docs(16): re-review clean + code review fix report

.planning/phases/16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks/16-REVIEW-FIX.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+phase: 16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks
+fixed_at: 2026-06-13T00:00:00Z
+review_path: .planning/phases/16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks/16-REVIEW.md
+iteration: 1
+findings_in_scope: 9
+fixed: 6
+skipped: 3
+status: partial
+---
+
+# Phase 16: Code Review Fix Report
+
+**Fixed at:** 2026-06-13
+**Source review:** .planning/phases/16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks/16-REVIEW.md
+**Iteration:** 1
+
+**Summary:**
+- Findings in scope: 9 (CR-01; WR-01..WR-05; IN-01..IN-04 — IN-04 carries no fix)
+- Fixed: 6 (CR-01, WR-01, WR-02, WR-03, WR-04, WR-05, plus IN-01)
+- Skipped: 3 (IN-02, IN-03, IN-04 — all optional/no-action)
+
+IN-01 was applied inside the CR-01 commit (same file, `scripts/check-audit.mjs`),
+so it does not get a standalone commit line below but is counted as fixed.
+
+## Validation
+
+All validation run inside the isolated review-fix worktree:
+
+- `pnpm lint` — PASS (apps/api + apps/pwa, `--max-warnings 0`). Note: the project
+  lint scope does not include `scripts/*.mjs`, so the edited `.mjs` scripts are
+  syntax-checked via `node -c` instead (all pass).
+- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (apps/api + apps/pwa `tsc --noEmit`, PWA e2e tsconfig).
+- `node --test scripts/__tests__/check-audit.test.mjs` — 8 pass / 0 fail
+  (includes 3 new expired-waiver / isWaived assertions for CR-01).
+- `python3 -c 'yaml.safe_load(...)'` for `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` and
+  `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml` — both parse OK after edits.
+- Working tree clean after all commits (no stray/uncommitted changes).
+
+The API DB-integration tests (`tests/routes/lists.test.ts`,
+`tests/lib/listAccess.test.ts`, etc.) fail with `ER_ACCESS_DENIED` in this
+environment because no dev MariaDB is reachable. That is pre-existing/environmental
+and unrelated to these fixes; no new test failures were introduced.
+
+## Fixed Issues
+
+### CR-01: Audit-waiver `expires` field is decorative — expired waivers never re-block
+
+**Files modified:** `scripts/check-audit.mjs`, `scripts/__tests__/check-audit.test.mjs`
+**Commit:** 4bb205f
+**Applied fix:** Added an exported `isWaived(adv, allowlist)` predicate. An allowlist
+entry with no `expires`, or a future `expires`, waives the advisory; an entry whose
+`expires` is in the past (`<= Date.now()`) is treated as absent so the High/Critical
+advisory re-blocks. Applied `isWaived` in BOTH `selectBlocking` and
+`partitionAdvisories` (replacing the bare `!allowlist[...]` checks). Added three
+unit tests: expired waiver re-blocks via `selectBlocking`, expired waiver re-blocks
+via `partitionAdvisories`, and a direct `isWaived` truth-table test (future expiry →
+waived, past expiry → not waived, no-expiry → waived, missing → not waived). All 8
+tests pass.
+
+### WR-01: `github.base_ref` interpolated into a shell command (script-injection vector)
+
+**Files modified:** `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`
+**Commit:** 26a6b2e
+**Applied fix:** Bound `github.event.pull_request.base.sha`, `head.sha`, and
+`github.base_ref` through an `env:` block (`PR_BASE_SHA`, `PR_HEAD_SHA`,
+`PR_BASE_REF`) on the "Probe PR base/head SHA" step. The `run:` body now references
+only the already-quoted shell variables — no `${{ ... }}` context interpolation
+inside the script. The merge-base fallback uses `git rev-parse "origin/$PR_BASE_REF"`.
+
+### WR-03: `HEAD_SHA` has no fallback while `BASE_SHA` does — asymmetric defense
+
+**Files modified:** `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`
+**Commit:** 26a6b2e (committed together with WR-01 — same step in the same file)
+**Applied fix:** Added a symmetric head fallback (`if [ -z "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then
+HEAD_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD); fi`) and an `echo "Secret-scan range:
+${BASE_SHA}..${HEAD_SHA}"` line before the gitleaks invocation so the scanned range
+is logged rather than relying on git's `A..` → `A..HEAD` default.
+
+### WR-02: Boot-smoke false-PASS if a regressed image emits ≥20 lines before binding
+
+**Files modified:** `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml`
+**Commit:** 3daa351
+**Applied fix:** Captured `docker run` output into `OUT=$(...)` and read `EXIT=$?`
+from the docker command directly (no `| head -20` in the exit-bearing command), so a
+chatty-but-booting image can no longer SIGPIPE docker to exit 141 and false-PASS.
+`head -20` is now applied only to the printed `echo "$OUT"`. Treat both `0` and `124`
+as FAIL ("did not refuse boot"). Added a positive belt-and-suspenders assertion:
+the output must contain `DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true is set in a production environment`
+(the exact D-08 guard marker from `bootGuards.ts`), so a refusal for an unrelated
+reason cannot masquerade as the guard working.
+
+> Logic note: this change alters the PASS/FAIL decision logic of a security smoke
+> test. The shell logic was reviewed against the guard marker string, but the actual
+> container behavior under the forbidden env is not exercisable in this environment
+> (no docker daemon / built image). Recommend a human confirm the smoke step on a
+> real publish run.
+
+### WR-05: Static `.dockerignore` assertions use unquoted-regex `grep` (false-positive prone)
+
+**Files modified:** `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml`
+**Commit:** 3daa351 (committed together with WR-02 — same file)
+**Applied fix:** Switched the per-pattern assertion to comment-stripped, fixed-string
+matching: `grep -v '^[[:space:]]*#' .dockerignore | grep -qF "$pattern"`. Patterns
+are no longer treated as regexes (`.env` can't match `denv`) and a commented-out
+rule (`# .env was here`) no longer satisfies the check. Failure message updated to
+"missing active rule".
+
+### WR-04: AUDIT-ADVISORY tier in the outdated report is effectively dead code
+
+**Files modified:** `scripts/check-outdated.mjs`
+**Commit:** 3e609b2
+**Applied fix:** Took the SAFE relabel option (no risky full-tree rewrite). Renamed
+the tier from `AUDIT-ADVISORY` to `OUTDATED-WITH-ADVISORY` and documented, in the
+file header, the inline classification comment, and the printed header text, that it
+only matches outdated *direct* deps against advisory `module_name`s (most advisories
+are on transitive deps, so it rarely fires) and that the authoritative advisory gate
+is `check-audit.mjs`. The report still always exits 0 (advisory-only). The
+audit-parse-failure warning message was updated to the new tier name.
+
+## Skipped Issues
+
+### IN-02: `pnpm audit --json` is run twice per CI security job
+
+**File:** `scripts/check-audit.mjs:84`, `scripts/check-outdated.mjs:65`
+**Reason:** Skipped — explicitly optional and out of v1 performance scope per REVIEW.md
+("Out of v1 performance scope and harmless"). The suggested fix (pipe one audit pass
+to both scripts via stdin/arg, or merge the two scripts) is a structural change to
+script interfaces and CI invocation with no correctness benefit; applying it here
+would be speculative scope creep.
+**Original issue:** Both scripts independently spawn `pnpm audit --json`, doubling
+the audit work in the security job.
+
+### IN-03: `outdated-pins.json` reasons are not cross-checked against the audit allowlist
+
+**File:** `scripts/outdated-pins.json` / `scripts/audit-allowlist.json`
+**Reason:** Skipped — explicitly optional ("Documentation-level coupling only").
+Both JSON files are flat maps that the consuming scripts iterate directly:
+`check-outdated.mjs` reads `pins[pkgName]` as a pin reason, and `check-audit.mjs`
+reads `allowlist[github_advisory_id]`. Injecting a meta `__note`/cross-reference key
+risks the consumers misreading it as real data (a `__note` pin would be treated as a
+pin reason if a package were ever named `__note`). The safer choice is to leave the
+data files as pure data rather than add inert-but-fragile meta keys. The suggested
+lint-step variant is net-new tooling, out of scope for a review fix.
+**Original issue:** Two independent suppression lists with no linkage between a
+pinned package and an audit waiver for the same package.
+
+### IN-04: `expand.test.ts` is in scope but unrelated to this CI/security phase
+
+**File:** `apps/api/tests/broker/expand.test.ts`
+**Reason:** Skipped — no action required. REVIEW.md states "**Fix:** None." The
+reviewer found no defects; the file appears in the review set only because it was
+touched/moved and is orthogonal to this phase.
+**Original issue:** Well-constructed test noted for completeness; no defect.
+
+---
+
+_Fixed: 2026-06-13_
+_Fixer: Claude (gsd-code-fixer)_
+_Iteration: 1_

.planning/phases/16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks/16-REVIEW.md

@@ -2,246 +2,117 @@
 phase: 16-ci-dependency-audit-and-security-checks
 reviewed: 2026-06-13T00:00:00Z
 depth: standard
-files_reviewed: 17
+files_reviewed: 5
 files_reviewed_list:
-  - .dockerignore
   - .gitea/workflows/ci.yml
   - .gitea/workflows/publish.yml
-  - .gitleaks.toml
-  - apps/api/Dockerfile
-  - apps/api/src/index.ts
-  - apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts
-  - apps/api/tests/broker/expand.test.ts
-  - apps/api/tests/lib/bootGuards.test.ts
-  - eslint.config.js
-  - package.json
-  - scripts/__tests__/check-audit.test.mjs
-  - scripts/audit-allowlist.json
   - scripts/check-audit.mjs
   - scripts/check-outdated.mjs
-  - scripts/gitleaks-baseline.json
+  - scripts/__tests__/check-audit.test.mjs
-  - scripts/outdated-pins.json
 findings:
-  critical: 1
+  critical: 0
-  warning: 5
+  warning: 0
-  info: 4
+  info: 1
-  total: 10
+  total: 1
-status: issues_found
+status: clean
 ---
 
 # Phase 16: Code Review Report
 
 **Reviewed:** 2026-06-13
 **Depth:** standard
-**Files Reviewed:** 17
+**Files Reviewed:** 5
-**Status:** issues_found
+**Status:** clean
 
 ## Summary
 
-CI / dependency-audit / security-hardening phase. The boot-guard logic
+Iteration-2 re-review of the fixer's changes to the 5 in-scope files. Every prior
-(`bootGuards.ts`) is correct and correctly ordered as the first statement inside
+finding that targeted these files (CR-01, WR-01, WR-02, WR-03, WR-04, WR-05,
-`isMainModule()` in `index.ts`. The audit wrapper (`check-audit.mjs`) parses the
+IN-01) is genuinely resolved, and the fixes introduced no Critical/Warning
-real `pnpm audit --json` shape correctly, keys the allowlist on
+regression. The previously-accepted skipped INFO items (IN-02, IN-03, IN-04) are
-`github_advisory_id` (verified against live audit output: the High advisory
+not re-litigated.
-`GHSA-gv7w-rqvm-qjhr` is present and is waived, so the gate currently passes),
-and fails closed (exit 2) on parse errors. The publish boot-smoke `set +e` +
-`pipefail` interaction was verified to propagate the container exit code through
-the `| head -20` pipe correctly.
 
-Findings concentrate in three areas: (1) the audit allowlist's `expires` field
+Verification performed:
-is **never enforced** — an expired security waiver silently keeps suppressing
+- `node --test scripts/__tests__/check-audit.test.mjs` → 8 pass / 0 fail
-High/Critical advisories forever (BLOCKER); (2) Gitea Actions context expressions
+  (includes the 3 new expired-waiver / `isWaived` truth-table assertions).
-(notably `github.base_ref`) are interpolated directly into shell script bodies,
+- Both workflow files parse under `yaml.safe_load`.
-the canonical script-injection anti-pattern that `publish.yml` itself avoids for
+- `node -c` syntax-clean on both `.mjs` scripts.
-secrets but `ci.yml` does not for context values; (3) several robustness gaps in
+- Guard marker string asserted by the boot-smoke
-the boot-smoke and the outdated cross-check tier.
+  (`DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true is set in a production environment`) confirmed to match
+  the literal in `apps/api/src/lib/bootGuards.ts:29`.
 
 I was not given a `<structural_findings>` block, so there is no fallow substrate
 section.
 
-## Critical Issues
+### Prior-finding verification
 
-### CR-01: Audit-waiver `expires` field is decorative — expired waivers never re-block
+- **CR-01 (resolved).** `isWaived(adv, allowlist)` (`scripts/check-audit.mjs:37-43`)
+  returns false for a missing entry and for a past/equal `expires`
+  (`Date.parse(w.expires) <= Date.now()`), true for future/no `expires`. Wired into
+  BOTH `selectBlocking` (line 55) and `partitionAdvisories` (line 72). Tests
+  exercise expired-waiver re-block via both functions plus a direct `isWaived`
+  truth-table. The time-boxed waiver is now actually time-boxed.
+- **IN-01 (resolved).** `isMainModule()` (`scripts/check-audit.mjs:86-93`) now
+  compares `realpathSync(process.argv[1])` to the resolved `__filename`, mirroring
+  `index.ts`. A symlinked/non-canonical entrypoint no longer silently skips the gate.
+- **WR-01 (resolved).** `github.event.pull_request.base.sha`, `head.sha`, and
+  `github.base_ref` are bound through `env:` (`ci.yml:365-368`) and referenced only
+  as already-quoted shell variables (`$PR_BASE_SHA`, `$PR_HEAD_SHA`, `$PR_BASE_REF`).
+  No `${{ ... }}` context value is interpolated into the rendered `run:` body. The
+  merge-base fallback uses `git rev-parse "origin/$PR_BASE_REF"` (quoted). The
+  script-injection vector is closed.
+- **WR-03 (resolved).** Symmetric head fallback added (`ci.yml:382-386`):
+  `if [ -z "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then HEAD_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD); fi`, plus an explicit
+  `echo "Secret-scan range: ${BASE_SHA}..${HEAD_SHA}"` (line 387). The gitleaks step
+  consumes both via `$GITHUB_ENV` under `set -u`, so a missing range fails loudly
+  rather than scanning a silently-wrong range.
+- **WR-02 (resolved).** Boot-smoke now captures `OUT=$(timeout 15 docker run ...)`
+  and `EXIT=$?` directly (`publish.yml:132-137`), with `head -20` applied only to the
+  display `echo` (line 139). A chatty-but-booting regressed image can no longer
+  SIGPIPE docker to exit 141 and false-PASS. 0/124 → FAIL, and a positive
+  belt-and-suspenders grep requires the exact D-08 guard marker (line 147).
+- **WR-04 (resolved, relabel option).** The tier is relabeled `OUTDATED-WITH-ADVISORY`
+  with an honest sub-line and header doc (`check-outdated.mjs:4-11, 144-145`)
+  stating it only cross-checks outdated *direct* deps against advisory
+  `module_name`s, rarely fires, and that `check-audit.mjs` is the authoritative gate.
+  The misleading implied check is gone.
+- **WR-05 (resolved).** Per-pattern `.dockerignore` assertion now strips comment
+  lines and fixed-string matches (`publish.yml:103-109`):
+  `grep -v '^[[:space:]]*#' .dockerignore | grep -qF "$pattern"`. `.env` no longer
+  regex-matches `denv`, and a commented-out rule no longer satisfies the check.
 
-**File:** `scripts/check-audit.mjs:32-38, 48-61` (and `scripts/audit-allowlist.json:5`)
+### Regression check on the fixes
-**Issue:** `selectBlocking` and `partitionAdvisories` waive an advisory using only
-`!allowlist[adv.github_advisory_id]`. The `expires` date stored in the allowlist
-(`"expires": "2026-09-01"`) is never read. After the expiry date the High/Critical
-advisory `GHSA-gv7w-rqvm-qjhr` (esbuild) will continue to be suppressed indefinitely,
-silently defeating the entire point of a time-boxed security waiver. The gate's
-security guarantee degrades to "any GHSA ever added to the allowlist is permanently
-ignored." The unit tests (`check-audit.test.mjs`) reinforce the gap — none of them
-exercise an expired waiver.
-**Fix:** Treat an expired waiver as absent. Evaluate expiry inside the predicate:
-```js
-function isWaived(adv, allowlist) {
-  const w = allowlist[adv.github_advisory_id];
-  if (!w) return false;
-  // No expiry or future expiry → waived; past expiry → NOT waived (re-blocks).
-  if (w.expires && Date.parse(w.expires) <= Date.now()) return false;
-  return true;
-}
 
-export function selectBlocking(advisories, allowlist) {
+- `ci.yml` env-binding: with `set -u`, an empty `PR_BASE_REF` + empty `base.sha`
-  return Object.values(advisories).filter(
+  makes `git rev-parse "origin/"` fail and the step fails closed — acceptable.
-    (adv) => BLOCKING_SEVERITIES.has(adv.severity) && !isWaived(adv, allowlist),
+- `publish.yml` boot-smoke: the only residual edge is that under `pipefail` a very
-  );
+  large `OUT` could SIGPIPE the display `echo "$OUT" | head -20` and fail the step.
-}
+  That direction is fail-safe (blocks a good image, never false-PASSes a bad one)
-```
+  and strictly more conservative than the original bug — not a defect.
-Apply the same `isWaived` check in `partitionAdvisories`, and add a unit test for
+- `check-audit.mjs` `isWaived`: logic-traced for missing / past / equal / future /
-an expired-waiver fixture asserting it is blocking.
+  absent-expires cases — all correct. One latent gap noted as IN-01 below.
-
+- `check-outdated.mjs` relabel: classification logic unchanged; only strings moved.
-## Warnings
-
-### WR-01: `github.base_ref` interpolated into a shell command (script-injection vector)
-
-**File:** `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:369` (also `base.sha`/`head.sha` at lines 363-366)
-**Issue:** `BASE_SHA=$(git merge-base "$(git rev-parse origin/${{ github.base_ref }})" HEAD)`
-splices the attacker-influenceable PR target branch name directly into the rendered
-shell body. This is the exact script-injection anti-pattern `publish.yml:64-75`
-deliberately avoids for `REGISTRY_PAT` ("Bind the secret through env: so it is never
-substituted into the rendered script body"). `base.sha`/`head.sha` are Git-validated
-SHAs (low risk), but `base_ref` is a branch name and Gitea permits a broad charset.
-A target branch name containing shell metacharacters would execute in the runner.
-**Fix:** Bind context values through `env:` and reference them as already-quoted
-shell variables, never inline `${{ ... }}` in `run:`:
-```yaml
-      - name: Probe PR base/head SHA
-        env:
-          PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
-          PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
-          PR_BASE_REF: ${{ github.base_ref }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          BASE_SHA="$PR_BASE_SHA"
-          HEAD_SHA="$PR_HEAD_SHA"
-          if [ -z "$BASE_SHA" ]; then
-            BASE_SHA=$(git merge-base "$(git rev-parse "origin/$PR_BASE_REF")" HEAD)
-          fi
-          { echo "BASE_SHA=$BASE_SHA"; echo "HEAD_SHA=$HEAD_SHA"; } >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-```
-
-### WR-02: Boot-smoke false-PASS if a regressed image emits ≥20 lines before binding
-
-**File:** `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml:125-140`
-**Issue:** `timeout 15 docker run ... 2>&1 | head -20` followed by `EXIT=$?`. The exit
-semantics handle 0 (FAIL), 124 (FAIL) and "other non-zero" (PASS). But if the guard
-regresses and the image boots **and is chatty** (web-push VAPID-unset warning,
-worker startup logs, "FamilySync API running…"), it can emit 20 lines fast; `head`
-then closes the pipe and SIGPIPEs `docker`, making the pipeline exit `141`
-(128+SIGPIPE). `141` is neither 0 nor 124, so the broken-guard image is reported as
-PASS. The smoke test's stated contract is "a container that BOOTS under the forbidden
-env must FAIL" — this hole lets a chatty boot slip through.
-**Fix:** Capture docker's exit code directly rather than the pipeline's, and treat
-"started" as anything that did not exit before the timeout. For example, drop the
-`| head` from the exit-bearing command and tee logs separately, or invert the test
-to a positive assertion:
-```bash
-          set +e
-          OUT=$(timeout 15 docker run --rm \
-            --env NODE_ENV=production --env DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true "$IMAGE" 2>&1)
-          EXIT=$?
-          set -e
-          echo "$OUT" | head -20
-          # 124 (timeout) or 0 (clean start) both mean the guard did NOT refuse boot.
-          if [ "$EXIT" -eq 0 ] || [ "$EXIT" -eq 124 ]; then
-            echo "FAIL: image did not refuse dev-bypass in production (exit $EXIT)"; exit 1
-          fi
-          # Belt-and-suspenders: require the FATAL marker in the output.
-          echo "$OUT" | grep -q "DEV_AUTH_BYPASS=true is set in a production environment" \
-            || { echo "FAIL: refused boot but not via the expected guard (exit $EXIT)"; exit 1; }
-```
-
-### WR-03: `HEAD_SHA` has no fallback while `BASE_SHA` does — asymmetric defense
-
-**File:** `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml:365-373`
-**Issue:** The step adds a `merge-base` fallback when `base.sha` is empty (Gitea version
-parity), but applies no equivalent guard when `head.sha` is empty. If `head.sha` is
-empty on a given Gitea version, the gitleaks range `--no-merges ${BASE_SHA}..` is
-emitted (line 390). `A..` happens to default to `A..HEAD` in git, so the scan still
-runs — but only by luck of git's range parsing, not by design, and the failure is
-silent (no log of which range was scanned). Given this job is the secret-scan gate,
-a silently-wrong range is a real risk.
-**Fix:** Mirror the base fallback: `if [ -z "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then HEAD_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD); fi`,
-and echo the final `${BASE_SHA}..${HEAD_SHA}` range before invoking gitleaks.
-
-### WR-04: AUDIT-ADVISORY tier in the outdated report is effectively dead code
-
-**File:** `scripts/check-outdated.mjs:62-76, 105, 116-117`
-**Issue:** `vulnerableModules` is built from `pnpm audit` `module_name` values (which
-are mostly **transitive** packages — verified live: the only advisories are on
-`esbuild`, a transitive dep). `outdatedData` keys come from `pnpm outdated`, which
-lists only **direct/top-level** dependencies (verified live: `hono`, `@types/react`,
-`eslint`, …). The two sets almost never intersect, so the `hasAdvisory` branch — the
-report's highest-priority tier — will essentially never fire. The report claims to
-surface "packages with active advisories on the pinned version" but cannot, because
-the advisory subject (esbuild) never appears in the outdated list. This is advisory-
-only (never gates), hence WARNING not BLOCKER, but the tier is misleading.
-**Fix:** Either cross-check against the full installed dependency tree (e.g. walk
-`pnpm list -r --json` and match transitive advisory `module_name`s), or relabel/remove
-the tier so the report does not imply a check it does not perform.
-
-### WR-05: Static `.dockerignore` assertions use unquoted-regex `grep` (false-positive prone)
-
-**File:** `.gitea/workflows/publish.yml:100-105`
-**Issue:** `grep -q "$pattern"` treats each pattern as a regex, so `.env` matches
-`denv`, `.git` matches `xgit`, `.planning` matches `Xplanning`, etc. More importantly
-the assertion only checks that the *substring* appears **anywhere** in `.dockerignore`,
-not that it is an effective ignore rule. A commented-out line (`# .env was here`) would
-satisfy the check while ignoring nothing — the hygiene gate would pass on a regressed
-ignore file. The gate's purpose is to prevent secrets/tests leaking into the image;
-a string-presence check is weaker than that promise.
-**Fix:** Use fixed-string, anchored matching and ignore comment lines:
-```bash
-          for pattern in ".env" "node_modules" "apps/api/scripts" ".git" \
-                         ".planning" "apps/api/tests" "apps/pwa/e2e"; do
-            if ! grep -v '^[[:space:]]*#' .dockerignore | grep -qF "$pattern"; then
-              echo "FAIL: .dockerignore missing active rule: $pattern"; exit 1
-            fi
-          done
-```
 
 ## Info
 
-### IN-01: `check-audit.mjs` `isMain` uses raw string compare vs `index.ts`'s `realpathSync`
+### IN-01: Unparseable `expires` in the audit allowlist waives indefinitely
 
-**File:** `scripts/check-audit.mjs:64-65`
+**File:** `scripts/check-audit.mjs:41`
-**Issue:** `process.argv[1] === __filename` is a plain string comparison.
+**Issue:** `isWaived` guards expiry with `if (w.expires && Date.parse(w.expires) <= Date.now())`.
-`index.ts:101-109` deliberately uses `realpathSync(process.argv[1])` for symlink/relative
+If `expires` is a non-empty but unparseable string (e.g. `"soon"`, `"2026-13-40"`),
-robustness and documents why (WR-05 in that file). Invoking the script via a symlink or
+`Date.parse` returns `NaN`, `NaN <= Date.now()` is `false`, and the entry waives the
-a non-canonical path (`./scripts/check-audit.mjs`) would silently skip the main body and
+advisory indefinitely — the same failure mode CR-01 fixed, reachable via a typo in
-exit 0 — a security gate that no-ops without error. CI invokes `node scripts/check-audit.mjs`
+committed allowlist data. Low severity: the allowlist is reviewed, committed,
-from repo root, which works today, so this is latent.
+non-attacker data, and CR-01's primary case (a real past date) is handled. Flagged
-**Fix:** Mirror the `index.ts` pattern: compare `realpathSync(process.argv[1])` to
+for completeness only; not a regression introduced by the fix.
-`__filename`, or use `import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1]).href` with realpath.
+**Fix:** Treat an unparseable `expires` as expired (fail-closed):
-
+```js
-### IN-02: `pnpm audit --json` is run twice per CI security job
+if (w.expires) {
-
+  const t = Date.parse(w.expires);
-**File:** `scripts/check-audit.mjs:84` and `scripts/check-outdated.mjs:65`
+  if (Number.isNaN(t) || t <= Date.now()) return false;
-**Issue:** Both scripts independently spawn `pnpm audit --json`. The security job runs
+}
-them back-to-back, doubling the audit work. Out of v1 performance scope and harmless,
+return true;
-but a shared cache or a single audit pass piped to both would be cleaner.
+```
-**Fix:** Optional — have `check-outdated.mjs` accept the audit JSON via stdin/arg, or
-merge the two into one script with two report sections.
-
-### IN-03: `outdated-pins.json` reasons are not cross-checked against the audit allowlist
-
-**File:** `scripts/outdated-pins.json` / `scripts/audit-allowlist.json`
-**Issue:** Two independent suppression lists (pin reasons keyed by package name; audit
-waivers keyed by GHSA). Nothing keeps them consistent, and neither references the other.
-A pinned package (e.g. `eslint`) that later acquires a High advisory would be waived in
-one place and pinned in another with no linkage. Documentation-level coupling only.
-**Fix:** Optional — add a note in each file referencing the other, or a lint step that
-flags a pinned package carrying an unwaived blocking advisory.
-
-### IN-04: `expand.test.ts` is in scope but unrelated to this CI/security phase
-
-**File:** `apps/api/tests/broker/expand.test.ts`
-**Issue:** This is a substantive, well-constructed test (DST wall-clock, EXDATE, DURATION,
-COUNT, Temporal round-trip). No defects found. It appears in the review set only because
-it was touched/moved; it is orthogonal to the CI/dependency/security changes. Noted for
-completeness — no action required.
-**Fix:** None.
 
 ---