diff --git a/apps/api/src/index.ts b/apps/api/src/index.ts
index 6616545..2f198a8 100644
--- a/apps/api/src/index.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/index.ts
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {
 } from './auth/middleware.js';
 import { devAuthBypass, devSessionCookieMiddleware } from './auth/devBypass.js';
 import { localAuthMiddleware } from './auth/localAuthMiddleware.js';
+import { verifyLocalSessionCookie } from './auth/localSession.js';
 import { persistSessionCookie } from './auth/persistSessionCookie.js';
 import { startBrokerPoller } from './broker/poller.js';
 import { startOutboxWorker, initOutboxTrigger } from './broker/outboxWorker.js';
@@ -79,10 +80,32 @@ app.get('/callback', async (c) => {
   // Link mode: after session is established, bind the OIDC identity to the local user.
   if (linkUserId !== null) {
     try {
+      // BL-03: cross-check that the local session completing this callback is the SAME
+      // user the link flow was initiated for. The signed `state` JWT proves the state was
+      // minted by POST /api/me/link-oidc, but NOT that the person finishing the OIDC login
+      // is that user. Without this check, an attacker who gets a victim to complete an OIDC
+      // login while replaying a still-valid (10-min) captured link state would bind the
+      // ATTACKER's OIDC identity onto the VICTIM's account (account takeover). Require the
+      // initiating local session to still be present and to match linkUserId.
+      const sessionUserId = await verifyLocalSessionCookie(c);
+      if (sessionUserId !== linkUserId) {
+        console.warn(
+          '[callback] OIDC-link rejected: local session does not match link state (possible replay).',
+        );
+        return c.redirect('/?error=oidc-link-conflict');
+      }
+
       const auth = await getAuth(c);
       if (auth) {
         const iss = (auth.iss as string | undefined) ?? '';
         const sub = auth.sub ?? '';
+        // BL-03: never bind on a blank/partial identity. linkOidcToUser writes oidc_iss/
+        // oidc_sub AND deletes the user's local_credentials — binding empty iss/sub would
+        // both corrupt identity and lock the user out of BOTH auth methods. Reject instead.
+        if (!iss || !sub) {
+          console.warn('[callback] OIDC-link rejected: empty iss/sub from getAuth.');
+          return c.redirect('/?error=oidc-link-conflict');
+        }
         await linkOidcToUser(linkUserId, iss, sub);
         // On success: user is now OIDC-only; normal redirect via callbackResponse proceeds.
       }