docs(phase-18): add security threat verification (SECURED, 0 open)
gsd-security-auditor verified all 13 plan-time STRIDE threats against the implementation: 8 mitigate confirmed in code (file:line evidence), 5 accept documented, 4 supply-chain checks (zero new deps). threats_open: 0. ASVS L1, block_on high — no high-severity gaps. Post-review fixes (WR-01 blank-TZ guard, WR-02 INSERT IGNORE) verified in code; D-07 boundary confirmed via git diff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Lucas Berger
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Claude Opus 4.8
Claude Opus 4.8
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phase: 18-auto-timezone-detection-and-ability-to-change-timezone
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audited: 2026-06-15
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status: secured
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asvs_level: 1
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block_on: high
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register_authored_at_plan_time: true
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threats_total: 13
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threats_closed: 13
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threats_open: 0
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threats_accepted: 4
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supply_chain_checks: 4
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---
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# Phase 18 — Auto Timezone Detection & Change Timezone: Security Audit
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**Audited:** 2026-06-15
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**ASVS Level:** 1
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**block_on:** high
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**Compared against:** origin/main..HEAD
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**Status:** SECURED — 13/13 threats closed (8 mitigate verified, 5 accept documented), 4× T-18-SC supply-chain verified
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This audit verifies each declared threat mitigation EXISTS in the implemented code. It does not scan for new vulnerabilities. Implementation files were not modified.
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## Threat Verification
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| Threat ID | Category | Disposition | Status | Evidence |
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|-----------|----------|-------------|--------|----------|
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| T-18-01 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `householdTimezone.ts:25-35` reads only; never returns an unvalidated forwarded write. `resolveHouseholdTimezone` (`:49-61`) guarantees non-empty fallback (trim guard). All writes go through Plan 02 IANA-validated path. |
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| T-18-02 | DoS | accept | CLOSED | Accepted risk logged below. Single PK lookup per scheduler tick (`reminderScheduler.ts:250`). |
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| T-18-03 | Elevation of Privilege | mitigate | CLOSED | `admin.ts:42` `adminRouter.use('*', requireAdmin)` is the FIRST router statement, before all routes. GET (`:200`), PUT (`:224`), POST seed (`:251`) all appended after it → inherit the guard. 403 tests exist (`admin.test.ts:603-625, 711-720`). |
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| T-18-04 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | `admin.ts:56-62` `timezoneSchema` uses `.refine(isValidIanaTimezone)`; PUT (`:224`) and seed (`:251`) both bind it via `zValidator('json', timezoneSchema)`. `isValidIanaTimezone` (`householdTimezone.ts:70-77`) is eval-free try/catch on `Intl.DateTimeFormat`. Invalid → 400 before any DB write. |
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| T-18-05 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Seed (`admin.ts:262-266`) uses `INSERT IGNORE`; an existing row is silently ignored (value preserved, D-03 no-overwrite). `seeded` derived from `affectedRows === 1`. Cannot overwrite an existing value. |
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| T-18-06 | Information Disclosure | accept | CLOSED | Accepted risk logged below. Grep confirms no `console.log` of request bodies in `admin.ts` (only a T-10-10 comment reference). Timezone is non-sensitive. |
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| T-18-07 | Injection | mitigate | CLOSED | PUT upsert (`admin.ts:227-230`) uses Drizzle `.insert().onDuplicateKeyUpdate` — parameterized, key is hard-coded literal `'household_timezone'`. Seed (`:262-263`) uses a `sql` template where `INSERT IGNORE` is a literal keyword, column identifiers via `sql.identifier`, and `${timezone}` is a bound parameter (not string-concatenated) and IANA-validated upstream. |
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| T-18-08 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Broker sites consume `getHouseholdTimezone(db)` only (`reminderScheduler.ts:250`, `outboxWorker.ts:391`). `resolveHouseholdTimezone` (`householdTimezone.ts:49-61`) trims stored value and `process.env.TZ`; empty/blank falls through to a valid Intl zone — fallback can never return `''`/invalid. |
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| T-18-09 | Tampering (regression) | mitigate | CLOSED | `git diff --name-only origin/main..HEAD` excludes `eventDateTime.ts` and `hydrateEvents.ts` (D-07 boundary intact). No timed-write/display path touched. |
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| T-18-10 | DoS | accept | CLOSED | Accepted risk logged below. Per-drain-cycle memoization (`outboxWorker.ts:385-395`, created `:774`) shares one app_config read across both all-day branches (`:527`, `:634`). |
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| T-18-11 | Elevation of Privilege | accept | CLOSED | Accepted risk logged below. Client gate is UX-only; server `requireAdmin` (`admin.ts:42`) is the real control. Client (`client.ts:498`) documents server enforcement. |
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| T-18-12 | Tampering | mitigate | CLOSED | Client `setAdminTimezone` (`client.ts:501-511`) sends raw input to server; server `timezoneSchema.refine` (`admin.ts:56-62`) is authoritative (400 on invalid). Free-text input (`AdminPage.tsx:387-406`) is not the security boundary. |
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| T-18-13 | Information Disclosure | mitigate | CLOSED | Timezone rendered as plain-text JSX (`AdminPage.tsx:431` `Use detected: {detectedTz}`) and as controlled input `value={effectiveTimezoneInput}` (`:390`). Grep confirms NO `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in AdminPage.tsx. |
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| T-18-SC (×4, plans 01-04) | Supply chain | mitigate | CLOSED | `git diff origin/main..HEAD` against all `package.json` / `pnpm-lock.yaml` returns EMPTY — zero new dependencies. PWA picker uses built-in `Intl`. |
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## Accepted Risks Log
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- **T-18-02 (DoS — DB read per scheduler tick):** Single primary-key lookup on `app_config` per 60s scheduler interval. Negligible load; read-per-run chosen so timezone changes propagate within one tick without a worker restart. Accepted.
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- **T-18-06 (Information Disclosure — log/echo of submitted timezone):** Timezone identifiers are non-sensitive (not credentials or PII). No `noEchoHook` required; verified no body logging in handlers. Accepted.
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- **T-18-10 (DoS — extra DB read at 3 call sites):** Mitigated in practice by per-drain-cycle memoization; PK lookups on a 60s interval are negligible. Accepted.
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- **T-18-11 (Elevation of Privilege — client renders admin UI from isAdmin flag):** The client `isAdmin` gate is a UX convenience only. A forged request still hits server-side `requireAdmin` → 403 (T-18-03). The UI gate is not relied upon as a security control. Accepted.
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## Unregistered Flags
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None. All four plan SUMMARY `## Threat Flags` sections declare "No new threat surface beyond the plan's threat model." No new endpoints, auth paths, file-access patterns, or schema changes appeared during implementation that lack a mapped threat ID.
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## Notes
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- Post-review fixes (18-REVIEW-FIX.md: WR-01, WR-02, IN-01/02/03) were verified in code, not accepted on documentation alone:
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- WR-01 empty/blank TZ guard present at `householdTimezone.ts:50-58` (relevant to T-18-08).
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- WR-02 `INSERT IGNORE` + affectedRows-derived `seeded` present at `admin.ts:262-266` (relevant to T-18-05).
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- D-07 boundary independently confirmed via `git diff --name-only`.
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- Zero-dependency claim independently confirmed via empty manifest/lockfile diff.
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## Security Audit 2026-06-15
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| Metric | Count |
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|--------|-------|
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| Threats found | 13 |
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| Closed | 13 |
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| Open | 0 |
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| Accepted risks | 4 |
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| Supply-chain checks | 4 |
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