(saltB64, 'base64url');
+ const storedHash = Buffer.from(hashB64, 'base64url');
+ const check = scryptSync(candidate, salt, storedHash.length, {
+ N: Number(n), r: Number(r), p: Number(p),
+ });
+ return timingSafeEqual(storedHash, check);
+ } catch {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+```
+
+### Hono JWT session cookie issuance
+
+```typescript
+// Source: runtime-verified — Jwt.sign/verify confirmed from hono/utils/jwt
+import { Jwt } from 'hono/utils/jwt';
+import { setCookie, getCookie, deleteCookie } from 'hono/cookie';
+
+export async function issueLocalSessionCookie(c: Context, userId: number): Promise {
+ const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET!;
+ const maxAge = Number(process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES ?? 86400);
+ const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+ const token = await Jwt.sign({ userId, iat: now, exp: now + maxAge }, secret, 'HS256');
+ setCookie(c, 'local-session', token, {
+ httpOnly: true,
+ secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+ sameSite: 'Lax',
+ path: '/',
+ maxAge,
+ });
+}
+```
+
+### localAuthMiddleware pattern (mirrors devAuthBypass)
+
+```typescript
+// Source: apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts (verified — the pattern to mirror)
+import type { MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';
+import { verifyLocalSessionCookie } from './localSession.js';
+import { db } from '../db/client.js';
+import { users } from '../db/schema.js';
+import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+
+export function localAuthMiddleware(): MiddlewareHandler {
+ return async (c, next) => {
+ // Skip if already authenticated (devAuthBypass ran first)
+ if (c.get('user')) { await next(); return; }
+
+ const userId = await verifyLocalSessionCookie(c);
+ if (!userId) { await next(); return; }
+
+ const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, userId)).limit(1);
+ if (user) {
+ c.set('user', {
+ id: user.id,
+ oidcIss: user.oidcIss ?? 'local',
+ oidcSub: user.oidcSub ?? String(user.id),
+ displayName: user.displayName ?? null,
+ color: user.color,
+ });
+ }
+ await next();
+ };
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Environment Availability
+
+| Dependency | Required By | Available | Version | Fallback |
+|------------|------------|-----------|---------|----------|
+| Node.js 22 | `node:crypto` scrypt | ✓ | 22.22.3 | — (required) |
+| MariaDB | `local_credentials` table | ✓ (Docker) | 11.x | — |
+| `hono/utils/jwt` | JWT session signing | ✓ | hono@4.12.23 | — (already installed) |
+| `hono/cookie` | Cookie read/write | ✓ | hono@4.12.23 | — (already installed) |
+| `drizzle-kit` | Schema migration | ✓ | 0.31.10 | — |
+| `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` env | JWT signing | ✗ (not yet set) | — | Add to docker-compose env + generate-secrets script |
+
+**Missing dependencies with no fallback:**
+- `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` env var — must be added to the operator's Docker Compose file and to the `generate-secrets` script. Absence must be caught at boot.
+
+---
+
+## Validation Architecture
+
+`workflow.nyquist_validation` is enabled (absent = enabled per config). Security-critical auth flows — all test seams enumerated.
+
+### Test Framework
+
+| Property | Value |
+|----------|-------|
+| Framework | Vitest 4.1.8 |
+| Config file | `apps/api/vitest.config.ts` |
+| Quick run command | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test` |
+| Full suite command | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test && pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e` |
+
+### Phase Requirements → Test Map
+
+| Req ID | Behavior | Test Type | Automated Command | File Exists? |
+|--------|----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|
+| AUTH-LOCAL-01 | `local_credentials` table schema | integration | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/db/schema.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-02 | `hashPassword` round-trip + `verifyPassword` timing-safe | unit | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/auth/localCredentials.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-03 | `POST /api/auth/local/login` — 200 success, 401 wrong, 429 rate, 423 lockout | unit+integration | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-04 | `localAuthMiddleware` — sets c.get('user') with valid cookie; no-op without cookie | unit | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/auth/localAuthMiddleware.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-05 | `GET /api/auth/mode` — returns `{localEnabled:true, oidcEnabled}` | unit | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/routes/authMode.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-06 | `POST /api/auth/local/logout` — clears cookie | unit | included in `localAuth.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-07 | Admin create member — 201 on success, 409 on duplicate username | unit | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/routes/admin.test.ts` | ✅ (extend) |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-08 | Admin reset password — updates hash | unit | included in `admin.test.ts` | ✅ (extend) |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-09 | Self-change password — verify current, update hash | unit | `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test tests/routes/me.test.ts` | ✅ (extend) |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-10 | OIDC-link — binds iss+sub, deletes local_credentials, 409 on conflict | unit | included in `me.test.ts` | ✅ (extend) |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-11 | Break-glass CLI — creates admin user | manual/smoke | `tsx scripts/reset-admin.ts --dry-run` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-12 | LoginPage renders brand slot + form; submits and receives cookie | e2e (Playwright) | `pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test:e2e --grep "login"` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-15 | App.tsx redirects unauthed user to /login | e2e | included in login spec | ❌ Wave 0 |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-16 | Harness continues to work with Option C dev-bypass | e2e | existing harness | ✅ (verify after change) |
+| AUTH-LOCAL-19 | Rate-limit 429 after 5 failures; lockout 423 after 10 | unit | included in `localAuth.test.ts` | ❌ Wave 0 |
+
+### Sampling Rate
+
+- **Per task commit:** `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test` (unit suite, ~10s)
+- **Per wave merge:** `pnpm --filter @familysync/api test && pnpm --filter @familysync/pwa test` (unit + PWA unit)
+- **Phase gate:** Full suite including Playwright harness before `/gsd-verify-work`
+
+### Wave 0 Gaps
+
+- [ ] `tests/auth/localCredentials.test.ts` — covers AUTH-LOCAL-02 (hash round-trip, timing-safe)
+- [ ] `tests/auth/localAuthMiddleware.test.ts` — covers AUTH-LOCAL-04
+- [ ] `tests/routes/authMode.test.ts` — covers AUTH-LOCAL-05
+- [ ] `tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts` — covers AUTH-LOCAL-03/06/19
+- [ ] `apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts` — covers AUTH-LOCAL-12/15
+
+---
+
+## Security Domain
+
+`security_enforcement: true` (enabled in config.json).
+
+### Applicable ASVS Categories (Level 1)
+
+| ASVS Category | Applies | Standard Control |
+|---------------|---------|-----------------|
+| V2 Authentication | YES | `node:crypto` scrypt + PHC encoding; `timingSafeEqual`; no username-enumeration timing oracle |
+| V3 Session Management | YES | Stateless signed JWT; `httpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Lax`; maxAge 1 day; logout = cookie clear |
+| V4 Access Control | YES | `requireAdmin` on all admin routes; `resolveUserId` always from session, never body; self-service can only modify own credential |
+| V5 Input Validation | YES | `zod` + `@hono/zod-validator` on all auth routes; `noEchoHook` prevents Zod errors from echoing passwords |
+| V6 Cryptography | YES (partially) | `node:crypto` scrypt (strong KDF); HS256 JWT (symmetric — acceptable for single-server; if multi-server ever applies, upgrade to RS256) |
+
+### Known Threat Patterns
+
+| Pattern | STRIDE | Standard Mitigation |
+|---------|--------|---------------------|
+| Username enumeration via timing | Information Disclosure | Dummy hash verify when username not found; `timingSafeEqual` |
+| Credential brute force | Elevation of Privilege | Per-IP rate-limit (5 failures → 60s cooldown → 429); account lockout at 10 (423) |
+| Session fixation | Elevation of Privilege | Issue new JWT on every login; old JWTs expire via `exp` claim |
+| Password echoed in error response | Information Disclosure | `noEchoHook` on all `zValidator` calls on auth routes |
+| Local-session cookie in prod image | Elevation of Privilege | D-15: `assertNotDevBypassInProduction()`; `.dockerignore` for scripts; seed only in `global-setup.ts` |
+| OIDC-link CSRF | Tampering | `state` parameter in OIDC redirect must be signed/nonce'd; `iss+sub` uniqueness checked server-side |
+| OIDC-link identity collision | Elevation of Privilege | `uniq_oidc_identity` DB constraint + pre-flight SELECT → 409 on conflict |
+| Missing `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` | Elevation of Privilege | Boot-time assertion; loud error + non-zero exit |
+| `local-session` cookie in XSS | Information Disclosure | `httpOnly: true` prevents JS access; OIDC cookie has same protection |
+
+---
+
+## State of the Art
+
+| Old Approach | Current Approach | Notes |
+|--------------|------------------|-------|
+| argon2id (native addon) | `node:crypto` scrypt | D-08 mandates no native deps; scrypt is OWASP-approved for this use |
+| DB session table | Stateless JWT cookie | D-05; consistent with `@hono/oidc-auth` pattern |
+| Hardcoded Authelia references | Generic OIDC copy | D-06 BYO-Auth principle |
+
+---
+
+## Open Questions
+
+### Resolved by Research
+
+1. **Dev-bypass rework** → Recommend Option C (bypass issues real `local-session` cookie). Minimal harness change; satisfies D-14 and D-15.
+2. **Break-glass form** → Recommend CLI script `scripts/reset-admin.ts` (tsx, runnable via `docker exec`). No new role model needed.
+3. **OIDC-link mechanism** → Reuse OIDC callback (`/callback`) with a signed `state` parameter encoding `{ linkUserId }`. Simpler than a new endpoint because `processOAuthCallback` already handles the code exchange.
+4. **`Jwt.sign`/`Jwt.verify` import** → `import { Jwt } from 'hono/utils/jwt'` (namespace import) — not named exports.
+
+### Still Open (require planner decision)
+
+1. **OIDC-only user provisioning:** How does an OIDC-only user get their `users` row now that the setup wizard's single-unclaimed-row claim (Phase 12 D-08) only works for one pre-created user? The current `upsertUser` in `auth/user.ts` already handles this: when `setup_complete === true` and no unclaimed row exists, it inserts a new fully-claimed OIDC user row (step 3/5 in `upsertUser`). The existing behavior already handles OIDC-only users without Phase 19 changes — no open issue here in practice. **Confirm:** planner should verify this path still works after Phase 19 DB changes.
+
+2. **Admin UI for managing OIDC-only users:** Can an admin remove a user's OIDC binding (reverting them to local-only)? D-12 says OIDC-link is one-directional (removes local cred) and "can't be undone from the app." This is correct per the UI-SPEC. No admin UI for OIDC-unlinking is in scope for Phase 19.
+
+3. **`LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` and `generate-secrets` script update:** The Phase 12 `generate-secrets` script generates `SESSION_SECRET`, `APP_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, and VAPID keys. It should be extended to also generate `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET`. Planner should include a task to update `scripts/generate-secrets.ts`.
+
+4. **`scripts/` in `.dockerignore`:** Verify `.dockerignore` already excludes `scripts/`. If not, a task to add `scripts/` to `.dockerignore` is required for D-15 compliance.
+
+---
+
+## Assumptions Log
+
+| # | Claim | Section | Risk if Wrong |
+|---|-------|---------|---------------|
+| A1 | `Jwt.verify` throws on expired token (caught in try/catch in `verifyLocalSessionCookie`) | §Common Pitfalls 9, §JWT Session Cookie | Session cookie not cleared on expiry; user remains "logged in" until cookie maxAge expires naturally |
+| A2 | `deleteCookie` from `hono/cookie` is available in hono@4.12.23 | §JWT Session Cookie | Logout implementation needs alternative cookie-clear method (can use `setCookie` with `maxAge: 0`) |
+| A3 | OIDC-link via signed `state` param in `/callback` is the cleanest mechanism | §OIDC-Link Flow | May need a dedicated endpoint; planner may choose differently |
+| A4 | The `scripts/reset-admin.ts` approach satisfies break-glass requirement | §Break-Glass | Operator may prefer env-var recovery; both are viable |
+| A5 | `hono/utils/jwt` `Jwt.sign` uses Web Crypto API internally (async, returns Promise) | §JWT Session Cookie | If sync behavior is needed, alternative needed — but async is the Hono convention |
+
+---
+
+## Sources
+
+### Primary (VERIFIED from codebase)
+- `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts` — `c.set('user')` pattern, `DEV_USER` shape, IMG-01 guard
+- `apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts` — OIDC middleware wiring, `oidcConfigFallbackMiddleware`
+- `apps/api/src/auth/persistSessionCookie.ts` — `setCookie` pattern, maxAge, httpOnly/Secure
+- `apps/api/src/auth/user.ts` — `upsertUser`, first-login-claims, D-10 identity model
+- `apps/api/src/db/schema.ts` — `users`, `memberCredentials`, `appConfig` definitions
+- `apps/api/src/index.ts` — full middleware ordering, pre-auth routes, `devBypassActive` pattern
+- `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts` — `requireAdmin`, `noEchoHook`, admin route patterns
+- `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts` — `resolveUserId`, `resolveAdminAndSetupStatus`, `POST /credential`
+- `apps/api/src/routes/setup.ts` — pre-auth route pattern, `isSetupLocked`, `noEchoHook`
+- `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts` — `assertNotDevBypassInProduction`
+- `apps/api/tests/routes/login.test.ts` — vitest mock patterns for auth tests
+- `apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` — harness seed pattern, DEV_AUTH_BYPASS guard
+- `apps/pwa/src/App.tsx` — PWA routing gate, setup gate, `meQuery`, route structure
+- `apps/api/src/db/migrations/0002_lethal_millenium_guard.sql` — additive migration example
+- `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` — CI harness step, DEV_AUTH_BYPASS env, seed step pattern
+- Node.js 22.22.3 runtime — confirmed: `scryptSync`, `randomBytes`, `timingSafeEqual` available
+- `hono@4.12.23` runtime — confirmed: `Jwt.sign`, `Jwt.verify` from `hono/utils/jwt`; `getCookie`, `setCookie` from `hono/cookie`
+- `hono/dist/utils/jwt/jwt.js` — source-read to understand error types and import shape
+
+### Secondary (ASSUMED from training + project patterns)
+- OWASP scrypt parameters (N=16384, r=8, p=1 as minimum; N=65536 preferred if hardware allows)
+- PHC-style `$`-delimited encoded hash format for self-describing password hashes
+- Rate-limit implementation as in-memory Map (appropriate for single-process household scale)
+
+---
+
+## Metadata
+
+**Confidence breakdown:**
+- Standard stack: HIGH — everything is the existing installed stack; no new packages; runtime-verified
+- Architecture: HIGH — derived directly from reading the actual middleware chain and existing patterns
+- Pitfalls: HIGH — derived from actual code reading; most pitfalls are known from existing code comments
+- Password hashing: HIGH — runtime-verified on Node 22.22.3
+- JWT signing: HIGH — runtime-verified `Jwt.sign`/`Jwt.verify` from `hono/utils/jwt`
+- OIDC-link mechanism: MEDIUM — derived from CONTEXT.md D-12 + existing `upsertUser` patterns; specific implementation is ASSUMED
+
+**Research date:** 2026-06-17
+**Valid until:** 2026-07-17 (stable stack; scrypt parameters are stable)
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW-FIX.iter2.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW-FIX.iter2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9314718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW-FIX.iter2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+fixed_at: 2026-06-17T20:39:00Z
+review_path: .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md
+iteration: 1
+findings_in_scope: 15
+fixed: 15
+skipped: 0
+status: all_fixed
+---
+
+# Phase 19: Code Review Fix Report
+
+**Fixed at:** 2026-06-17T20:39:00Z
+**Source review:** .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md
+**Iteration:** 1
+
+**Summary:**
+- Findings in scope: 15 (4 critical, 4 blocker, 7 warning, 4 info — fix_scope: all)
+- Fixed: 15
+- Skipped: 0
+
+**Verification:** Full API suite **452/452** (34 files, live MariaDB) and full PWA suite **266/266** (22 files) pass; both `tsc --noEmit` clean. Findings classified as security/availability logic (CR-04, BL-03, WR-06, IN-04) are flagged "requires human verification" below — syntax/tests pass but a human should confirm the threat-model intent.
+
+## Fixed Issues
+
+### CR-01: OIDC-link flow broken — client/server response-shape mismatch
+**Files modified:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts`, `apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx`
+**Commit:** 1688f22
+**Applied fix:** Changed `fetchLinkOidc` to return `{ authorizationUrl: string | null }` matching the server's `{ signedState, authorizationUrl }` contract, and updated `LinkOidcSheet` to navigate to `authorizationUrl` (handling the `null`/unconfigured case by surfacing an error instead of navigating to `undefined`).
+
+### CR-02: Admin "create member" always fails — request field-name mismatch
+**Files modified:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts`
+**Commit:** 93c47b3
+**Applied fix:** `fetchCreateMember` now sends `initialPassword` (the field `createMemberSchema` requires) instead of `password`, and maps HTTP 409 to `Error('conflict')` so the AdminPage's existing conflict branch renders the right banner.
+
+### CR-03: Self-service password change logs user out on wrong current password
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`, `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts`, `apps/api/tests/routes/me.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 6ef8e03
+**Applied fix:** Server returns **403** (not 401) for an incorrect current password; client `fetchChangePassword` branches on 403 → `Error('wrong-current')` before the 401→`SessionExpiredError` path, so a mistyped password no longer triggers the global session-expiry logout. Updated me.test Test 2 to expect 403.
+
+### CR-04: Login lockout per-IP, global, permanent, unrecoverable — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`, `apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx`, `apps/api/tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts`
+**Commit:** b083cb7
+**Applied fix:** Re-scoped the rate limiter from client IP to the **validated username**; added a **15-minute TTL** so a 423 lockout auto-expires (self-healing, no restart); wired admin password-reset to call `resetLoginAttempts(username)` for an immediate unlock; corrected the LoginPage banner copy. Added Test 5b asserting TTL auto-expiry. *Human verification: confirm the username-scoping + TTL behaviour matches the intended threat model for the tunnel deployment.*
+
+### BL-01: devSessionCookieMiddleware issues a session without verifying secret strength
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts`
+**Commit:** 3674b25
+**Applied fix:** Apply the same `secret.length >= 32` floor used by the boot guard inside `devSessionCookieMiddleware` before minting the dev cookie (degrade to no-op if too short), and emit a loud warning when the secret is the well-known dev placeholder.
+
+### BL-02: Logout cannot clear the cookie in non-production (Secure attribute mismatch)
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts`
+**Commit:** cd095e5
+**Applied fix:** `clearLocalSessionCookie` now mirrors the issue-time `secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'` logic instead of hard-coding `secure: true`, so the deletion cookie is accepted over plain HTTP and logout actually clears the session in HTTP-only self-hosts.
+
+### BL-03: OIDC-link binding swallows failure / binds on stale/blank identity — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/index.ts`
+**Commit:** 7153760
+**Applied fix:** In the `/callback` link path, reject the bind unless the current local session (`verifyLocalSessionCookie`) matches `linkUserId` (account-takeover guard), and reject when `iss`/`sub` are empty (never call `linkOidcToUser` with blank identity, which would corrupt identity and delete the user's local credential). *Human verification: confirm the session cross-check closes the replay-takeover path described in the review.*
+
+### BL-04: localAuthMiddleware fabricates oidcSub collisions for local users
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts`, `apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts`, `apps/api/tests/auth/localAuthMiddleware.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 40666e1
+**Applied fix:** Introduced a `ContextUser` interface with nullable `oidcIss`/`oidcSub`; the middleware now stores `null` for local users instead of the `'local'`/`String(id)` sentinels that shared the `uniq_oidc_identity` uniqueness domain. Added Test 1c asserting null context for a null-OIDC local user.
+
+### WR-01: reset-admin.ts arg parsing trusts `--password ''` and echoes username
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts`
+**Commit:** c4d8d76
+**Applied fix:** Rewrote `parseArgs` to support `--key=value` and to treat `--username`/`--password` as value-taking (consuming the next token verbatim, so a `--`-prefixed or empty password is preserved) and `--dry-run` as boolean; removed username interpolation from log lines.
+
+### WR-02 + WR-04: hardcoded Authelia auth path / OIDC-config detection divergence
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/oidcConfig.ts` (new), `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`
+**Commit:** 322929a
+**Applied fix:** New `oidcConfig.ts` centralizes the env-OR-app_config resolution (`resolveOidcConfig`) and discovers the `authorization_endpoint` from the provider's `/.well-known/openid-configuration` (`discoverAuthorizationEndpoint`). me.ts link-oidc now uses both, so a wizard-configured instance no longer reports `oidcEnabled:true` while returning `authorizationUrl:null`, and the URL is no longer Authelia-path-specific. (Two findings fixed in one commit — they share the same handler/lines and are inseparable.)
+
+### WR-03: scryptSync blocks the event loop on the login hot path
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`, plus their tests
+**Commit:** 30ad25c
+**Applied fix:** Converted `hashPassword`/`verifyPassword` to async (threadpool scrypt via a typed Promise wrapper), awaited at all call sites, made the login DUMMY_HASH a module-level promise, and moved create-member hashing outside the DB transaction. Updated all test call sites to await. Preserves the timing-defense property while keeping the event loop responsive.
+
+### WR-05: noEchoHook pass-through is correct-but-untested
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts`, `apps/api/tests/routes/me.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 4bd6b2c
+**Applied fix:** Added focused no-echo tests for the admin create-member and me password hook sites asserting a malformed body never includes the submitted password or Zod's `received`/`issues`. `@hono/zod-validator` is already pinned to exact `0.8.0` in package.json.
+
+### WR-06: rate-limit lockedUntil refreshed on every blocked attempt — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`
+**Commit:** 4cf2ad4
+**Applied fix:** The 429 (already-rejected) branch no longer re-arms `lockedUntil`; the cooldown window stays anchored to when it was first armed, so sustained attacker traffic can no longer slide the window forward indefinitely. *Human verification: confirm the window now expires on schedule for a legitimate user behind the same identity.*
+
+### WR-07: parseInt member/calendar id accepts trailing garbage
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`, `apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 32bdd1e
+**Applied fix:** Added `parsePositiveIntParam` using `Number.isInteger(Number(raw))` and applied it to `/members/:id/password` and `/calendars/:id/shared`, so `"12abc"` is now rejected with 400. Added a test for the calendar route.
+
+### IN-01: localSession maxAge/expiry parsing has no validation
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts`
+**Commit:** f2fc140
+**Applied fix:** Coerce and validate `LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES` — fall back to 86400s for any non-finite or non-positive value, preventing a `NaN` exp/maxAge.
+
+### IN-02: duplicated inline scrypt implementation across three locations
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/tests/auth/localCredentials.test.ts`
+**Commit:** e392bf2
+**Applied fix:** Added a lockstep test that builds a hash using the inlined scrypt parameters (N=16384, r=8, p=1, KEY_LEN=32 — matching reset-admin.ts and ci.yml) and asserts it round-trips against the canonical `verifyPassword`, so a parameter drift fails CI loudly.
+
+### IN-03: loginAttempts map is unbounded
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`
+**Commit:** f02521d
+**Applied fix:** Added `evictStaleLoginAttempts`, called opportunistically per login request, dropping entries that are neither in an active rate-limit window nor an active lockout TTL — bounding the map under input churn without weakening the limiter.
+
+### IN-04: link-oidc nonce generated but never persisted/verified — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/linkNonceStore.ts` (new), `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`, `apps/api/src/index.ts`
+**Commit:** 2691dd0
+**Applied fix:** New in-memory single-use nonce store: me.ts registers the issued nonce (valid until the state JWT's exp); the `/callback` link path consumes it and rejects any replayed/unknown/expired nonce before binding. Combined with BL-03's session cross-check, the captured-state replay window is closed. *Human verification: confirm single-use semantics are sufficient for the single-process deployment (move to Redis if multi-process).*
+
+## Skipped Issues
+
+None — all 15 in-scope findings were fixed.
+
+---
+
+_Fixed: 2026-06-17T20:39:00Z_
+_Fixer: Claude (gsd-code-fixer)_
+_Iteration: 1_
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW-FIX.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW-FIX.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9314718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW-FIX.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+fixed_at: 2026-06-17T20:39:00Z
+review_path: .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md
+iteration: 1
+findings_in_scope: 15
+fixed: 15
+skipped: 0
+status: all_fixed
+---
+
+# Phase 19: Code Review Fix Report
+
+**Fixed at:** 2026-06-17T20:39:00Z
+**Source review:** .planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md
+**Iteration:** 1
+
+**Summary:**
+- Findings in scope: 15 (4 critical, 4 blocker, 7 warning, 4 info — fix_scope: all)
+- Fixed: 15
+- Skipped: 0
+
+**Verification:** Full API suite **452/452** (34 files, live MariaDB) and full PWA suite **266/266** (22 files) pass; both `tsc --noEmit` clean. Findings classified as security/availability logic (CR-04, BL-03, WR-06, IN-04) are flagged "requires human verification" below — syntax/tests pass but a human should confirm the threat-model intent.
+
+## Fixed Issues
+
+### CR-01: OIDC-link flow broken — client/server response-shape mismatch
+**Files modified:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts`, `apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx`
+**Commit:** 1688f22
+**Applied fix:** Changed `fetchLinkOidc` to return `{ authorizationUrl: string | null }` matching the server's `{ signedState, authorizationUrl }` contract, and updated `LinkOidcSheet` to navigate to `authorizationUrl` (handling the `null`/unconfigured case by surfacing an error instead of navigating to `undefined`).
+
+### CR-02: Admin "create member" always fails — request field-name mismatch
+**Files modified:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts`
+**Commit:** 93c47b3
+**Applied fix:** `fetchCreateMember` now sends `initialPassword` (the field `createMemberSchema` requires) instead of `password`, and maps HTTP 409 to `Error('conflict')` so the AdminPage's existing conflict branch renders the right banner.
+
+### CR-03: Self-service password change logs user out on wrong current password
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`, `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts`, `apps/api/tests/routes/me.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 6ef8e03
+**Applied fix:** Server returns **403** (not 401) for an incorrect current password; client `fetchChangePassword` branches on 403 → `Error('wrong-current')` before the 401→`SessionExpiredError` path, so a mistyped password no longer triggers the global session-expiry logout. Updated me.test Test 2 to expect 403.
+
+### CR-04: Login lockout per-IP, global, permanent, unrecoverable — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`, `apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx`, `apps/api/tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts`
+**Commit:** b083cb7
+**Applied fix:** Re-scoped the rate limiter from client IP to the **validated username**; added a **15-minute TTL** so a 423 lockout auto-expires (self-healing, no restart); wired admin password-reset to call `resetLoginAttempts(username)` for an immediate unlock; corrected the LoginPage banner copy. Added Test 5b asserting TTL auto-expiry. *Human verification: confirm the username-scoping + TTL behaviour matches the intended threat model for the tunnel deployment.*
+
+### BL-01: devSessionCookieMiddleware issues a session without verifying secret strength
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts`
+**Commit:** 3674b25
+**Applied fix:** Apply the same `secret.length >= 32` floor used by the boot guard inside `devSessionCookieMiddleware` before minting the dev cookie (degrade to no-op if too short), and emit a loud warning when the secret is the well-known dev placeholder.
+
+### BL-02: Logout cannot clear the cookie in non-production (Secure attribute mismatch)
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts`
+**Commit:** cd095e5
+**Applied fix:** `clearLocalSessionCookie` now mirrors the issue-time `secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'` logic instead of hard-coding `secure: true`, so the deletion cookie is accepted over plain HTTP and logout actually clears the session in HTTP-only self-hosts.
+
+### BL-03: OIDC-link binding swallows failure / binds on stale/blank identity — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/index.ts`
+**Commit:** 7153760
+**Applied fix:** In the `/callback` link path, reject the bind unless the current local session (`verifyLocalSessionCookie`) matches `linkUserId` (account-takeover guard), and reject when `iss`/`sub` are empty (never call `linkOidcToUser` with blank identity, which would corrupt identity and delete the user's local credential). *Human verification: confirm the session cross-check closes the replay-takeover path described in the review.*
+
+### BL-04: localAuthMiddleware fabricates oidcSub collisions for local users
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts`, `apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts`, `apps/api/tests/auth/localAuthMiddleware.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 40666e1
+**Applied fix:** Introduced a `ContextUser` interface with nullable `oidcIss`/`oidcSub`; the middleware now stores `null` for local users instead of the `'local'`/`String(id)` sentinels that shared the `uniq_oidc_identity` uniqueness domain. Added Test 1c asserting null context for a null-OIDC local user.
+
+### WR-01: reset-admin.ts arg parsing trusts `--password ''` and echoes username
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts`
+**Commit:** c4d8d76
+**Applied fix:** Rewrote `parseArgs` to support `--key=value` and to treat `--username`/`--password` as value-taking (consuming the next token verbatim, so a `--`-prefixed or empty password is preserved) and `--dry-run` as boolean; removed username interpolation from log lines.
+
+### WR-02 + WR-04: hardcoded Authelia auth path / OIDC-config detection divergence
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/oidcConfig.ts` (new), `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`
+**Commit:** 322929a
+**Applied fix:** New `oidcConfig.ts` centralizes the env-OR-app_config resolution (`resolveOidcConfig`) and discovers the `authorization_endpoint` from the provider's `/.well-known/openid-configuration` (`discoverAuthorizationEndpoint`). me.ts link-oidc now uses both, so a wizard-configured instance no longer reports `oidcEnabled:true` while returning `authorizationUrl:null`, and the URL is no longer Authelia-path-specific. (Two findings fixed in one commit — they share the same handler/lines and are inseparable.)
+
+### WR-03: scryptSync blocks the event loop on the login hot path
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`, plus their tests
+**Commit:** 30ad25c
+**Applied fix:** Converted `hashPassword`/`verifyPassword` to async (threadpool scrypt via a typed Promise wrapper), awaited at all call sites, made the login DUMMY_HASH a module-level promise, and moved create-member hashing outside the DB transaction. Updated all test call sites to await. Preserves the timing-defense property while keeping the event loop responsive.
+
+### WR-05: noEchoHook pass-through is correct-but-untested
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts`, `apps/api/tests/routes/me.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 4bd6b2c
+**Applied fix:** Added focused no-echo tests for the admin create-member and me password hook sites asserting a malformed body never includes the submitted password or Zod's `received`/`issues`. `@hono/zod-validator` is already pinned to exact `0.8.0` in package.json.
+
+### WR-06: rate-limit lockedUntil refreshed on every blocked attempt — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`
+**Commit:** 4cf2ad4
+**Applied fix:** The 429 (already-rejected) branch no longer re-arms `lockedUntil`; the cooldown window stays anchored to when it was first armed, so sustained attacker traffic can no longer slide the window forward indefinitely. *Human verification: confirm the window now expires on schedule for a legitimate user behind the same identity.*
+
+### WR-07: parseInt member/calendar id accepts trailing garbage
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts`, `apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts`
+**Commit:** 32bdd1e
+**Applied fix:** Added `parsePositiveIntParam` using `Number.isInteger(Number(raw))` and applied it to `/members/:id/password` and `/calendars/:id/shared`, so `"12abc"` is now rejected with 400. Added a test for the calendar route.
+
+### IN-01: localSession maxAge/expiry parsing has no validation
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts`
+**Commit:** f2fc140
+**Applied fix:** Coerce and validate `LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES` — fall back to 86400s for any non-finite or non-positive value, preventing a `NaN` exp/maxAge.
+
+### IN-02: duplicated inline scrypt implementation across three locations
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/tests/auth/localCredentials.test.ts`
+**Commit:** e392bf2
+**Applied fix:** Added a lockstep test that builds a hash using the inlined scrypt parameters (N=16384, r=8, p=1, KEY_LEN=32 — matching reset-admin.ts and ci.yml) and asserts it round-trips against the canonical `verifyPassword`, so a parameter drift fails CI loudly.
+
+### IN-03: loginAttempts map is unbounded
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts`
+**Commit:** f02521d
+**Applied fix:** Added `evictStaleLoginAttempts`, called opportunistically per login request, dropping entries that are neither in an active rate-limit window nor an active lockout TTL — bounding the map under input churn without weakening the limiter.
+
+### IN-04: link-oidc nonce generated but never persisted/verified — *requires human verification*
+**Files modified:** `apps/api/src/auth/linkNonceStore.ts` (new), `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts`, `apps/api/src/index.ts`
+**Commit:** 2691dd0
+**Applied fix:** New in-memory single-use nonce store: me.ts registers the issued nonce (valid until the state JWT's exp); the `/callback` link path consumes it and rejects any replayed/unknown/expired nonce before binding. Combined with BL-03's session cross-check, the captured-state replay window is closed. *Human verification: confirm single-use semantics are sufficient for the single-process deployment (move to Redis if multi-process).*
+
+## Skipped Issues
+
+None — all 15 in-scope findings were fixed.
+
+---
+
+_Fixed: 2026-06-17T20:39:00Z_
+_Fixer: Claude (gsd-code-fixer)_
+_Iteration: 1_
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.iter2.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.iter2.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb38370
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.iter2.md
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+reviewed: 2026-06-17T00:00:00Z
+depth: deep
+files_reviewed: 39
+files_reviewed_list:
+ - apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/linkOidc.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts
+ - apps/api/src/db/migrations/0003_warm_deathstrike.sql
+ - apps/api/src/db/schema.ts
+ - apps/api/src/index.ts
+ - apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/authMode.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/me.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/localAuthMiddleware.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/localCredentials.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/localSession.test.ts
+ - apps/api/test/setup.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/lib/requireAdmin.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/authMode.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/lists.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/me.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/push.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/setup.test.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts
+ - apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.test.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/InstructionSheet.test.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/styles/tokens.css
+ - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+ - scripts/generate-secrets.mjs
+findings:
+ critical: 4
+ blocker: 4
+ warning: 7
+ info: 4
+ total: 15
+status: issues_found
+---
+
+# Phase 19: Code Review Report
+
+**Reviewed:** 2026-06-17
+**Depth:** deep
+**Files Reviewed:** 39 (auth source + routes + PWA + CI)
+**Status:** issues_found
+
+## Summary
+
+Phase 19 adds a local username/password authentication mode alongside the existing
+OIDC flow. The cryptographic core (scrypt PHC hashing, constant-time compare, dummy-hash
+timing defense, HS256 session JWT with boot guards) is implemented carefully and is sound.
+The middleware chain (`devAuthBypass → devSessionCookie → localAuthMiddleware → OIDC guard`)
+and the admin-privilege boundary (`requireAdmin` DB-enforced on every `/api/admin/*` request)
+are correct.
+
+The serious problems are at the **client↔server API contract boundary** — the exact place
+a deep cross-file review is meant to catch. Three Phase-19 client functions in
+`apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts` disagree with their server routes on field names, response
+shape, or status-code handling, so the corresponding features (OIDC-link, admin
+create-member, and self-service password change error handling) are broken end-to-end
+despite each side individually passing its own unit tests. There is also an
+authentication availability defect: the per-IP login lockout is mislabeled as
+"account locked," is global, and never expires — a single attacker IP can permanently
+deny login for the whole household with no self-recovery path.
+
+## Critical Issues
+
+### CR-01: OIDC-link flow is broken — client/server response-shape mismatch
+
+**File:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts:226-238` and `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:301-341`
+**Issue:** `fetchLinkOidc()` reads `result.redirectUrl` and its return type is
+`{ redirectUrl: string }`. The server's `POST /api/me/link-oidc` returns
+`{ signedState, authorizationUrl }` — there is no `redirectUrl` key. The caller
+(Surface 13 "Link OIDC") will navigate to `undefined`, so the entire OIDC-link feature
+(AUTH-LOCAL-10) cannot work in the browser. Each side's own unit tests pass because
+neither test crosses the boundary. Additionally `authorizationUrl` can legitimately be
+`null` (OIDC unconfigured), which the client type does not model.
+**Fix:** Make the contract agree. Either return `redirectUrl` from the server, or read
+`authorizationUrl` on the client and handle `null`:
+```ts
+export async function fetchLinkOidc(): Promise<{ authorizationUrl: string | null }> {
+ // ...
+ return res.json() as Promise<{ signedState: string; authorizationUrl: string | null }>;
+}
+// caller:
+const { authorizationUrl } = await fetchLinkOidc();
+if (authorizationUrl) window.location.href = authorizationUrl;
+```
+
+### CR-02: Admin "create member" always fails — request field-name mismatch
+
+**File:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts:176-194` and `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts:123-133`
+**Issue:** `fetchCreateMember` POSTs `{ displayName, username, password }`. The server's
+`createMemberSchema` requires `{ displayName, username, initialPassword }`. The `password`
+field is ignored and `initialPassword` is missing, so Zod validation fails and the route
+returns `400 { error: 'Invalid request' }` (via `noEchoHook`) for *every* valid admin
+attempt to create a local member (AUTH-LOCAL-07). The Admin UI maps a non-409 error to
+the generic "Something went wrong" banner, so the admin can never create an account.
+**Fix:** Send the field the server expects:
+```ts
+body: JSON.stringify({
+ displayName: body.displayName,
+ username: body.username,
+ initialPassword: body.password,
+}),
+```
+
+### CR-03: Self-service password change logs the user out on a wrong current password
+
+**File:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts:148-165` and `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:233-261`
+**Issue:** `fetchChangePassword` treats `res.status === 401` as `SessionExpiredError`,
+which the global MutationCache handler interprets as "session expired → arm the
+re-auth interstitial / redirect to login." But `POST /api/me/password` returns **401**
+`{ error: 'Current password incorrect' }` when the supplied current password is wrong
+(me.ts:259-260). So a user who simply mistypes their current password is forcibly logged
+out instead of seeing "current password incorrect." The client doc comment even claims
+"401 → wrong current password" while the code routes 401 to `SessionExpiredError`. The
+documented 422 validation branch also never fires — the server returns 400 (noEchoHook)
+or 404, not 422.
+**Fix:** Distinguish auth-expiry from an in-app 401. Have the route return a distinct
+status for "wrong current password" (e.g. 403 or a body code), and branch on it client-side
+before treating 401 as session expiry:
+```ts
+if (res.status === 401) {
+ const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
+ if (body?.error === 'Current password incorrect') throw new Error('wrong-current');
+ throw new SessionExpiredError();
+}
+```
+
+### CR-04: Login lockout is per-IP, global, permanent, and unrecoverable
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:55-140`
+**Issue:** Multiple correctness/availability defects in one mechanism:
+1. The `loginAttempts` map is keyed by **IP**, yet the 423 response and the PWA banner say
+ "This account is temporarily locked." It is neither account-scoped nor temporary.
+2. Once `count >= LOCKOUT_FAILURES (10)`, `lockedOut` is set permanently. The only documented
+ clear path is "admin password reset" — but no admin route ever clears `loginAttempts`
+ (admin.ts reset-password updates the hash, not the in-memory map). So **the lockout is
+ genuinely unrecoverable without a process restart**.
+3. Because it is per-IP and all household traffic arrives via the Pangolin tunnel with the
+ same `X-Forwarded-For` first hop, one bad actor (or one user fat-fingering 10 times) can
+ lock out **every** member at that egress IP. This is a self-inflicted DoS on a 2-person
+ household whose entire reason for existing is low-friction access.
+4. `X-Forwarded-For` is attacker-controllable on any request that does not pass through the
+ trusted proxy; an attacker can rotate the header to get unlimited fresh rate-limit
+ buckets, defeating the brute-force defense entirely while still being able to lock
+ *other* identities by spoofing their IP if it were ever known.
+**Fix:** Re-scope the limiter to the submitted username (not IP), make the 423 lockout
+expire on a timer (or actually wire admin reset to clear it), correct the banner copy, and
+only trust `X-Forwarded-For` when the request demonstrably came from the known proxy
+(or use the leftmost-trusted hop). At minimum, give the lockout a TTL so a restart is not
+required:
+```ts
+// derive key from the validated username, and expire lockout after N minutes
+const LOCKOUT_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+if (attempt?.lockedOut && Date.now() < attempt.lockedUntil) { /* 423 */ }
+```
+
+## Blockers
+
+### BL-01: `devSessionCookieMiddleware` issues a session for user id=1 without verifying the user exists or the secret is strong
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts:102-131` and `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts:53-66`
+**Issue:** In dev-bypass mode the boot guard `assertLocalSessionSecretSet()` is *skipped*
+entirely (returns early when `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS==='true'`). `devSessionCookieMiddleware` then
+only checks that `LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET` is *present* (truthy), not that it is ≥32 chars, and
+mints a real, fully-valid `local-session` JWT for `DEV_USER.id (=1)`. The CI sets a weak
+fixed secret `'dev-secret-change-me-0000000000000000'`. Any cookie minted under bypass is a
+genuine, signature-valid session token for user 1 — if that same weak/known secret is ever
+present in a non-bypass environment (e.g. an operator copies the dev compose), forged
+sessions are trivial. The hard `NODE_ENV==='production'` guard mitigates the worst case, but
+this is a latent footgun: the boot guard's length check is the documented defense and it is
+bypassed here.
+**Fix:** Apply the same `secret.length >= 32` floor inside `devSessionCookieMiddleware`
+before issuing, and emit a loud warning if the dev secret is the placeholder value. Do not
+treat "present" as "safe."
+
+### BL-02: Logout cannot clear the cookie in non-production (attribute mismatch)
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts:53-59` vs `97-106`
+**Issue:** `issueLocalSessionCookie` sets `secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'`
+(i.e. `secure:false` in dev/test over HTTP). `clearLocalSessionCookie` hard-codes
+`secure: true`. Browsers require the `Secure` attribute on a deletion cookie to match the
+context: over plain HTTP a `Secure` delete-cookie is rejected, so `POST /local/logout`
+returns 200 but the `local-session` cookie is **not actually cleared** in any non-HTTPS
+deployment (local dev, and any HTTP-only self-host). The user appears logged in after
+"logout." The inline comment acknowledges the mismatch but waves it away with "logout should
+happen over HTTPS" — that is an unsafe assumption for a self-hosted app that explicitly
+supports private-IP/HTTP internal access.
+**Fix:** Mirror the issue-time logic on delete:
+```ts
+deleteCookie(c, COOKIE_NAME, {
+ path: '/', httpOnly: true,
+ secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
+ sameSite: 'Lax',
+});
+```
+
+### BL-03: OIDC-link binding swallows `processOAuthCallback` failure and can bind on a stale/blank identity
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/index.ts:57-101`
+**Issue:** In the `/callback` link path the code calls `processOAuthCallback(c)` then
+`getAuth(c)` and binds whatever `iss`/`sub` it finds to `linkUserId`. Two problems:
+(1) `iss`/`sub` fall back to `''` (`auth.iss ?? ''`, `auth.sub ?? ''`); if `getAuth` returns
+a partially-populated session, `linkOidcToUser(linkUserId, '', '')` will write
+`oidc_iss=''`/`oidc_sub=''` onto the user and **delete their local_credentials** — locking
+them out of both auth methods. (2) `linkUserId` comes from a JWT signed with
+`LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET`, but nothing verifies the *currently authenticated session* matches
+`linkUserId`; the signed-state CSRF defense assumes the state can only have been produced by
+`POST /api/me/link-oidc`, but the callback binds to `linkUserId` regardless of who completes
+the OIDC login. An attacker who can get a victim to complete an OIDC login while replaying a
+captured (still-valid, 10-min) link state binds the *attacker's* OIDC identity to the
+*victim's* account — account takeover.
+**Fix:** Reject the bind unless `iss` and `sub` are both non-empty, and cross-check that the
+OIDC identity being bound is the one the initiating user intended (e.g. require the
+post-callback session's subject to be confirmed by the user, or bind only when the
+initiating local session is still present and matches `linkUserId`). Never call
+`linkOidcToUser` with empty iss/sub.
+
+### BL-04: `localAuthMiddleware` fabricates `oidcSub` collisions for local users
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts:88-94` and `apps/api/src/db/schema.ts:60-64`
+**Issue:** When populating context for a local user with null OIDC fields, the middleware
+substitutes `oidcIss: 'local'` and `oidcSub: String(row.id)`. This is only a context shape
+and is not persisted by the middleware — but `me.ts:resolveUserId` (the OIDC path) and
+`upsertUser` key identity on `iss+sub`, and the `users` table has
+`unique('uniq_oidc_identity').on(oidcIss, oidcSub)`. If any code path ever upserts using the
+context's `('local', String(id))` pair (e.g. a future call to `upsertUser` with these
+values), two local users would deterministically collide or a local user could shadow a real
+OIDC identity whose `(iss,sub)` happened to equal `('local','')`. The fabricated values
+leak a synthetic identity namespace that overlaps the real one.
+**Fix:** Keep the context `oidcIss/oidcSub` as `null` for local users (widen the
+`ContextVariableMap` `user` type to allow null) rather than inventing `'local'`/`String(id)`
+sentinels that share a uniqueness domain with real OIDC identities.
+
+## Warnings
+
+### WR-01: `reset-admin.ts` interpolates the username into a log line and trusts `--password ''`
+
+**File:** `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts:60-66, 123, 133`
+**Issue:** Two issues. (1) The arg parser treats any token starting with `--` as a new flag,
+so `--password --foo` yields `password=''`; combined with the dry-run branch the validation
+is loose. More importantly a password that legitimately begins with `--` (or is the empty
+string) is silently coerced to `''`. (2) The username is interpolated directly into
+`console.log(... username="${username}")`; while not an injection into SQL (queries are
+parameterized — good), logging the username is a minor info disclosure for a break-glass tool
+and inconsistent with the password-never-logged contract.
+**Fix:** Parse `--password=value` and `--password value` explicitly; do not infer empty
+strings from a following flag. Avoid echoing the username, or document it as acceptable.
+
+### WR-02: `me.ts` builds the OIDC authorization URL with a hardcoded Authelia path
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:331`
+**Issue:** `new URL(`${issuer}/api/oidc/authorization`)` hardcodes Authelia's authorization
+endpoint path. The project's stated design is to discover endpoints via
+`/.well-known/openid-configuration` (the whole reason `@hono/oidc-auth` is used). Any
+non-Authelia or differently-mounted provider will get a wrong URL. This is a latent
+correctness bug that compounds CR-01.
+**Fix:** Resolve the authorization endpoint from the discovery document rather than assuming
+`/api/oidc/authorization`.
+
+### WR-03: `scryptSync` blocks the event loop on the login hot path
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts:42-53, 71-90` and `localAuth.ts:127-129`
+**Issue:** `verifyPassword` always runs `scryptSync` (N=16384) synchronously, including the
+dummy-hash branch on every failed/unknown login. The file comment justifies this for a
+2-person household, but combined with the per-IP rate limiter and the always-run dummy hash,
+a burst of unauthenticated `POST /local/login` requests can pin the single Node event loop
+(each scrypt is ~tens of ms of blocking CPU) and stall *all* other API traffic — a cheap
+unauthenticated DoS. The rate limiter does not protect this because the scrypt runs *before*
+the failure counter is consulted on the dummy path for new IPs.
+**Fix:** Use `promisify(scrypt)` (async) so hashing does not block the loop, as the comment
+itself suggests. This keeps the timing-defense property while preventing loop starvation.
+
+### WR-04: `authMode` / OIDC-enabled detection diverges across three files
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/authMode.ts:33-49`, `apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts:62-114`,
+`apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:323-328`
+**Issue:** Three independent notions of "is OIDC configured": `authMode` checks
+`OIDC_ISSUER` env OR `app_config.oidc_issuer`; the fallback middleware injects
+issuer/client-id/external-url from app_config; but `me.ts` link-oidc only builds a URL when
+`OIDC_ISSUER && OIDC_CLIENT_ID && OIDC_REDIRECT_URI` are all in **env** (it never consults
+app_config). So a wizard-configured-but-not-restarted instance reports `oidcEnabled:true`
+from `/api/auth/mode`, shows the "Link OIDC" button, but `link-oidc` returns
+`authorizationUrl:null` — inconsistent state surfaced to the user.
+**Fix:** Centralize the "OIDC configured" resolution (env-or-app_config) in one helper and
+use it in all three sites.
+
+### WR-05: `noEchoHook` return value is ignored by `@hono/zod-validator` in one of two styles
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:39-43`, `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts:74-78`,
+`apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:178-182`
+**Issue:** The hook signature is `(result, c)` and returns `c.json(...)` only on failure. This
+relies on zValidator short-circuiting when the hook returns a Response. That contract holds
+for current `@hono/zod-validator`, but the hook does not `return` anything on success and does
+not assert `result.success` narrows the type, so a future validator version that requires an
+explicit early-return-on-success, or that passes through when the hook returns `undefined`,
+would silently start echoing Zod errors (the exact T-19-14 leak this guards against). It is
+correct today but fragile and untested for the pass-through case.
+**Fix:** Add a focused test asserting that a malformed body never includes `received`/the
+submitted value for each hook site (localAuth has one; admin/me password routes should too),
+and pin the `@hono/zod-validator` version.
+
+### WR-06: Rate-limit `lockedUntil` is refreshed on every blocked attempt, extending the window indefinitely
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:97-106, 133-137`
+**Issue:** On a 429 the code sets `attempt.lockedUntil = Date.now() + RATE_WINDOW_SECS*1000`
+again, so an attacker who keeps hitting the endpoint perpetually slides the cooldown forward —
+a legitimate user behind the same IP can never get back in even after pausing, because every
+attacker request re-arms the window. Coupled with CR-04 this makes the household-wide lock
+effectively permanent under sustained traffic.
+**Fix:** Do not extend `lockedUntil` on requests that are themselves rejected by the window;
+only set it when transitioning from below-threshold to at-threshold.
+
+### WR-07: `parseInt` member/calendar id accepts trailing garbage
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts:215-218, 307-311`
+**Issue:** `parseInt(c.req.param('id'), 10)` returns `12` for `"12abc"` and the `isNaN`
+guard passes. Not exploitable here (the value is used only in a parameterized `eq`), but it
+silently accepts malformed ids and could mask client bugs. The `/members/:id/password` and
+`/calendars/:id/shared` routes both use this pattern.
+**Fix:** Validate with `Number.isInteger(Number(raw))` or a Zod param schema so `"12abc"` is
+rejected with 400.
+
+## Info
+
+### IN-01: `localSession` `maxAge`/expiry parsing has no validation
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts:31`
+**Issue:** `Number(process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES ?? 86400)` yields `NaN` for a malformed
+value, producing a JWT with `exp = now + NaN` (→ `NaN`) and a cookie `maxAge: NaN`. Verify
+behavior is then "always expired" or "never expires" depending on the JWT lib's NaN handling.
+**Fix:** Coerce and validate: `const n = Number(env); SESSION_MAX_AGE = Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 86400;`
+
+### IN-02: Duplicated inline scrypt implementation across three locations
+
+**File:** `apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts:45-51`, `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:307-311`,
+`apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts:42-53`
+**Issue:** The PHC scrypt hash is copy-pasted in the reset-admin script, the CI seed step,
+and the canonical module. If the parameters ever change (the file comment advertises
+parameter evolution as a feature), these three drift and produce incompatible hashes. The
+duplication is documented as necessary (cannot import compiled TS from a plain script), but
+there is no test asserting the three stay in lockstep.
+**Fix:** Add a test that imports `hashPassword` and asserts a known input round-trips against
+a hash produced by the inlined parameters, so a parameter change fails CI loudly.
+
+### IN-03: `loginAttempts` map is unbounded (memory growth)
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:66`
+**Issue:** Entries are only removed on a *successful* login for that IP. Spoofed/rotated
+`X-Forwarded-For` values (see CR-04) accumulate map entries with no eviction, a slow memory
+leak. Out of strict v1 perf scope, noted because it is reachable by unauthenticated input.
+**Fix:** Add periodic eviction of entries whose `lockedUntil` is far in the past.
+
+### IN-04: `me.ts` link-oidc nonce is generated but never persisted/verified
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:312-320` and `apps/api/src/index.ts:60-74`
+**Issue:** The signed state carries a `nonce` "to prevent replay," but the `/callback`
+handler never records or checks the nonce — it only verifies the JWT signature and reads
+`linkUserId`. A captured state JWT is fully replayable within its 10-minute window (the
+signature stays valid), so the nonce provides no actual replay protection. This underlies
+the takeover concern in BL-03.
+**Fix:** Persist issued nonces (or a single-use jti) and reject a state whose nonce was
+already consumed, or shorten the window and bind the state to the initiating session cookie.
+
+---
+
+_Reviewed: 2026-06-17_
+_Reviewer: Claude (gsd-code-reviewer)_
+_Depth: deep_
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f4827f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-REVIEW.md
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+reviewed: 2026-06-17T00:00:00Z
+depth: deep
+files_reviewed: 41
+files_reviewed_list:
+ - apps/api/scripts/reset-admin.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/linkOidc.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localAuthMiddleware.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts
+ - apps/api/src/auth/middleware.ts
+ - apps/api/src/db/migrations/0003_warm_deathstrike.sql
+ - apps/api/src/db/schema.ts
+ - apps/api/src/index.ts
+ - apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/authMode.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts
+ - apps/api/src/routes/me.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/localAuthMiddleware.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/localCredentials.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/auth/localSession.test.ts
+ - apps/api/test/setup.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/lib/requireAdmin.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/admin.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/authMode.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/lists.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/me.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/push.test.ts
+ - apps/api/tests/routes/setup.test.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts
+ - apps/pwa/e2e/login.spec.ts
+ - apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.test.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/App.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/BrandSlot.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/InstructionSheet.test.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/components/SettingsSheet.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx
+ - apps/pwa/src/styles/tokens.css
+ - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml
+ - scripts/generate-secrets.mjs
+findings:
+ critical: 0
+ blocker: 0
+ warning: 0
+ info: 2
+ total: 2
+status: clean
+---
+
+# Phase 19: Code Review Report (Iteration-2 Re-Review)
+
+**Reviewed:** 2026-06-17
+**Depth:** deep
+**Files Reviewed:** 41
+**Status:** clean
+
+## Summary
+
+This is the iteration-2 re-review confirming the fixer correctly applied all 15
+findings from the prior review (4 critical, 4 blocker, 7 warning, 4 info). I read
+every listed source file, traced the high-judgment fixes through their full call
+chains across module boundaries, ran `tsc --noEmit` on both `@familysync/api` and
+`@familysync/pwa` (both clean, exit 0), and confirmed the CI seed parameters and
+inlined scrypt copies all agree. The runtime test suite could not execute in this
+sandbox (global-setup requires a live MariaDB with root grants — `ER_ACCESS_DENIED`),
+so test verification is static: the relevant assertions were read directly and the
+production source typechecks against them.
+
+**Verdict: all 15 prior findings are correctly and completely resolved. No
+regressions, no re-occurrence at other call sites, and no new critical/blocker/warning
+issues.** Two low-severity Info observations are recorded below; neither blocks ship.
+
+### Confirmation of high-judgment fixes (verified by tracing, not just diff)
+
+- **CR-01/02/03 (client↔server contracts):**
+ - CR-01 shared-calendar: `admin.ts` `PUT /calendars/:id/shared` now does an
+ existence check inside a transaction (404 on missing id), so a stale id can no
+ longer silently clear the shared lane. Client `setSharedCalendar` agrees.
+ - CR-02 create-member: client `fetchCreateMember` maps `password → initialPassword`
+ (client.ts:199-204) and the server `createMemberSchema` requires `initialPassword`
+ (admin.ts:140); 409 maps to the `'conflict'` sentinel the AdminPage `onError`
+ expects (AdminPage.tsx:229). Server returns 409 on `ER_DUP_ENTRY` (admin.ts:202).
+ Both ends agree; admin.test.ts Tests 1–2 cover the round-trip + 409 rollback.
+ - CR-03 wrong-current-password: server returns **403** (`me.ts:267`), client checks
+ 403 **before** the 401 session-expiry branch (client.ts:166) and maps it to
+ `'wrong-current'`, which `ChangePasswordSheet.onError` surfaces without dropping
+ the session (SettingsSheet.tsx:569). me.test.ts Test 2 asserts 403 + update-not-called.
+- **CR-04 / WR-06 / IN-03 (login limiter):** the limiter key is the validated,
+ trimmed username (localAuth.ts:138) — no `x-forwarded-for`/IP residue remains
+ anywhere in `routes/localAuth.ts` or `src/auth/*` (grep clean). 423 lockout
+ auto-expires after `LOCKOUT_TTL_MS` (15 min, localAuth.ts:149-155); admin reset
+ calls `resetLoginAttempts(credRow.username)` for an instant unlock (admin.ts:262).
+ WR-06: the 429 branch deliberately does **not** re-arm `lockedUntil`
+ (localAuth.ts:164-169), so a rejected attempt can no longer slide the window
+ forward; the window is only re-anchored by a genuine failure in the failure path.
+ IN-03: `evictStaleLoginAttempts` only drops entries that are both window-expired
+ and lockout-TTL-expired (localAuth.ts:113-121) — behaviourally identical to natural
+ expiry, so eviction never weakens the brute-force defense. Tests 4, 5, 5b cover it.
+- **BL-01 (dev-bypass secret floor):** `devSessionCookieMiddleware` applies the same
+ `>= 32` length floor before minting a real DEV_USER session JWT (devBypass.ts:144-151)
+ and warns on the well-known placeholder. The CI placeholder
+ `dev-secret-change-me-0000000000000000` is 36 chars, so it passes the floor and only
+ triggers the warning — intended.
+- **BL-02 (logout cookie Secure match):** `clearLocalSessionCookie` now mirrors the
+ issue-time `secure: NODE_ENV==='production'` (localSession.ts:114), so the
+ delete-cookie is accepted over plain HTTP and the user is actually logged out on
+ non-HTTPS deployments. `sameSite`/`path`/`httpOnly` also match issue-time.
+- **BL-03 (OIDC-link takeover guard):** `/callback` (index.ts:84-123) now enforces
+ three gates before binding: (1) single-use nonce via `consumeLinkNonce`; (2) the
+ initiating local session must still match `linkUserId`
+ (`verifyLocalSessionCookie(c) === linkUserId`); (3) `iss`/`sub` from `getAuth` must
+ be non-empty. `/callback` is registered outside `/api/*` so `localAuthMiddleware`
+ does not run, but the `local-session` cookie (path `/`) is still present and read
+ directly — the cross-check is effective. All three gates fail-closed to
+ `/?error=oidc-link-conflict`. The preflight conflict check in `linkOidcToUser`
+ (linkOidc.ts:65-74) remains the backstop.
+- **BL-04 (no fabricated identity sentinels):** `localAuthMiddleware` passes through
+ the DB `oidcIss`/`oidcSub` as `?? null` (localAuthMiddleware.ts:91-97); `ContextUser`
+ widens both to `string | null` (devBypass.ts:56-62). No `'local'`/`String(id)`
+ sentinels are written, so a local user cannot collide in the `uniq_oidc_identity`
+ domain. localAuthMiddleware.test.ts Test 1c pins null.
+- **WR-03 (async scrypt):** `hashPassword`/`verifyPassword` are async over the libuv
+ threadpool (localCredentials.ts:33-45, 65, 101) at every call site — login
+ (dummy-hash promise awaited, localAuth.ts:128/199), create-member (hash before the
+ transaction, admin.ts:159), admin reset, and self-change. The always-run dummy-hash
+ path preserves the timing-oracle defense (localAuth.ts:197-199). reset-admin.ts
+ legitimately keeps `scryptSync` (standalone CLI, no event loop to starve).
+- **IN-04 (single-use nonce):** `linkNonceStore.ts` records the nonce at issue
+ (me.ts:333) and `consumeLinkNonce` returns true exactly once per unexpired nonce,
+ with opportunistic sweep keeping the map bounded; `/callback` consumes before binding.
+
+### Cross-cutting checks
+
+- Inlined PHC scrypt parameters agree across all three copies: canonical module
+ (N=16384,r=8,p=1,keylen=32), `reset-admin.ts`, and `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`
+ (seed step lines 309-310). localCredentials.test.ts Test 6 pins this round-trip.
+- `oidcConfig.ts` (`resolveOidcConfig` + `discoverAuthorizationEndpoint`) is the single
+ env-OR-app_config source now shared by `/api/auth/mode`, the fallback middleware, and
+ `me.ts` link-oidc, closing the WR-04 divergence where link-oidc could return
+ `authorizationUrl:null` while `/mode` reported `oidcEnabled:true`.
+- `LOCAL_SESSION_EXPIRES` NaN-coercion guard (localSession.ts:35-38) and boot guards
+ (`assertLocalSessionSecretSet` >= 32, exempt under bypass) are correct and wired
+ first in the `isMainModule()` block (index.ts:262-265).
+- Migration `0003_warm_deathstrike.sql` matches the `localCredentials` Drizzle schema
+ (unique on user_id and username, FK cascade, varchar(256) hash).
+
+## Info
+
+### IN-01: `fetchLinkOidc` declared return type is narrower than the cast it returns
+
+**File:** `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts:250,261`
+**Issue:** The function signature declares `Promise<{ authorizationUrl: string | null }>`
+but the body returns `res.json() as Promise<{ signedState: string; authorizationUrl: string | null }>`.
+The widening cast is harmless (the only consumer, `SettingsSheet.tsx` `LinkOidcSheet`,
+reads `data.authorizationUrl` only and never `signedState`), and `tsc` is clean. It is a
+minor contract-doc inconsistency: the declared type drops a field the server actually
+sends. Not a defect — recorded only so the next editor does not "fix" the cast and
+accidentally start relying on the absent field.
+**Fix:** Align the declared return type with the cast for clarity:
+```ts
+export async function fetchLinkOidc(): Promise<{ signedState: string; authorizationUrl: string | null }> {
+```
+
+### IN-02: 429 rate-limit branch short-circuits before the dummy-hash work
+
+**File:** `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:162-177`
+**Issue:** Once an identity is in the 429 window, the handler returns before the DB
+lookup and the always-run `verifyPassword`/dummy-hash. This is a deliberate and correct
+DoS/throughput tradeoff (a rate-limited identity should not pay scrypt cost), and it does
+NOT leak username existence because the 429 path is reached identically for valid and
+invalid usernames (the limiter is keyed on the submitted username regardless of whether a
+credential row exists). The timing-oracle defense is only required on the *credential-check*
+path, which still always runs the dummy hash. Recorded for completeness; no change needed.
+**Fix:** None required. If a future reviewer wants strict constant-time even under
+rate-limiting, the dummy-hash could be awaited before the 429 return — but that would
+re-introduce the exact event-loop-starvation cost WR-03 removed, so leaving it as-is is
+the right call.
+
+---
+
+_Reviewed: 2026-06-17_
+_Reviewer: Claude (gsd-code-reviewer)_
+_Depth: deep_
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-SECURITY.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-SECURITY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..883267b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+audited: 2026-06-17
+status: secured
+asvs_level: 1
+block_on: high
+register_authored_at_plan_time: true
+threats_total: 28
+threats_closed: 28
+threats_open: 0
+threats_accepted: 2
+supply_chain_checks: 2
+---
+
+# Phase 19 — Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode): Security Audit
+
+**Audited:** 2026-06-17
+**ASVS Level:** 1
+**block_on:** high
+**Compared against:** main..HEAD
+**Audit type:** Retroactive threat-mitigation verification (declared register, no net-new scan)
+**Branch:** `gsd/phase-19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode`
+**Verdict:** SECURED — 28/28 threats closed (26 mitigate + 2 accept), 0 open, 0 unregistered flags
+
+Implementation files were treated as READ-ONLY. No implementation file was modified by this audit.
+
+---
+
+## Threat Verification
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence (file:line) |
+|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------------------|
+| T-19-01 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/auth/localCredentials.ts:66` (16-byte randomBytes salt), `:114` timingSafeEqual, `:115-118` verify never throws; no password logged |
+| T-19-02 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/auth/localSession.ts:58` Jwt.sign HS256 w/ LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET; `:90-94` verify returns null on tamper/expiry |
+| T-19-03 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts:53-66` assertLocalSessionSecretSet (exit 1 when unset/<32, exempt in bypass); wired `apps/api/src/index.ts:265` |
+| T-19-04 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `.dockerignore:7` `apps/api/scripts/`, `:21` `apps/api/tests/`, `:23` `apps/pwa/e2e/` |
+| T-19-SC(01) | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `git diff main...HEAD` shows zero dependency-line changes in any package.json |
+| T-19-05 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts:47` `adminRouter.use('*', requireAdmin)` is first statement; test asserts 403 |
+| T-19-06 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts:75-79` noEchoHook on create/reset; `:148,:239` no-log comments honored |
+| T-19-07 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:240` resolveUserId from session, `:260-268` verifyPassword(current) before update |
+| T-19-08 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/auth/linkOidc.ts:65-74` preflight conflict before any write; backstop `uniq_oidc_identity` in `migrations/0000_baseline.sql` |
+| T-19-09 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/me.ts:321-333` per-request nonce in signed HS256 state; `linkNonceStore.ts:41-48` single-use consume |
+| T-19-10 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/admin.ts:165-185` db.transaction wraps users + local_credentials; `:202` 409 rolls back |
+| T-19-11 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED (deviation noted) | `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:162-176` 5→429 / 10→423; `:96-98`/admin.ts:262 admin reset clears. Keyed on **username** not IP (CR-04, documented) |
+| T-19-12 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:128` dummyHashPromise, `:197-199` verifyPassword always run, `:210` identical 401 body |
+| T-19-13 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/index.ts:191-197` OIDC guard wrapped to skip when `c.get('user')` set; `localAuthMiddleware.ts:45-101` populates it |
+| T-19-14 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:47-51` noEchoHook on login route |
+| T-19-15 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/index.ts:84-133` callback: nonce consume + BL-03 session-match + empty-iss/sub guard + linkOidcToUser conflict (409) |
+| T-19-16 | Information Disclosure | accept→mitigate | CLOSED | D-06 applied; Phase-19-touched PWA files render no "Authelia" (see T-19-21) |
+| T-19-17 | Spoofing | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts:216` fresh issueLocalSessionCookie every success; `localSession.ts:50-55` exp claim bounds lifetime |
+| T-19-18 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx` + `SettingsSheet.tsx` password in useState only; no localStorage/sessionStorage write for password fields |
+| T-19-19 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/pwa/src/routes/LoginPage.tsx:291` single "Incorrect username or password." — no field-level blame |
+| T-19-20 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | No `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in any PWA src (grep across `apps/pwa/src/` = 0 usages; only prohibition comments) |
+| T-19-21 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `grep -ci authelia` == 0 in LoginPage/AdminPage/BrandSlot; SettingsSheet's 1 hit is a copywriting-rule comment (line 828), not rendered |
+| T-19-22 | Elevation of Privilege | accept | CLOSED | Documented accepted risk (below); server boundary verified at `admin.ts:47` requireAdmin |
+| T-19-23 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | Seed only in `apps/pwa/e2e/global-setup.ts` (.dockerignore'd); zero seed in `migrations/` or `index.ts` |
+| T-19-24 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `apps/api/src/auth/devBypass.ts:87,:122` NODE_ENV==='production' is FIRST check; `bootGuards.ts:26-34` assertNotDevBypassInProduction |
+| T-19-25 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `.dockerignore:7` excludes `apps/api/scripts/`; `reset-admin.ts:26-32` NODE_ENV=production throw is first executable statement |
+| T-19-26 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | `reset-admin.ts` logs only user id / status; no console statement emits the password value; `--dry-run` validates without writing (`:129-133`) |
+| T-19-SC(05) | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Zero new packages (same as T-19-SC(01)) |
+
+---
+
+## Deviation Note — T-19-11 (rate-limit key)
+
+The register declares "per-IP rate-limit". The implementation (`localAuth.ts`, CR-04) keys the
+limiter on the **submitted username**, not the client IP. This is a deliberate, documented
+deviation: in this Pangolin-tunnel deployment all household traffic shares one X-Forwarded-For
+first hop (so IP-keying let one actor lock out every member) and X-Forwarded-For is spoofable.
+The declared security property — brute-force resistance via 5→429 and 10→423 with admin-reset
+recovery and a self-healing TTL — is fully present. Treated as CLOSED. The register wording is
+stale relative to the shipped (stronger-for-this-topology) mechanism.
+
+---
+
+## Accepted Risks Log
+
+| Threat ID | Risk | Rationale |
+|-----------|------|-----------|
+| T-19-22 | Client `isAdmin` / `hasLocalCredential` flags are UX-only and trivially editable in the browser. | Accepted: these flags only gate PWA nav/affordances. The real authorization boundary is server-side `requireAdmin` on every `/api/admin/*` request (`admin.ts:47`) and session-derived `resolveUserId` on `/api/me/*`. Client gating is never the security boundary. Documented prior decision. |
+| T-19-16 | "Authelia" provider name could leak infrastructure detail in UI/comments. | Low-severity hygiene (accept→mitigate). D-06 applied across Phase-19-touched surfaces; remaining occurrences are in the out-of-scope Phase 12 `SetupPage.tsx` wizard and in source comments, not on the local-auth surfaces this phase introduced. |
+
+---
+
+## Unregistered Flags
+
+The two `## Threat Flags` entries in `19-04-SUMMARY.md`
+(`threat_flag: credential-in-controlled-state` for `LoginPage.tsx` and `SettingsSheet.tsx`)
+both map to existing register threats **T-19-18** (password in client storage). Informational
+only — no unregistered attack surface. No WARNING raised.
+
+---
+
+## Out-of-Scope Observation (non-blocking, not a Phase 19 gap)
+
+`apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx` (lines 379, 498, 627, 645, 695) renders the literal string
+"Authelia" in the first-run setup wizard. This file was **not** modified in Phase 19
+(`git diff main...HEAD` = no changes) — it is the pre-existing Phase 12 wizard, outside the
+T-19-21 mitigation scope ("any PWA source touched by this plan"). It does not affect the local-auth
+login/admin/settings surfaces. Flagged here for a future D-06 sweep of the setup wizard; it is
+**not** an open Phase 19 threat.
+
+---
+
+## Security Audit 2026-06-17
+
+| Metric | Count |
+|--------|-------|
+| Threats found | 28 |
+| Closed | 28 |
+| Open | 0 |
+| Accepted | 2 |
+| Supply-chain checks | 2 |
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UAT.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UAT.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ea11f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UAT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+---
+phase: 19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+created: 2026-06-17T18:25:00Z
+updated: 2026-06-17T21:20:00Z
+status: complete
+source: verification + plan-checkpoints
+gaps: []
+findings_routed_to_phase_17: [F-01, F-02, F-03, F-04]
+---
+
+## Live UAT Session (resumed 2026-06-17, post code-review-fix)
+
+**Stack configured for local-auth / no-OIDC mode** (Phase 19's canonical deployment):
+- API rebuilt from the phase-19 branch (all 18 code-review fixes live; verified `initialPassword` + 403 present in running `dist`).
+- `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=false` and `OIDC_ISSUER=""` via throwaway `docker-compose.uat.yml` override
+ (tracked files untouched; restore the normal bypass stack after UAT).
+- Seeded local admin: **username `uatadmin` / password `UATtest1234!`** (user id 2, is_admin=1).
+- PWA on host Vite at **http://localhost:5173**.
+
+**Automated API smoke (pre-checks):**
+- ✅ `POST /api/auth/local/login` (uatadmin) → 200 + `local-session` cookie.
+- ✅ Wrong password → 401 `{"error":"Invalid credentials"}` (generic, no field blame).
+- ✅ Authenticated `GET /api/me` → `{id:2, isAdmin:true, hasLocalCredential:true}`.
+- ⚠️ Unauth `GET /api/me` → **500 `Invalid session`** (not 401) in no-OIDC mode: the OIDC guard
+ is mounted whenever bypass is off and errors trying to redirect with a blank issuer. **Cosmetic**
+ — PWA gates on `meQuery.isError && localEnabled` (App.tsx:213) so it still redirects to `/login`.
+ Candidate follow-up: short-circuit the OIDC guard to a clean 401 when no issuer is configured.
+
+**Note on Item 1 OIDC button:** the "OIDC button appears when oidcEnabled" sub-check can't be
+exercised on this box (no reachable Authelia → blanked). Covered at unit/e2e level. This session
+verifies the no-OIDC local-auth surface, which is the phase's primary deliverable.
+
+# Phase 19: Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode) — User Acceptance Tests
+
+All automated verification passed (API 446/446, PWA 266/266, e2e desktop 42 passed
+/ 3 skipped, typecheck clean; VERIFICATION.md status: passed, 21/21 must-haves).
+The single blocker found during verification (admin reset-password URL mismatch) was
+fixed and confirmed live (commit `53da4be`).
+
+The items below are the remaining **human / live-stack** checks that cannot be driven
+from the dev `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS` harness or a headless box. They do not block automated
+goal achievement but should be confirmed before shipping.
+
+## UAT Items
+
+### 1. Login page visual + flow (real, non-bypass stack)
+- **Test:** Run the stack with OIDC/Authelia configured and `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS` **off**.
+ Visit the app unauthenticated → confirm redirect to `/login`. Verify the brand slot
+ ("FS" mark, "FamilySync", "Family calendar & lists"), the form (username auto-focus,
+ password show/hide), wrong-creds single error ("Incorrect username or password."),
+ correct-creds navigation into the app, and the OIDC button only when `oidcEnabled`.
+- **Expected:** All surfaces per 19-UI-SPEC; no "Authelia" text anywhere; error copy
+ never blames a specific field.
+- **Why human:** The unauth login-gate redirect is unreachable under the bypass-only
+ harness (covered at unit level in `App.test.tsx`); the full visual flow needs a real
+ browser against a non-bypass deployment. (Desktop/Chromium portions are already e2e-
+ covered via `login.spec.ts`.)
+- **result: pass** (2026-06-17, live no-OIDC stack, operator-confirmed — all steps:
+ redirect to /login, brand slot, username autofocus, password show/hide, generic
+ wrong-creds error, successful login into the app). Setup-gate precedence confirmed:
+ `setupComplete===true` so /login is reachable (App.tsx checks `/setup` redirect first).
+
+### 2. Admin Reset-password sheet (live, end-to-end)
+- **Test:** As an admin, open Admin → Local Accounts → Reset password for a member;
+ submit a new password; confirm the member can then log in with it.
+- **Expected:** `POST /api/admin/members/:id/password` returns 200; new password works.
+- **Why human:** Needs a live stack with an admin session and a real local member.
+ (URL fix already verified: route reachable, 404 eliminated.)
+- **result: pass (functional) — with UX gap.** Operator created `testmember` + reset its
+ password via the admin UI. Verified at DB/login level: member exists (user 3, non-admin);
+ login with the **reset** pw (`MemberPass456!`) → 200; login with the **original**
+ (`MemberPass123!`) → 401. So **CR-02 create-member + reset both work and persist.**
+ BUT neither action showed a success confirmation (see Finding F-01).
+
+### 3. Settings Change-password sheet (live, local user)
+- **Test:** As a local user, Settings → Account → Change password; verify wrong current
+ password shows "Current password is incorrect.", correct current updates, and the new
+ password works on next login.
+- **Expected:** Current-password verification enforced; update succeeds; re-login works.
+- **Why human:** Needs a live stack with a local-user session.
+- **result: pass** (2026-06-17, verified functionally via API on the live no-OIDC stack as
+ `testmember`). CR-03 confirmed: wrong current password → **403 (not 401)** and the session
+ stays valid (`/me`→200, no force-logout); correct current → 200; new password logs in (200),
+ old password rejected (401).
+
+### 4. Rate-limit / lockout test flakiness (harden)
+- **Test:** Run `apps/api/tests/routes/localAuth.test.ts` Test 5 (10 failures → 423)
+ ~10 times; characterize the intermittent failure the orchestrator observed (1 failure
+ across 3 runs, then stable).
+- **Expected:** Stable pass; if timing-dependent, harden the in-memory rate-limit test
+ (e.g. fake timers / deterministic clock).
+- **Why human:** Timing-dependent in-memory test; needs repeated runs to characterize.
+- **result: resolved-by-fix.** The code-review fix (CR-04/WR-06/IN-03) rewrote the limiter and
+ made the lockout test **deterministic** — it back-dates `lockedAt` instead of using wall-clock
+ timers (`localAuth.test.ts:280`), structurally removing the timing flakiness. The fixer ran the
+ full API suite **452/452** (incl. Test 5/5b). Couldn't be re-run in this session's shell (no
+ test-DB root creds — `ER_ACCESS_DENIED`); confirm via CI or `set -a; . ./.env; set +a;
+ DB_HOST=127.0.0.1 pnpm --filter @familysync/api test`.
+
+### 5. CI harness green + D-15 image boundary (push, outward-facing)
+- **Test:** Push the branch and open the PR so Gitea CI runs. Confirm the `harness` job
+ (iphone + pixel + desktop, incl. `login.spec.ts`) is green, the `api` job is green,
+ and the published-image hygiene checks (no `apps/api/scripts/` or `apps/pwa/e2e/` in
+ the prod image) pass.
+- **Expected:** CI all green; no dev artifact in the shipped image (D-14/D-15).
+- **Why human:** Pushing to the remote / triggering CI is an outward-facing action the
+ operator owns. (Plan 19-05's blocking checkpoint.)
+- **result: deferred to `/gsd-ship`** (operator decision 2026-06-17). The push/PR/CI run +
+ image-hygiene gate is owned by the ship workflow, not this UAT session.
+
+## Live Session Findings (2026-06-17)
+
+Surfaced by the operator during Test 2. **Operator decision (2026-06-17): route ALL four UI
+findings — including the logout button — to Phase 17 (UI Optimization & Polish), which has not yet
+kicked off. None block Phase 19**, whose auth machinery is functionally complete and verified.
+
+All four added to `17-CONTEXT.md` (Phase-17 branch):
+
+- **F-02 — No logout button in the UI (functional-UI).** Logout is fully plumbed — endpoint
+ `POST/GET /api/auth/local/logout` returns 200 and clears the cookie (BL-02 verified live), and
+ `fetchLocalLogout()` exists in `apps/pwa/src/api/client.ts:127` — but **no component calls it**
+ (grep of `apps/pwa/src` finds zero logout buttons/handlers). Phase 17 wires a logout control to
+ the existing client function (no backend work). Per operator: a UI concern, not a Phase-19 blocker.
+- **F-01 — Admin create/reset give no success feedback.** Both succeed (verified at DB/login level)
+ but show no success toast/confirmation. Add success feedback to the admin local-account flows.
+- **F-03 — Dialogs/popups render at bottom-center instead of properly centered (cosmetic).** Fits
+ Phase 17's fixed-chrome/sheet-positioning sweep.
+- **F-04 — Admin UI navigation is clunky and needs a rework.** UX-polish item for Phase 17.
+
+**Status:** Phase 19 UAT **complete (functional)** — Tests 1–3 pass (live), Test 4 resolved-by-fix,
+Test 5 deferred to `/gsd-ship`. No Phase-19 blockers. F-01–F-04 carried to Phase 17.
diff --git a/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UI-SPEC.md b/.planning/phases/19-local-auth-no-oidc-mode/19-UI-SPEC.md
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+---
+phase: 19
+slug: local-auth-no-oidc-mode
+status: approved
+shadcn_initialized: false
+preset: none
+created: 2026-06-16
+approved: 2026-06-16
+---
+
+# Phase 19 — UI Design Contract: Local Auth (No-OIDC Mode)
+
+> Visual and interaction contract for the local login screen, login-method chooser,
+> and admin-surface additions for local account management.
+> Generated by gsd-ui-researcher. Verified by gsd-ui-checker.
+
+---
+
+## Context & Audience
+
+This phase introduces the **first real login UI** in the FamilySync PWA. Today the PWA boots
+straight into the authed app (OIDC redirect) or via dev-bypass — there is no login form. Phase 19
+builds:
+
+1. A **local login screen** (username + password) — full-viewport, pre-auth, the first surface an
+ unauthenticated user sees. This is the highest-value branding surface in the app.
+2. A **login-method chooser** rendered when OIDC is also configured (D-02) — local form OR
+ "Login with OIDC" (generic, never says "Authelia" — D-06).
+3. Admin-surface additions (in-app shell `/admin` route, extending Phase 10): local member
+ creation + initial password; self password-change; admin password-reset; per-user
+ "Link OIDC identity" action.
+
+The login screen is **end-user-facing**, not operator-facing. The non-technical Apple household
+member is the primary user — UX must be slick and low-friction (CLAUDE.md hard constraint).
+
+The login screen is a **standalone full-page route**, most closely analogous to the Phase 12
+setup wizard (`/setup`). It renders none of the AppNav / BottomTabBar / SetupBanner chrome.
+
+All design tokens are inherited from `apps/pwa/src/styles/tokens.css`. No new tokens are
+introduced.
+
+---
+
+## Design System
+
+| Property | Value |
+|----------|-------|
+| Tool | none (existing CSS custom properties) |
+| Preset | not applicable |
+| Component library | none (hand-rolled inline `React.CSSProperties`, project convention) |
+| Icon library | lucide-react (already installed — `Lock`, `User`, `Eye`, `EyeOff`, `Loader2`, `AlertCircle`, `LogIn`, `ShieldCheck`) |
+| Font | system-ui, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', sans-serif (var(--font-family-base)) |
+
+Source: `apps/pwa/src/styles/tokens.css` — pre-populated from existing codebase scan.
+Pattern baseline: `apps/pwa/src/routes/SetupPage.tsx` (full-viewport standalone page),
+`apps/pwa/src/routes/AdminPage.tsx` (admin-surface additions).
+
+---
+
+## Spacing Scale
+
+Uses the existing 4px-based scale. No new tokens.
+
+| Token | Value | Usage in this phase |
+|-------|-------|---------------------|
+| --space-1 | 4px | Icon gaps, label-to-input gap, helper-text margin-top |
+| --space-2 | 8px | Compact element spacing, password show/hide button gap, form field gap within a group |
+| --space-3 | 12px | Input padding (vertical), row gaps |
+| --space-4 | 16px | Between form fields, button horizontal padding, card horizontal padding |
+| --space-6 | 24px | Card padding, section gap, brand slot bottom margin |
+| --space-8 | 32px | Between the brand slot and the login card, between major sections |
+| --space-12 | 48px | Page top/bottom padding (matches SetupPage pattern) |
+
+Exceptions:
+- Login card max-width: 400px (narrower than wizard 540px; a two-field login needs less width).
+- All interactive elements: `minHeight: 44px; minWidth: 44px` (WCAG 2.5.5 Touch Target).
+- Password show/hide toggle: 44px tap target embedded inside the input row (right-side icon button).
+- Brand logo slot: reserved 48px height (aspect-ratio box 1:1); see Brand Slot section.
+
+---
+
+## Typography
+
+All values from `tokens.css`. No new sizes or weights.
+
+| Role | Size | Weight | Line Height | Variable |
+|------|------|--------|-------------|----------|
+| Body | 15px | 400 | 1.5 | var(--text-body-size) / var(--text-body-weight) / var(--text-body-line-height) |
+| Label | 13px | 400 | 1.4 | var(--text-label-size) / var(--text-label-weight) / var(--text-label-line-height) |
+| Heading | 18px | 600 | 1.25 | var(--text-heading-size) / var(--text-heading-weight) / var(--text-heading-line-height) |
+| Display | 24px | 600 | 1.2 | var(--text-display-size) / var(--text-display-weight) / var(--text-display-line-height) |
+
+Usage in this phase:
+- App name "FamilySync" in brand slot: Display (24px/600/1.2) — `var(--color-text-primary)`
+- App tagline "Family calendar & lists" in brand slot: Body (15px/400/1.5) — `var(--color-text-secondary)`
+- Login card heading ("Sign in"): Heading (18px/600/1.25) — `var(--color-text-primary)`
+- Field labels, helper text, divider label ("or"): Label (13px/400/1.4)
+- Field labels use weight 600, helper text uses weight 400
+- Section labels in admin additions ("LOCAL ACCOUNTS", "OIDC LINK"):
+ 13px/600/uppercase/0.06em letter-spacing (AdminPage `sectionLabelStyle` pattern)
+- Error messages: Body (15px/400/1.5) — `var(--color-destructive)`
+- Primary CTA label: Label (13px/600)
+
+---
+
+## Color
+
+All values from `tokens.css`. No new hex values.
+
+| Role | Value | Variable | Usage |
+|------|-------|----------|-------|
+| Dominant (60%) | #ffffff | var(--color-surface) | Page background, card background, input background |
+| Secondary (30%) | #f7f7f8 | var(--color-surface-dim) | Divider area between form methods, info banners, rate-limit notice background |
+| Accent (10%) | #4a90d9 | var(--color-member-0) | Primary CTA button ("Sign in"), spinner, focus ring, "Login with OIDC" button border |
+| Destructive | #dc2626 | var(--color-destructive) | Error message text, error-state input border, lockout notice, rate-limit warning |
+
+Accent reserved for:
+- "Sign in" button (filled background)
+- "Login with OIDC" button (outlined, `1px solid var(--color-member-0)`, accent text)
+- `Loader2` spinner during login submit
+- Focus ring on all inputs and buttons (`var(--color-focus-ring)`, 2px outline, 2px offset)
+- Text links (e.g., "Forgot password? Ask your admin.")
+
+Additional semantic colors (not new — already in tokens.css):
+- `var(--color-border)` #e2e4e9 — card border, input border (default), divider line
+- `var(--color-border-subtle)` #eceef2 — section dividers in admin additions
+- `var(--color-text-primary)` #111318 — headings, field values, app name
+- `var(--color-text-secondary)` #6b7280 — descriptions, helper text, tagline, divider label
+- `var(--color-text-muted)` #9ca3af — placeholder text, inactive admin rows
+- `var(--color-overlay)` rgba(0,0,0,0.32) — modal backdrop for confirmation dialogs
+
+---
+
+## Brand Slot — Phase 17 Readiness
+
+The login screen is the **highest-value branding surface** in the app — full-viewport,
+unauthenticated, the first thing any user sees. A reserved brand slot sits above the login
+card and is designed as a **theming/asset seam**: Phase 19 ships a minimal shippable
+placeholder; Phase 17 drops in real assets without restructuring the layout.
+
+### Brand slot structure (Phase 19 ships this)
+
+```
+[brand-slot]
+ [--brand-logo placeholder] — 48×48px box, aspect-ratio 1/1, reserved intrinsic dimensions
+ Placeholder: a 48px circle, background var(--color-member-0),
+ initials "FS" in white Display (24px/600).
+ No broken image ref. No layout shift when replaced.
+ [--brand-app-name] — "FamilySync" text (Display 24px/600, var(--color-text-primary))
+ Rendered from a CSS custom property / named slot; not hardcoded.
+ [--brand-tagline] — "Family calendar & lists" (Body 15px/400, var(--color-text-secondary))
+```
+
+Layout:
+- Centered column, `textAlign: center`
+- Logo mark: `width: 48px; height: 48px; borderRadius: 50%; margin: 0 auto var(--space-2)`
+- App name: `marginTop: var(--space-2); marginBottom: var(--space-1)`
+- Tagline: `marginBottom: var(--space-8)` (32px gap before the login card)
+
+### Asset seam tokens
+
+Define in `tokens.css` (Phase 19 sets placeholder defaults; Phase 17 overrides):
+
+```css
+:root {
+ /* Phase 17 replaces these values — never the component structure */
+ --brand-logo-bg: var(--color-member-0); /* placeholder circle background */
+ --brand-logo-text: #ffffff; /* placeholder initials color */
+ --brand-logo-size: 48px; /* reserved slot height; keep 1:1 aspect */
+ --brand-logo-border-radius: 50%; /* circle for initials; Phase 17 may change */
+ --brand-app-name: 'FamilySync'; /* not used as CSS content — drives doc only */
+}
+```
+
+The logo slot renders via a React component `` in the login page — not inline JSX.
+This isolates the seam: Phase 17 replaces `` internals (swap placeholder div for
+``) without touching `` layout.
+
+### Phase 17 readiness subsection
+
+**Phase 17 contract — what Phase 17 must honor:**
+
+| Slot | Asset Phase 17 provides | Constraints Phase 17 must respect |
+|------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| Logo mark | SVG or PNG, favicon-derived | Must fit in 48×48px box at 1x; provide 2x/3x for retina. `alt=""` (decorative — app name already in text) |
+| App name text | Same string "FamilySync" or updated display name | Rendered as text, not image — screen readers read it |
+| Tagline | Optional; may be removed | If removed, set `--brand-tagline-display: none` — no layout reflow |
+| Background hero | Optional — if added, must go behind the entire page, not just the brand slot | `var(--brand-bg): none` default; Phase 17 sets to a CSS gradient or subtle image |
+| Aspect-ratio box | Phase 17 MUST keep the 48px height reserve | Prevents layout shift; use `aspect-ratio: 1/1; width: var(--brand-logo-size)` |
+
+Phase 17 asset swap is: update `` internals (image src) + set CSS custom property
+values. No changes to `` layout, spacing, or card structure are permitted by this
+contract.
+
+---
+
+## Surface Architecture
+
+### Surface 1 — Login Page Shell (`/login`)
+
+A standalone full-page route. No AppNav, no BottomTabBar, no SetupBanner, no
+PermissionDeniedBanner at any breakpoint.
+
+- Background: `var(--color-surface)` (#ffffff)
+- Layout: `minHeight: 100dvh; display: flex; flexDirection: column; alignItems: center; justifyContent: flex-start`
+- Content column: `maxWidth: 400px; width: 100%; margin: 0 auto; padding: var(--space-12) var(--space-6)`
+
+Routing gate:
+1. On app load, `GET /api/auth/mode` (pre-auth endpoint — no session required) returns
+ `{ localEnabled: true, oidcEnabled: boolean }`.
+2. If the user already has a valid session (local JWT cookie or OIDC session), they are
+ redirected to `/calendar` before the login page renders.
+3. The `/login` route renders the `` (full-viewport, no shell).
+4. After successful login, navigate to `/` (which redirects to `/calendar`).
+
+### Surface 2 — Brand Slot
+
+Sits at the top of the content column, above the login card. Detailed in "Brand Slot" section.
+Not inside the login card — floats above it in the flow.
+
+### Surface 3 — Login Card
+
+The primary login interaction area.
+
+- Background: `var(--color-surface)` (#ffffff)
+- Border: `1px solid var(--color-border)` (#e2e4e9)
+- Border-radius: 8px
+- Padding: `var(--space-6)` (24px) all sides
+- Box-shadow: `0 1px 4px rgba(0,0,0,0.06)` (matches SetupPage cardStyle)
+- Card heading "Sign in": Heading (18px/600/1.25), `var(--color-text-primary)`,
+ `marginBottom: var(--space-6)` (24px)
+
+### Surface 4 — Username Field
+
+- Label: "Username" — 13px/600, `var(--color-text-primary)`, `marginBottom: var(--space-1)` (4px)
+- Input: `type="text"`, `autoComplete="username"`, `id="login-username"`
+- Style: full-width, `padding: var(--space-3) var(--space-4)`, `border: 1px solid var(--color-border)`,
+ `borderRadius: var(--space-1)`, 15px/400, `var(--color-text-primary)`, `background: var(--color-surface)`
+- Error state border: `1px solid var(--color-destructive)`
+- `aria-describedby="login-error"` when error state is active
+- `spellCheck={false}`, `autoCapitalize="none"`, `autoCorrect="off"`
+
+### Surface 5 — Password Field with Show/Hide Toggle
+
+- Label: "Password" — 13px/600, `var(--color-text-primary)`, `marginBottom: var(--space-1)` (4px)
+- Input wrapper: `position: relative`
+- Input: `type="password"` (toggled to `"text"` by show/hide button), `autoComplete="current-password"`,
+ `id="login-password"`, `paddingRight: 44px` (space for toggle)
+- Error state border: `1px solid var(--color-destructive)`
+- Show/hide toggle button: `position: absolute; right: 0; top: 0; height: 100%; minWidth: 44px;
+ background: none; border: none; cursor: pointer; color: var(--color-text-muted)` —
+ renders lucide `Eye` (show) or `EyeOff` (hide), 16px, `aria-label="Show password"` /
+ `"Hide password"`, `aria-pressed` reflects current state
+- Field container `marginBottom: var(--space-4)` (16px)
+
+### Surface 6 — Form Error / Lockout Banner
+
+Shown below the password field, above the submit button. Uses `role="status"` + `aria-live="polite"`.
+
+**Error states in order of severity:**
+
+1. **Invalid credentials** (incorrect username or password):
+ - Icon: `AlertCircle` (16px, `var(--color-destructive)`) inline
+ - Copy: "Incorrect username or password." — Body (15px/400), `var(--color-destructive)`
+ - Both fields remain editable; no field is specifically blamed (timing-safe: do not indicate
+ which field is wrong)
+ - Input borders: both switch to `var(--color-destructive)`
+
+2. **Rate limit** (too many attempts, not yet locked):
+ - Background: `var(--color-surface-dim)` pill/banner, `border-radius: var(--space-1)`,
+ `padding: var(--space-3) var(--space-4)`
+ - Icon: `AlertCircle` (16px, `var(--color-destructive)`) inline
+ - Copy: "Too many attempts. Please wait a moment and try again." — 13px/400,
+ `var(--color-destructive)`
+ - Submit button: disabled during rate-limit window
+
+3. **Account locked** (persistent lockout — household scale break-glass is CLI only, D-13):
+ - Same banner style as rate-limit
+ - Copy: "This account is temporarily locked. Contact your admin to reset access."
+ - Submit button: disabled
+
+4. **Generic server error** (5xx / network):
+ - Copy: "Something went wrong. Please try again." — Body (15px/400), `var(--color-destructive)`
+ - Submit button: re-enabled after error
+
+### Surface 7 — Primary Submit Button ("Sign in")
+
+- Filled: `background: var(--color-member-0)`, `color: #ffffff`
+- Width: 100% (full-width login button — D-04 low-friction for non-technical user)
+- Label: 13px/600, `fontFamily: var(--font-family-base)`
+- `minHeight: 44px`, `borderRadius: var(--space-1)` (4px), `border: none`
+- `transition: background 0.15s ease`
+- Disabled state: `background: var(--color-border)`, `cursor: default` (during submission or lockout)
+- Loading state: `Loader2` icon (16px, #ffffff, `animation: spin 1s linear infinite`) inline before
+ label text; label changes to "Signing in…"
+- Enabled only when both username and password fields are non-empty
+
+### Surface 8 — Method Divider (OIDC mode only)
+
+Rendered between the local login card and the OIDC button when `oidcEnabled === true` from
+`/api/auth/mode`. Not rendered when OIDC is not configured.
+
+- A horizontal rule with centered label "or":
+ - `display: flex; alignItems: center; gap: var(--space-3); marginTop: var(--space-4); marginBottom: var(--space-4)`
+ - Left/right lines: `flex: 1; height: 1px; background: var(--color-border)`
+ - "or" label: 13px/400, `var(--color-text-secondary)`, `flexShrink: 0`
+
+### Surface 9 — OIDC Login Button (OIDC mode only)
+
+Rendered below the method divider when `oidcEnabled === true`. Not rendered when OIDC is not
+configured. This is NOT inside the login card — it sits below the card, after the divider.
+
+- Outlined style: `background: transparent; border: 1px solid var(--color-member-0); color: var(--color-member-0)`
+- Width: 100% (matches Surface 7 width)
+- Label: "Login with OIDC" — 13px/600 (never says "Authelia" — D-06 BYO-Auth principle)
+- `minHeight: 44px`, `borderRadius: var(--space-1)`, `cursor: pointer`
+- On click: initiates the OIDC authorization-code flow (same as today's redirect)
+- `lucide ShieldCheck` (16px) inline before label text — represents "your SSO provider"
+- No loading state needed (redirect is instant)
+
+### Surface 10 — Forgot Password Helper
+
+Below Surface 7 (sign-in button), inside the login card.
+
+- A single-line text: "Forgot your password? Ask your admin." — 13px/400,
+ `var(--color-text-secondary)`, `textAlign: center; marginTop: var(--space-4)`
+- No link — password reset is admin-only (D-11), no self-service email reset (D-11, email
+ out of project scope). The text is informational only; not interactive.
+- This copy is non-alarming for the non-technical user: frames it as a quick admin action,
+ not a problem.
+
+### Surface 11 — Admin Additions: Local Accounts Section
+
+Extends the existing `/admin` route (AdminPage.tsx), below the "MEMBERS" section and "SHARED
+CALENDAR" section. New section labeled "LOCAL ACCOUNTS" (section-label style: 13px/600/uppercase/
+0.06em letter-spacing, `var(--color-text-muted)`).
+
+**Sub-surface 11A — Create Member / Set Initial Password**
+
+A card/form within the LOCAL ACCOUNTS section:
+
+- Heading (inline, not a card): "Add member" — Body (15px/600/`var(--color-text-primary)`)
+- Fields (same input style as CredentialSheet):
+ - Display name — `type="text"`, label "Display name"
+ - Username — `type="text"`, label "Username", `autoComplete="off"`, `spellCheck={false}`, `autoCapitalize="none"`
+ - Initial password — `type="password"`, label "Initial password", `autoComplete="new-password"`
+ - Confirm password — `type="password"`, label "Confirm password", `autoComplete="new-password"`
+- Field error: inline below the specific field, 13px/400, `var(--color-destructive)`, same style as
+ CredentialSheet validation failure
+- Submit: "Add member" — filled accent button (same style as admin Save Credential button),
+ `minHeight: 44px`, right-aligned in action row. Disabled when any required field is empty or
+ passwords do not match.
+- Success: form clears; member appears in the MEMBERS section above.
+- Error copy variants:
+ - Username already taken: "That username is already in use. Choose a different one."
+ - Passwords do not match: "Passwords do not match."
+ - Weak password (if enforced): "Password is too short. Use at least 8 characters."
+
+**Sub-surface 11B — Admin Password Reset (per-member)**
+
+Accessible from each member row in the MEMBERS section via a new "Reset password" action button
+(alongside existing "Rotate credential"/"Add credential" buttons — shown only for members who have
+a local credential row).
+
+Opens a bottom sheet (mobile) / centered modal (desktop), identical pattern to CredentialSheet
+(role="dialog", aria-modal, Escape closes, focus returns to trigger):
+
+- Heading: "Reset password" — 18px/600
+- Member subtitle: "{DisplayName}" — 15px/400, `var(--color-text-secondary)`
+- Fields:
+ - New password — `type="password"`, `autoComplete="new-password"`, label "New password"
+ - Confirm new password — `type="password"`, `autoComplete="new-password"`, label "Confirm new password"
+- No current-password field — admin reset does not require knowing the old password
+- Action row (right-aligned, gap `var(--space-3)`):
+ - Cancel: ghost button (same ghostBtnStyle as CredentialSheet)
+ - "Reset password": filled accent button, disabled while fields empty or mismatch
+- Success: sheet closes; no toast (the action is silent — admin-only, not user-visible)
+- Error: inline below confirm field in `var(--color-destructive)`, 13px/400
+
+### Surface 12 — Self Password-Change (member self-service)
+
+Accessible from the SettingsSheet (existing Settings bottom sheet the user opens from the avatar
+button). A new "Change password" row in SettingsSheet, shown only when the current user has a
+local credential (`hasLocalCredential: true` from `/api/me`). Tapping opens a bottom sheet
+(same pattern as CredentialSheet):
+
+- Heading: "Change password" — 18px/600
+- Fields:
+ - Current password — `type="password"`, `autoComplete="current-password"`, label "Current password"
+ - New password — `type="password"`, `autoComplete="new-password"`, label "New password"
+ - Confirm new password — `type="password"`, `autoComplete="new-password"`, label "Confirm"
+- Action row:
+ - Cancel: ghost button
+ - "Change password": filled accent, disabled while any field empty or new/confirm mismatch
+- Success: sheet closes; no toast (self-service action is low-stakes confirmation)
+- Error variants:
+ - Wrong current password: "Current password is incorrect."
+ - Passwords do not match: "Passwords do not match."
+ - Generic error: "Something went wrong. Please try again."
+- `aria-describedby` on each field pointing to the specific inline error
+
+### Surface 13 — Link OIDC Identity (per-user action)
+
+Shown in SettingsSheet for the currently authenticated user, only when:
+- The user has a local credential (is a local user, not already OIDC-only)
+- OIDC is enabled (`oidcEnabled === true` from app state)
+
+Entry point: a "Link OIDC identity" row in SettingsSheet, below "Change password" (if shown).
+
+Tapping opens a **confirmation bottom sheet** (not a form — the actual linking happens via OIDC
+redirect, so the sheet just explains consequences):
+
+- Heading: "Link OIDC identity" — 18px/600
+- Body (15px/400, `var(--color-text-secondary)`, `lineHeight: 1.5`):
+ "After linking, you'll sign in with your OIDC provider instead of a username and password.
+ Your local password will be removed."
+- This is informational, not alarming: frame as an upgrade, not a removal.
+- Do NOT use the word "delete" or "remove" in the primary copy.
+- A secondary note in `var(--color-text-muted)` 13px/400:
+ "This can't be undone from the app. Contact your admin if you need to revert."
+- Action row:
+ - "Cancel" ghost button
+ - "Continue with OIDC" filled accent button (D-06: never "Continue with Authelia")
+- On "Continue with OIDC": sheet closes; OIDC authorization-code flow initiates.
+ On callback, backend binds `iss+sub` to the user and deletes the `local_credentials` row (D-12).
+ User is then redirected to `/calendar` as a now-OIDC-only user.
+- If the OIDC `iss+sub` already belongs to another user: the callback returns a 409 error.
+ The PWA shows a generic error page: "This OIDC identity is already linked to another account.
+ Please contact your admin." (not shown in the sheet — occurs post-redirect)
+
+---
+
+## Routing & App-Level Gate
+
+1. On app load, `GET /api/auth/mode` is fetched pre-auth (before OIDC middleware, no session
+ required). Returns: `{ localEnabled: true, oidcEnabled: boolean }`.
+2. If the user has a valid session (any method): skip `/login`, proceed to normal app routes.
+3. If no valid session AND `localEnabled === true`: render `/login` (Surface 1).
+4. If no valid session AND `localEnabled === false` AND `oidcEnabled === true`: initiate OIDC
+ redirect directly (no login page shown — OIDC-only mode, today's behavior).
+5. The `/login` route does NOT render inside the normal App shell — no AppNav, no BottomTabBar.
+
+The existing `AuthSplash` component (spinner + "Signing you in") continues to be shown during
+any auth-state loading before the login page is reached.
+
+The Phase 12 setup gate (`/api/setup/status`) takes priority: if `setupComplete === false`, the
+app redirects to `/setup` before reaching the login gate.
+
+---
+
+## Interaction Contract
+
+### Login form state machine
+
+```
+fields empty → Submit disabled
+username OR password empty → Submit disabled
+both fields non-empty → Submit enabled
+submit tapped → loading state (Loader2 spinner, "Signing in…", submit disabled)
+ success → navigate to /calendar (cookie set by API)
+ 401 invalid credentials → error state (Surface 6, variant 1); fields remain editable; reset loading
+ 429 rate limit → error state (Surface 6, variant 2); submit temporarily disabled
+ 423 locked → error state (Surface 6, variant 3); submit disabled
+ 5xx / network → error state (Surface 6, variant 4); submit re-enabled
+```
+
+### Password show/hide
+
+Toggle button (Surface 5): clicking switches `type` between `"password"` and `"text"`.
+The toggle state resets to hidden (`type="password"`) when the field loses focus.
+`aria-pressed` reflects current show state.
+
+### OIDC button (Surface 9)
+
+Rendered only when `oidcEnabled === true`. Clicking initiates OIDC authorization-code flow
+(same redirect as today). No loading state — the redirect is immediate.
+
+### Focus management
+
+- On page mount, focus moves to the username field (autofocus — login form is the only content)
+- On submit error, focus moves to the heading of Surface 6 (`tabIndex={-1}`, `ref` + `.focus()`)
+- On Enter key in username field: focus moves to password field
+- On Enter key in password field: submit fires (if button not disabled)
+
+### Keyboard-only login
+
+The entire login form is keyboard-navigable. Tab order: username → password → show/hide toggle →
+"Sign in" button → "Login with OIDC" button (if shown). No tab traps outside the OIDC
+confirmation sheet.
+
+---
+
+## Copywriting Contract
+
+### Login Screen (Surface 1–10)
+
+| Element | Copy |
+|---------|------|
+| App name in brand slot | "FamilySync" |
+| App tagline in brand slot | "Family calendar & lists" |
+| Login card heading | "Sign in" |
+| Username field label | "Username" |
+| Password field label | "Password" |
+| Show password toggle aria-label | "Show password" |
+| Hide password toggle aria-label | "Hide password" |
+| Primary CTA | "Sign in" |
+| Primary CTA loading state | "Signing in…" |
+| Forgot password helper | "Forgot your password? Ask your admin." |
+| Method divider label | "or" |
+| OIDC button label | "Login with OIDC" |
+| Error — invalid credentials | "Incorrect username or password." |
+| Error — rate limit | "Too many attempts. Please wait a moment and try again." |
+| Error — account locked | "This account is temporarily locked. Contact your admin to reset access." |
+| Error — server/network | "Something went wrong. Please try again." |
+| Empty state | N/A — login form always has explicit content |
+
+### Admin Additions (Surfaces 11–13)
+
+| Element | Copy |
+|---------|------|
+| Section label | "LOCAL ACCOUNTS" |
+| Add member form heading | "Add member" |
+| Display name field label | "Display name" |
+| Username field label | "Username" |
+| Initial password field label | "Initial password" |
+| Confirm password field label | "Confirm password" |
+| Add member submit button | "Add member" |
+| Error — username taken | "That username is already in use. Choose a different one." |
+| Error — passwords mismatch (create) | "Passwords do not match." |
+| Error — password too short | "Password is too short. Use at least 8 characters." |
+| Admin reset sheet heading | "Reset password" |
+| Admin reset new password label | "New password" |
+| Admin reset confirm label | "Confirm new password" |
+| Admin reset submit button | "Reset password" |
+| SettingsSheet — change password row | "Change password" |
+| Self-change sheet heading | "Change password" |
+| Self-change current password label | "Current password" |
+| Self-change new password label | "New password" |
+| Self-change confirm label | "Confirm" |
+| Self-change submit button | "Change password" |
+| Self-change error — wrong current | "Current password is incorrect." |
+| Self-change error — passwords mismatch | "Passwords do not match." |
+| SettingsSheet — link OIDC row | "Link OIDC identity" |
+| Link OIDC sheet heading | "Link OIDC identity" |
+| Link OIDC sheet body | "After linking, you'll sign in with your OIDC provider instead of a username and password. Your local password will be removed." |
+| Link OIDC secondary note | "This can't be undone from the app. Contact your admin if you need to revert." |
+| Link OIDC cancel button | "Cancel" |
+| Link OIDC confirm button | "Continue with OIDC" |
+| Link OIDC post-redirect error (409) | "This OIDC identity is already linked to another account. Please contact your admin." |
+| Admin member row CTA — reset (local user) | "Reset password" |
+| Generic admin error | "Something went wrong. Please try again." |
+
+### Copywriting rules (D-06 BYO-Auth principle)
+
+- Never use the word "Authelia" in any user-facing copy. Use "your OIDC provider" or
+ "Login with OIDC" everywhere.
+- Never say "delete" or "remove" when describing the OIDC-link consequence — use
+ "your local password will be removed" (passive, factual, non-alarming).
+- Admin copy ("Reset password") is direct — admins are comfortable with technical vocabulary.
+- End-user copy ("Sign in", "Forgot your password? Ask your admin.") is warm and low-friction —
+ optimized for the non-technical Apple household member.
+
+---
+
+## Destructive Actions
+
+| Action | Trigger | Confirmation approach |
+|--------|---------|----------------------|
+| Link OIDC identity (removes local credential for that user) | "Link OIDC identity" in SettingsSheet → "Continue with OIDC" tap | Two-step: open confirmation sheet (step 1, explains consequence) + explicit "Continue with OIDC" tap (step 2). The confirmation sheet clearly states "your local password will be removed." No additional modal/dialog beyond this sheet. |
+| Admin password reset | "Reset password" in admin member row → sheet submit | Two-step: open reset sheet (step 1) + explicit "Reset password" tap with filled-in new password (step 2). No separate confirmation dialog — the act of filling and submitting a new value is the acknowledgement. |
+
+No hard-delete of local accounts in this phase. Account removal is out of scope.
+
+---
+
+## Accessibility Contract
+
+### Login page (Surfaces 1–10)
+- `role="main"` on the content column
+- `
` is the app name "FamilySync" in the brand slot (page-level heading);
+ `