Lint (eslint --max-warnings 0):
- index.ts: disable no-unsafe-argument on the type-only Context mismatch when
delegating to the OIDC handler inside the local-session skip wrapper
- localAuth.ts: handleLogout is sync (no await) — drop async (require-await)
- devBypass.ts: disable detect-possible-timing-attacks on the public well-known
dev-placeholder string compare (not a secret comparison)
- remove dead code / unused bindings flagged by no-unused-vars: makeTestApp
(localSession.test), makeUnauthContext + BrowserContext import (login.spec),
unused memberId (admin.test), unused txSelectCount counter (me.test)
- localAuthMiddleware.test / me.test: fix unused + reflow-detached
eslint-disable directives
Format: prettier --write across the 20 Phase-19 files that were never formatted.
Secret scan (gitleaks): allowlist two false positives — the synthetic >=32-char
TEST_SECRET in localSession.test.ts, and .planning/ design prose (a generic-api-key
regex hit on "credential atomically, 409-equivalent"). Neither is a real secret.
Verified locally: format:check, lint, typecheck, md:lint, gitleaks (no leaks),
PWA 266/266, API 452/452.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
VERIFICATION.md found a cross-layer URL mismatch: fetchAdminResetPassword
POSTed to /api/admin/members/:id/reset-password but the API registers the
route as /api/admin/members/:id/password (admin.ts), so the Admin reset sheet
404'd on every submit. Confirmed live: old path -> 404, correct path -> 400
(route reached). Unit tests missed it because API tests hit the real path
directly and PWA tests mock the fetcher — no test crossed both layers.
Fix the client URL and add a URL-contract regression test that pins the exact
path (asserts fetch is called with /api/admin/members/:id/password).
PWA 266/266 (+1), typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two issues surfaced only when plans 19-04 (login UI) and 19-05 (Option C
bypass + login.spec) were merged together and run against the real stack —
neither executor could catch them in isolation:
1. LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET was added to the CI harness (ci.yml) but not to the
local dev stack (docker-compose.dev.yml). Without it the real-login success
path (POST /api/auth/local/login) 503s when signing the session cookie, so
the e2e round-trip failed. Add the same fixed dev-only value to the dev
compose override (dev-only target; never a production secret).
2. login.spec test 1 assumed clearing the local-session cookie yields a
logged-out state, but under the always-on DEV_AUTH_BYPASS devAuthBypass()
injects DEV_USER into /api/me regardless of any cookie — a logged-out state
is architecturally unreachable in this bypass-only harness. Reframe the test
to drive /login directly (validating the real-browser render of all brand +
form surfaces) and move the unauthenticated root->/login redirect-gate
coverage to a unit test in App.test.tsx where meQuery.isError is controllable.
Result: API 446/446, PWA 265/265 (+2 gate tests), e2e desktop 42 passed / 3
skipped (all login specs green).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lucas Berger
luckberg