diff --git a/apps/api/src/auth/linkOidc.ts b/apps/api/src/auth/linkOidc.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a11f8c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/api/src/auth/linkOidc.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/**
+ * linkOidc.ts — OIDC-link binding helper (AUTH-LOCAL-10, D-12).
+ *
+ * Exports:
+ *   - OidcLinkConflictError: thrown when iss+sub already belongs to a DIFFERENT user.
+ *   - linkOidcToUser(userId, iss, sub): binds oidc_iss+oidc_sub to the user row and
+ *     deletes their local_credentials row in an atomic transaction.
+ *
+ * Security contract (T-19-08):
+ *   - Preflight SELECT checks iss+sub uniqueness BEFORE any write.
+ *   - If a different user already owns iss+sub: throw OidcLinkConflictError; NO write occurs.
+ *   - db.transaction wraps the UPDATE users + DELETE local_credentials so both succeed or
+ *     neither does — no partial state where oidc is bound but local cred survives or vice versa.
+ *   - Identity binding uses iss+sub ONLY — never the user's address field (D-10).
+ *   - The uniq_oidc_identity DB constraint on users is the backstop behind the preflight
+ *     (RESEARCH Pitfall 6 — preflight prevents the race-case before hitting the constraint).
+ *
+ * Called by:
+ *   - apps/api/src/routes/me.ts POST /link-oidc (initiates OIDC flow, state carries userId)
+ *   - apps/api/src/routes/localAuth.ts /callback (19-03) — reads linkUserId from state,
+ *     calls linkOidcToUser after verifying the OIDC token.
+ */
+
+import { and, eq, ne } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { db } from '../db/client.js';
+import { users, localCredentials } from '../db/schema.js';
+
+/**
+ * Thrown by linkOidcToUser when iss+sub already belongs to a DIFFERENT user.
+ *
+ * Callers should translate this to a 409 response or error-redirect to the PWA.
+ * The thrown error deliberately carries no raw iss/sub values to avoid leaking
+ * identity correlation info in error logs (T-19-08).
+ */
+export class OidcLinkConflictError extends Error {
+  readonly name = 'OidcLinkConflictError';
+
+  constructor() {
+    super('OIDC identity already linked to a different account');
+    Object.setPrototypeOf(this, OidcLinkConflictError.prototype);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Bind an OIDC identity (iss+sub) to the given userId and delete that user's
+ * local_credentials row (D-12: OIDC-link replaces local credential).
+ *
+ * Steps:
+ *   1. Preflight SELECT: check if iss+sub belongs to a user with id ≠ userId.
+ *      If so: throw OidcLinkConflictError (NO writes).
+ *   2. db.transaction:
+ *      a. UPDATE users SET oidc_iss=iss, oidc_sub=sub, claimed=true WHERE id=userId
+ *      b. DELETE FROM local_credentials WHERE user_id=userId
+ *         (user becomes OIDC-only; no local credential remains)
+ *
+ * D-10 constraint: binding is strictly iss+sub — no address claim or contact field used.
+ * T-19-08: abort before any write on conflict; uniq_oidc_identity constraint is backstop.
+ *
+ * @throws OidcLinkConflictError if iss+sub is already owned by a DIFFERENT userId.
+ */
+export async function linkOidcToUser(userId: number, iss: string, sub: string): Promise<void> {
+  // Preflight: check if another user already holds this iss+sub (T-19-08 / RESEARCH Pitfall 6)
+  // We SELECT WHERE oidc_iss=iss AND oidc_sub=sub AND id ≠ userId — only a DIFFERENT user is a conflict.
+  // If the same userId already has iss+sub (idempotent re-link): allow the UPDATE to proceed.
+  const [conflicting] = await db
+    .select({ id: users.id })
+    .from(users)
+    .where(and(eq(users.oidcIss, iss), eq(users.oidcSub, sub), ne(users.id, userId)))
+    .limit(1);
+
+  if (conflicting) {
+    // iss+sub belongs to a DIFFERENT user — abort before any write (T-19-08)
+    throw new OidcLinkConflictError();
+  }
+
+  // Atomic: UPDATE users + DELETE local_credentials — both or neither (D-12)
+  await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+    // a. Bind the OIDC identity and mark the user as claimed
+    await tx
+      .update(users)
+      .set({ oidcIss: iss, oidcSub: sub, claimed: true })
+      .where(eq(users.id, userId));
+
+    // b. Delete the local_credentials row — user is now OIDC-only (D-12)
+    //    Silently succeeds even if no local_credentials row exists (DELETE 0 rows is fine)
+    await tx.delete(localCredentials).where(eq(localCredentials.userId, userId));
+  });
+}
diff --git a/apps/api/src/routes/me.ts b/apps/api/src/routes/me.ts
index 5cd2640..6587312 100644
--- a/apps/api/src/routes/me.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/me.ts
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ import type { Context } from 'hono';
 import { zValidator } from '@hono/zod-validator';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { Jwt } from 'hono/utils/jwt';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
 import { getAuth } from '../auth/middleware.js';
 import { upsertUser, deriveDisplayName } from '../auth/user.js';
 import { db } from '../db/client.js';
@@ -274,3 +276,66 @@ meRouter.post(
     }
   },
 );
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// POST /api/me/link-oidc — initiate OIDC identity-link flow (AUTH-LOCAL-10, T-19-09)
+//
+// Purpose: initiates the OIDC authorization-code flow for the currently-authenticated
+// local user. The current userId is encoded in a signed OIDC `state` parameter so that
+// the /callback handler (plan 19-03) can bind the returned iss+sub to this user.
+//
+// Security contract (T-19-09 — OIDC-link CSRF):
+//   - state payload: { linkUserId, nonce } signed with LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET (HS256)
+//   - nonce: 16-byte random hex string per request — prevents state replay
+//   - Only the user encoded in `state.linkUserId` is bound on callback (T-19-09)
+//
+// Returns:
+//   { signedState: string, authorizationUrl: string | null }
+//   signedState: JWT for the OIDC state parameter (plan 19-03 /callback reads this)
+//   authorizationUrl: OIDC authorization endpoint URL with state, or null if OIDC not configured
+//
+// The PWA (Surface 13) redirects the user to authorizationUrl. The actual binding
+// (UPDATE users + DELETE local_credentials) happens in the /callback handler (19-03).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+meRouter.post('/link-oidc', async (c) => {
+  const currentUserId = await resolveUserId(c);
+  if (!currentUserId) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, 401);
+  }
+
+  const secret = process.env.LOCAL_SESSION_SECRET;
+  if (!secret) {
+    return c.json({ error: 'Service unavailable' }, 503);
+  }
+
+  // Produce a signed state token encoding the current userId + a per-request nonce
+  // T-19-09: nonce prevents state replay attacks (each link attempt gets a fresh nonce)
+  const nonce = randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
+  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const signedState = await Jwt.sign(
+    { linkUserId: currentUserId, nonce, iat: now, exp: now + 600 }, // 10-minute window
+    secret,
+    'HS256',
+  );
+
+  // Build the OIDC authorization URL if OIDC is configured (else return null — PWA disables button)
+  const issuer = process.env.OIDC_ISSUER ?? null;
+  const clientId = process.env.OIDC_CLIENT_ID ?? null;
+  const redirectUri = process.env.OIDC_REDIRECT_URI ?? null;
+
+  let authorizationUrl: string | null = null;
+  if (issuer && clientId && redirectUri) {
+    // Construct the authorization URL. plan 19-03 will handle the full PKCE flow;
+    // for now encode the signed state so the callback can read linkUserId.
+    const url = new URL(`${issuer.replace(/\/$/, '')}/api/oidc/authorization`);
+    url.searchParams.set('response_type', 'code');
+    url.searchParams.set('client_id', clientId);
+    url.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', redirectUri);
+    url.searchParams.set('scope', 'openid profile email');
+    url.searchParams.set('state', signedState);
+    authorizationUrl = url.toString();
+  }
+
+  return c.json({ signedState, authorizationUrl }, 200);
+});